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INTRODUCTION

Among the most striking and, at the same time, least well-explained characteristics of American bankruptcy law is the intensity
of that law's focus on providing relief to the bankrupt debtor. One
firmly established tenet of time-worn bankruptcy lore holds, of
course, that the bankruptcy system serves two functions: the protection and payment of creditors; and the provision of shelter and
a "fresh start" to overburdened debtors.1 That description is accurate, however, only when applied to the system as a whole. As a
practical matter, the great majority of consumer bankruptcy proceedings produce little or nothing in the way of payments to creditors.2 In those bankruptcies, relief of the debtor by means of the
1. See, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-46, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974)
(quoting Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913)); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605,
617 (1918); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1101
(1833).
2. Prior to the 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"), infra note 6, "noasset" and "nominal-asset" cases (that is, respectively, those in which the debtor had no
nonexempt property and those in which any non-exempt property was consumed entirely in
administrative expenses) consistently made up about 85% of all filings in "straight" bankruptcy (that is, asset liquidation under what would now be Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code). See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 20-21 (1971).
While a larger percentage of cases under former Chapter 13 (wage earner plans) resulted in
significant payments to creditors, see Boren & Ralston, Chapter XIII Wage EarnerPlans:
An Analysis of Their Effectiveness, 15 AM. Bus. L.J. 293, 304 (1978) (53.8% of Chapter 13
plans successfully completed, with successful plans paying an average 96.5% of all claims),
those cases constituted a relatively small percentage of total filings, as discussed infra note
80. The available data on returns to creditors under the Code suggest that the situation has
not materially improved. Thus, while Chapter 13 cases have increased as a proportion of
total nonbusiness filings, the rate of successful completion appears to have dramatically declined. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Future Earnings):Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1981)
[hereinafter Future Earnings Hearings] (29.6% of Chapter 13 plans successfully completed,
paying on average 92.6% of total claims). Likewise, the proportion of no-asset cases in
Chapter 7 appears to be higher than prior to enactment of the Code. See U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENT-
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bankruptcy discharge and its ancillary protections is not merely an
objective of the system; it is, rather, the principal (if not the sole)
point of the exercise.
The central importance of debtor relief in consumer bankruptcies is a commonplace of legal discussion. Legislative decisions to
adopt or modify specific debtor-protection devices are inevitably
attacked or defended as impeding or aiding the debtor's "fresh
start." 3 Likewise, judicial efforts to define the scope and effect of
those protections once enacted are recurringly framed with reference to the bankruptcy system's "fresh start" objectives.4 Yet, as is
the case with many widely employed truisms, common acceptance
of the phrase tends to obscure the elusiveness of its content. Indeed, as used most frequently in judicial and legislative analysis,
the "debtor's fresh start" is simply a synonym for the existing set
of debtor-protection devices, and the "fresh start policy" merely a
shorthand label for a host of ill-defined, usually unstated, and perhaps unconscious assumptions about the purposes and effect of
employing those devices to alter the relations between debtor and
5
creditor.
The "fresh start" policy's lack of a coherently articulated content has proven particularly troublesome in the years since the
1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code6 (the "Code") and of the
ATIVES, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978-A BEFORE AND AFTER LOOK 56-57 (1983) [hereinafter GAO STUDY] (estimate that 97% of nonbusiness Chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases).

3. See, e.g., Ayers, Reforming the Reform Act: Should the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 Be Amended to Limit the Availability of Discharges to Consumers?, 17 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 719 (1982); Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-And a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809 (1983); Note, Toward
a Reform of the Six-Year Bar to Dischargein Bankruptcy, 97 HARV. L. REv. 759 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (motorists' financial responsibility act
held incompatible with "fresh start" policy); Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (what
constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate, determined in part by "fresh start" objectives); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934) (effect of discharge on prebankruptey
wage assignment, determined in party by "fresh start" objectives).
5. An excellent example of the phenomenon is the collection of decisions on the "good
faith" requirement in Chapter 13 cases, discussed infra notes 185-95 and accompanying
text. See also REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1973) [hereinafter REPORT] (describing "inadequacy"
of efforts to explain bankruptcy policy as attributable to a failure "to account for the overriding goals of the bankruptcy process in the context of its relationship with other economic
and social processes"); Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 1393, 1447 (1985) (noting that discussions of bankruptcy policy ordinarily proceed
without a grounding in a "normative theory of discharge's functions, goals, and
justifications").
6. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101151326 (1982 & Supp. HI 1985).
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Code Amendments contained in the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments Act.7 In the context of consumer bankruptcies, the Code is
most notable for its significant expansion of the protection afforded to bankrupt debtors.8 The novelty of many of its provisions
necessarily leads to interpretive uncertainties which require an
analysis of the underlying policies for their resolution. Difficulties
of that kind are, of course, characteristic of any new statute in its
infancy, but relative to the Code they are aggravated by the opentextured drafting employed to define various new aspects of the
debtor's "fresh start."9 This increase in the practical importance of
bankruptcy policies has, regrettably, not been matched by improvements in the consistency or clarity of the articulation and application of those policies. As a result, interpretations of any given
element of the Code's debtor-relief provisions are likely to be characterized by a wide diversity of results,1 0 which is too often attributable to the decisionmakers' lack of a clear conception of the social
and economic function of the bankruptcy discharge in the system
of consumer credit.
The present essay attempts to describe the content of the "fresh
start" policy with greater precision than has previously been given
7. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (codified as amendments to scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1984)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984].
8. The strong "debtor orientation" of the Code's discharge provisions, especially in comparison with former law, has been noted by various commentators. See, e.g., Cohen & Klee,
Caveat Creditor: The Consumer Debtor Under the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N. C. L. REv. 681,
721 (1980); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 953, 980 (1981);
Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a FresherStart, 58 N. C. L. REv. 723, 725
(1980). Even with the modifications enacted as part of the 1984 Act, supra note 7, the chief
characteristics of the Code's debtor relief features remain the breadth and accessibility of
the postbankruptcy protection afforded debtors. Both the general tenor and particular aspects of the Code and the 1984 amendments are discussed more fully infra notes 152-68,
196-202 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 524 (c), (d) (limiting enforceability of certain postbankruptcy
agreements unless approved by the court as "not imposing an undue hardship" and "in the
debtor's best interest"), 525 (prohibitions of "discrimination" against debtors), 707(b) (permitting dismissal where discharge would be a "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7 of the Code,
discussed infra notes 367-415 and accompanying text), 1325(a)(3) (requirement for confirmation that Chapter 13 plan be filed in "good faith") (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10. Compare, e.g., Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982) with Ravenot v. Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982) (effect of "good faith" requirement on Chapter 13 plans
proposing minimal payments, discussed infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text); compare,e.g., In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 928 (1984) with In
re Maddox, 713 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983) (effect of state law on scope of debtor's power to
avoid liens on exempt property).
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this subject. Part II is devoted to a review of the history of the
"fresh start" policy in the context of bankruptcy law. While the
discussion in part chronicles the legal or doctrinal evolution of the
discharge, the central emphasis is on the development of the idea
of debtor relief-identifying the empirical assumptions and value
judgments that have animated debates over the "fresh start" policy and the administration of particular doctrines it embodies. Part
III builds on that description to discuss the current manifestation
of the "fresh start" policy in the Code. It employs the Code's existing discharge provisions to test the present validity or plausibility of various concerns that have historically been advanced as determinative of the appropriate scope and extent of discharge
rights. In brief, the discussion in Part III suggests that the present
state of discharge rights can be properly explained as a compulsory
allocation of certain risks associated with credit use. This allocation rests on a few relatively clear assumptions about the economic
competence of consumer borrowers and about the social costs of
default. As described in the final section of Part III, a clear understanding of those underlying assumptions is an essential starting
point in judicial interpretation and application of the Code's "fresh
start."
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE THEORY AND LEGAL STRUCTURE OF

THE "FRESH START" POLICY

A. Debtor Relief and the Bankruptcy System: Antecedents and
Origins
The idea of creating legal devices for the relief of insolvent debtors has ancient antecedents.1 1 But debtor relief as a primary objective of bankruptcy laws in particular is a decidedly modern and
peculiarly American phenomenon. 12 For most of its Anglo-Ameri11. See, e.g., Tan

HAmMURABi CODE AND THE SINArIc LEGISLATION

36, 40 (C. Edwards

trans. 1904) (provisions in Babylonian law compelling forgiveness of interest in any year in
which crops failed, and affording debtors in any event a right to alternate forms of repayment if unable to make payment in corn or silver); W. BUCKLAND, A TExTBOOK OF RomAN
LAW 645 (1966) (describing imperial Roman institution of cessio bonorum, by which an insolvent debtor could voluntarily surrender his assets to creditors as a means of limiting
subsequent collections efforts); see also Deuteronomy 15:1-3 (Mosaic law provision for periodic release of debts).
12. Of the various legal systems in which bankrupty is an available remedial device for
adjusting debtor-creditor and creditor-creditor relationships, only that of the United States
appears to afford a freely available discharge to debtors without regard to the level of payments to, or the consent of, creditors. See J. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL IN-

54

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:49

can history, bankruptcy was exclusively a creditors' remedy, a device for equitably dividing an insufficient pool of assets among
multiple claimants. To the extent that the remedy afforded the
debtor some degree of relief from other varieties of coercive collection, that effect was regarded as merely an incidental by-product
of a system single-mindedly focused on advancing the interests of
creditors.1 3 Even the centerpiece of the modern "fresh start," the
bankrupt's discharge from further liability for prebankruptcy
debts, was originally conceived not as a relief measure but as a reward for the debtor's efforts to maximize the return to his creditors.14 Indeed, until well into this century, despite the obvious intent of modern bankruptcy legislation and the empirical realities
of consumer bankruptcy filings, respected authorities continued to
argue that the protection and payment of creditors was the only
legitimate point of permitting legal relief through bankruptcy.1 5
While pre-twentieth century bankruptcy was essentially a collections mechanism, this does not mean that there were no available
legal means for insolvent debtors to avoid liability for credit obligations without satisfying their creditors. To the contrary, nineteenth century state legislatures and their colonial predecessors enacted a rich variety of laws with the avowed purpose of affording
1.07[l] (1986) (continental legal systems); Boshkoff, Limited,
Conditional,and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1982) (comparison of English and American discharge provisions); Honsberger, Bankruptcy: A Comparison of the United States and Canada,45 AM. BANKR. L.J.
129, 144-46 (1971); Shuchman, Field Observations and Archival Data on Execution Process
and Bankruptcy in Jerusalem, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 356 (1978) (Israeli system).
13. See generally Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the
Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIsT. 153 (1982); Levinthal, The Early History of
SOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY §

English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1919).

14. The bankruptcy discharge entered English law in 1705. 4 & 5 Anne, ch. 17, § 8 (1705).
By amendment the following year, discharge was made conditional on the consent of fourfifths in number and amount of creditors. 6 Anne, ch. 22, § 2 (1706). On the intent to afford
the debtor an incentive to cooperation, see Cohen, supra note 13, at 156-57. See also 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *482-83. The early limited interest in
discharge as a form of relief is perhaps most evident in the unavailability of bankruptcy on
a debtor's voluntary petition until the mid-nineteenth century. See 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 134
(1861) (permitting voluntary petitions by nonmerchants); 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 96 (1844) (same
for merchants).
15. See, e.g., Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of Fraud,and Control of the
Debtor, 23 VA. L. REV. 373 (1937); Olmstead, Bankruptcy A Commercial Regulation, 15
HARv. L. REV. 829, 835, 842-43 (1902); Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 6, 8-9 (1940); Remington, Bankruptcy and PeaceableSettlement of Business Failures, 18
YALE L.J. 590, 594-95 (1909); see also 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 14.01[6], 14.0211] (J.
Moore & L. King 14th ed. 1978) (collections function is "original and fundamental purpose"
or "primary purpose," discharge "a secondary purpose").
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insolvent debtors some greater or lesser degree of release from the
enforcement of creditors' claims."6 For the most part, these statecreated "insolvency laws" (so called to distinguish them from creditor-oriented bankruptcy statutes) had their origins in the widespread movement to abolish or severely limit the availability of
civil imprisonment as a means of debt collection. The usual first
step on the path to complete abolition was the legislative creation
of a scheme in which an imprisoned debtor could obtain his release
from confinement by executing an oath of impoverishment or a
conveyance of all his nonexempt property to a trustee or assignee
for the benefit of his creditors. 7 The authors of many such relief
measures were content to limit the debtor's relief to discharge from
imprisonment, together with protection against future imprisonment for debt owed at the time of his release."8 Others, however,
went further. Aided perhaps by the similarities both in label and in
doctrinal structure between the insolvency discharge from confinement and the bankruptcy discharge from debt, these legislatures
devised systems in which debtors had an opportunity to obtain
permanent relief, not only 9 from imprisonment, but from other
means of collection as well.'
The widespread adoption of these state insolvency laws in the
nineteenth century did not occur in isolation. Their enactment
took place, rather, in the context of a number of other legislative
developments that, taken together, established the framework of
modern debtor-creditor and collections law. Those developments
included continual efforts to increase the efficacy of creditors' remedies, such as by the expansion of the classes of property that
could be seized to satisfy judgments, and by the streamlining of
execution and levy procedures.2 0 At the same time, these improvements in creditor advantage were accompanied by the rapid devel16. For more detailed accounts of some of these laws, see P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS IN AMERICA, passim (1974); F. NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF
THE CONsrrrrUTiON 55-65 (1918); Bankrupt and Insolvent Laws, 3 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 201
(1830). See also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 240-43 (1973); Williston, The
Effect of a NationalBankruptcy Law Upon State Laws, 22 HARv. L. REv. 547 (1909).
17. See P. COLEMAN, supra note 16, at 256.
18. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 23, 1824, 22 Ohio Laws 326 (establishing public commissioner of
insolvents to administer property assigned to obtain release from imprisonment).
19. For example, see the New York scheme discussed at length in Bankrupt and Insolvent Laws, 4 AM.

JURIST

& L. MAG. 98, 100, 103 (1830).

20. See generally Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A HistoricalInventory and a Prospectus, 42 IowA L. REv. 155 (1957); Riesenfeld, Enforcement of
Money Judgments in Early American History, 71 MIcat L. REv. 691 (1973).
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opment of debtor-protective devices-exemptions, valuation rights,
moratory legislation-that tended to blunt the full force of the
creditors' expanded remedies.2 1 Insolvency laws and, when available, their debtor-protective discharge were thus one aspect of a
larger trend toward limiting the severity of the legal consequences
attached to insolvency and economic failure.
The developing recognition of the legitimacy of debtor protection and debtor relief as legislative objectives in the nineteenth
century is usually attributed to corresponding increases in the incidence and importance of credit in the nation's economic structure
during that period.2" The enhanced role of credit in economic development was accompanied by an expansion in the social importance and political power of the most significant debtor class, the
entrepreneurial merchants and traders. These developments created a fundamental change in public attitudes toward borrowing,
and eventually toward economic failure and insolvency as well. Indebtedness, once regarded as a sign of extravagance and poor financial management, came to be seen as an appropriate and indeed essential aspect of successful commercial activity. At the
same time, the era's recurring financial crises and the concomitant
widespread business failures highlighted the idea that the economic risks involved in commercial activity were not inevitably a
function of the actor's dishonesty or irresponsibility. There was,
rather, an increasingly strong perception of the significant possibility that economic failures were produced by economic forces no
more controllable or predictable than visitation by a tornado or the
bite of a wild dog. This severing in public consciousness of the
hitherto close relation between fault and default easily found its
way into legal rhetoric and theory and provided a legitimizing
framework for legislation shielding insolvent debtors from coercive
collections activity.23
21. See P. COLEMAN, supra note 16, passim (exemptions and moratory or stay laws);
Feller, Moratory Legislation, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1061 (1933); Priest, Law and Economic Distress: Sagamon County, Illinois, 1837-1844, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 469 (1973) (moratory and valuation laws).
22. See generally P. COLEMAN, supra note 16, at 283-85; M. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 228-29 (1977); W.E. NELSON, AMERIcAmzATION OF THE
COMMON LAW 153-54 (1975).
23. See e.g., W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *474 ("if by accidental calamities, as, by
the loss of a ship in a tempest, the failure of brother traders, or by the non-payment of
persons out of trade, a merchant or trader becomes incapable of discharging his own debts,

it is his misfortune and not his fault"); 2 J. KENT,

COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW

321

(1827) (availability of relief from consequences of "inevitable misfortune" particularly ap-
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There were essentially two styles of explanation for such laws,
each focused on considerations that have been and remain, at least
rhetorically, recurring themes in the debate over the "fresh start"
policy. By far the more zommon was framed in terms of socioeconomic policy and social utility. In large part, this approach was
founded on a perception of insolvent debtors as potentially valuable contributors to the nation's economic development, whose participation in the economy was impeded by the hopelessness of
their financial conditions. Relief measures, the argument ran, were
an appropriate means of restoring to the public at large the benefits of these debtors' entrepreneurial skills and energies, and of doing so with minimal impact on their creditors' realistic expectations of repayment. 24 The second line of explanation, one framed
in moral terms, was usually offered more tentatively, and frequently accompanied arguments of the social utility sort. Building
on a characterization of the insolvent's default as a matter of misfortune rather than blameworthiness, this approach focused on
mercy or forbearance as the morally correct response to financial
failure and depicted collection efforts as a morally repugnant effort
to inflict suffering for greedy motives. From this perspective, relief
legislation was, if not precisely an enforcement of a creditor's obligation to forbear and forgive, at least a refusal to involve
the state
25
in his morally questionable pursuit of repayment.
propriate for merchants, given the "enterprising nature of trade" and its "extraordinary
hazards"); On A National Bankrupt Law, 1 Am. JURIST & L. MAG. 35, 39, 51 (1829) (describing the causes of insolvency in terms of external events and not as fault-based).
24. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1841) (message of President Tyler
transmitting petitions for a bankruptcy act: "The distress incident to the derangements of
some years past has visited large numbers of our fellow citizens with hopeless insolvency,
whose energies, both mental and physical, by reason of the load of debt pressing upon them,
are lost to the country."); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *484 ("the bankrupt becomes
a clear man again: and . . . may become a useful member of the commonwealth"); 3 J.
STORY, supra note 1, § 1101 ("an absolute right to appropriate and monopolize all their
future earnings ... obviously destroys all encouragement to industry and enterprize [sic]
on the part of the unfortunate debtor"); Mack, Bankruptcy Legislation, 28 An. U. L. REv. 1,
5 (1894) ("society needs the activity of every one of its members; ... while a man, whose
earnings are entirely at his creditor's mercy, would be little disposed to work, he might, if
freed from this burden, retrieve his reputation and become a valuable member of the community"); On a National Bankrupt Law, supra note 23, at 44 ("It is important, too, to the
nation to be able to avail itself of the services of all classes of citizens ... and to convert
[insolvent debtors] into active and useful members of society.").
25. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 814 app. (1840) (remarks of Daniel Webster attributing failure to "selfish, unjust, or indifferent creditors"); id., 27th Cong., 1st Sess.
318 (1841) (remarks of Representative Roosevelt describing effects of insolvency as a "moral
calamity": "Talk of slavery and abolition! What slavery was to compare with the bondage of
the mind and heart? Men talked of physical chains and shackles, but these were nothing to
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The absorption of these concerns into the framework of bankruptcy law and the consequent transformation of that law from
collections device to debtors' remedy was in large part a product of
the allocation of powers between state and federal governments in
the constitutional scheme. Among the federal powers enumerated
in the Constitution was the authority "[t]o establish

. . .

uniform

Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.

' 26

In any effort to identify the scope of "the subject of

Bankruptcies," the traditional notion of bankruptcy as a creditors'
remedy was clouded by the tendency of preconstitutional state legislatures to be less than precise in labelling their creations. A few
debtor relief statutes had been enacted as "bankruptcy" laws,27
and even the most debtor-protective insolvency laws nonetheless
had included some provision for distributing the insolvent's estate
among creditors. 28 There was thus more than sufficient room for
those with an expansive conception of federal powers to contend
that the constitutional phrasing extended to the entire range of
laws "for the benefit and relief of creditors and their debtors, in
cases, in9 which the latter are unable, or unwilling to pay their
2
debts."

Although this expansive view had its opponents, they were a distinct minority among constitutional commentators and federal
judges.8 0 Moreover, as time passed, the practical necessity of broad
the chains of the soul."); 3 J. STORY, supra note 1, § 1101 ("[W]hen the debtors have no
property, or have yielded up the whole to their creditors, to allow the latter at their mere
pleasure to imprison them, is a refinement in cruelty, and an indulgence of private
passsions, which could hardly find apology in an enlightened despotism ....
It is incompatible with the first precepts of Christianity; and is a living reproach to the nations of
christendom."); J. TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT AND CONsTrruTIONAL LAW 215
(1867) ("One of the first duties of legislation, while providing for the obligation of contracts,
is, to relieve the unfortunate and meritorious debtor from a slavery of mind and body, which
deprives him in great measure of the enjoyment of the comforts of life and the common
benefits of society."); Bankrupt and Insolvent Laws, supra note 19, at 110 (exercise of collections rights against insolvent debtors "is rarely of any value to the creditor, while, on the
other hand, it is in a great majority of cases ruinous to the debtor"); id. at 116 (imprisonment of insolvent described as "barbarous cruelty").
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
27. For example, the short-lived Pennsylvania statute of 1812, described in P. COLEMAN,
supra note 16, at 153, and the Rhode Island legislation of 1756 and 1771, described id. at
91-93.
28. See generally P. COLEMAN, supra note 16, passim; Bankrupt and Insolvent Laws,
supra note 16.
29. 3 J. STORY, supra note 1, § 1108, at 13-14 n.3.
30. The difference between the narrow (collections-oriented) and broad (encompassing
both collections and relief) definitions surfaced most frequently in debate over whether the
federal government could constitutionally establish a voluntary "bankruptcy" system. That
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federal power was made apparent by the constitutional limitations
faced by the states. In particular, a series of early decisions by the
Supreme Court held that state-created discharge schemes were ineffective as to debts incurred before their enactment"1 and as to
any debts, pre- or postenactment, owed to foreign creditors or contracted in other states.8 2 As a result, any comprehensive and
broadly effective discharge legislation could be enacted, if at all,
only by Congress. The expansive idea of "bankruptcy" was further
aided by the fact that the debate over the scope of the federal
bankruptcy power took place in an era most notable for congressional restraint in its exercise. There were only three, relatively
short-lived, national bankruptcy acts passed prior to 1898, and
question was often treated as part of the era's larger debate over states' rights and the
constitutional scope of federal power. The leading proponents of the broad view were, of
course, Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Joseph Story. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193-96 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); 3 J. STORY, supra note 1, § 1108, at 1314 n.3. The narrow view enjoyed its greatest strength in Congress. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE,
26th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1840) (Senator Calhoun, arguing that voluntary bankruptcy would
be unconstitutional). See generally C. WARREN, BANKRUPTcy IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 3-92
(1935) (recounting the nineteenth century legislative debates). Only a few judges expressed
doubts as to the correctness of the expansive approach. See, e.g., In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 719,
720-21 (C.C.D. Mo. 1842) (No. 7866), rev'd, 42 U.S. 277 (1843); Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas.
141, 143 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 66); see also 1 N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DiGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 317-18 (1824) (emphasizing the distinction between involuntary,
creditor-oriented "bankruptcy" and voluntary, relief-oriented "insolvency" laws).
31. Farmers & Mechanics' Bank of Pa. v. Smith, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 131 (1821); Sturges,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 122.
32. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). In what appears to have been
the only instance of his being outvoted in the course of his entire tenure, Chief Justice
Marshall (together with Justices Story and Duvall) dissented, on the ground that even the
prospective discharge of obligations owed only to local creditors was nonetheless beyond
state power. Id. at 332-58; see also M'Millan v. M'Neill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.). As noted by Professor Countryman, the precise constitutional basis of the rule
announced by the majority in Ogden is "obscure." V. CoUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 249 (1974). In the main, it appears to have been based on the early
nineteenth century conceptions of territorial sovereignty of which (ironically enough, in view
of his dissent) Justice Story was a leading proponent. See Hazard, A General Theory of
State Court Jurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 258-62. Thus, in much the same manner as
state adjudicative jurisdiction was later held to be territorially bounded under the due process clause, see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), legislative competence was viewed as
equally circumscribed. See Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1864). To the extent that
that was the basis of Ogden and similar cases, one might reasonably doubt their authority
today, given the changes in jurisdictional theory in the intervening 160 years. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The point is moot, though, given the
effect of existing federal bankruptcy legislation in pre-empting state discharge laws. See
International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929). In any event, the decisions remain
notable as early examples of limitations on state power that appear to have been derived
solely from political theory and the structure of the government, rather than from the constitutional text, since there was at the time no due process clause applicable to the states.
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only one of those (the most short-lived) clearly departed from the
traditional bankruptcy objective of protecting and paying creditors." This congressional inactivity effectively deferred any authoritative judicial pronouncement on the constitutional scope of
"bankruptcy" until the beginning of the twentieth century. By that
time, the expansion of the term to include debtor relief measures
had been so often stated, and concepts of federalism had so radically changed, that the correctness of the expansive view could be
affirmed by the Supreme Court as "really not open to
34
discussion.
B.

The 1898 Act and the EntrepreneurialModel

The enactment of the first permanent American bankruptcy legislation, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act"), 5 thus took place
in an environment in which the modern concept of bankruptcy had
already become relatively well established. Central to that concept
was the use of a single remedy to carry out the dual functions of
debtor relief and creditor payment that were previously served by
distinct legal devices. At the doctrinal level, the merger was most
clearly reflected in the availability of a discharge under the Act to
petitioning debtors without regard to the level of payments to
creditors and without any requirement of creditor consent.3 6 By
thus severing the previously existing link between payment and
discharge, the authors of the Act had necessarily adopted a view of
debtor relief as a legitimate independent objective of legislation in
general and of the bankruptcy system in particular.
General acceptance of the propriety of debtor relief as a federal
legislative concern did not go far, however, toward defining the nature and quality of the relief to be afforded. As originally formu33. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20
Stat. 99; Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5
Stat. 614; Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2
Stat. 248.
The exception was the 1841 Act, supra, which was the first American bankruptcy legislation to permit voluntary petitions and which was alone among the pre-1898 statutes in affording discharge without regard to payment levels or creditor consent. Act of Aug. 19, 1841,
ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440.
34. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 187 (1902); see also Boshkoff, supra
note 12, at 108 n.159 (noting that the congressional debates over the 1898 Act are "curiously
silent" on the federal power issues that had fueled legislative passions regarding prior acts).
35. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
36. Id. § 14, 30 Stat. at 550.
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lated, the discharge under the Act was available to any debtor who
made a timely application unless he had concealed property after
filing the petition, given false testimony in the proceeding, or failed
to keep adequate records prior to bankruptcy "with fraudulent intent . . . and in comtemplation of bankruptcy. ' 37 Once granted,
the discharge extended to all "provable" debts except liabilities for
unpaid taxes, for fraud, for "willful and malicious injuries," or for
misconduct as a fiduciary.38 This facially broad scope was somewhat limited, however, by the definition of "provable" debts to exclude unliquidated noncontractual obligations, which thereby precluded the discharge of most "pure" tort liabilities that had not
been reduced to judgment.39 Moreover, beginning almost immediately after its adoption, the Act was repeatedly amended to further
narrow both the availability and the scope of the discharge. These
amendments added as grounds for complete denial of relief the
debtor's failure to cooperate in the proceeding"0 or to satisfactorily
explain his financial condition,41 the commission of a fraudulent
conveyance within the twelve months preceding bankruptcy, 2 his
receipt of a discharge within the preceding six years,43 and his having obtained prebankruptcy credit on the basis of a false financial
statement." Similarly, the list of nondischargeable debts was expanded to include alimony and child support obligatins,' 5 liabilities for certain torts having to do with sex relations, 46 and employ37. Id. §§ 14(b), 29, 30 Stat. at 550, 554.
38. Id. § 17, 30 Stat. at 550-51.
39. Id. § 63(a), 30 Stat. at 562-63. When, however, the creditor's claim could be framed
either in tort or in contract or quasi-contract, it remained dischargeable, whether or not
liquidated and whether or not framed in tort. Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239, 248 (1920);
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904). Likewise, liabilities for fines and penalities were
held nondischargeable because not provable "debts" within § 63(a). See, e.g., Parker v.
United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946). In 1934, § 63(a) was amended to include within
"provability" any unliquidated negligence claims as to which an action was pending at the
time the bankruptcy petition was filed. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 911, 92324.
40. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797-98.
41. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 6, 44 Stat. 663-64.
42. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797, amended by Act of May 27, 1926, ch.
406, § 6, 44 Stat. 663-64.
43. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797-98.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 5, 32 Stat. 798. Prior to the amendment, the Supreme Court had already held
that family obligations were nondischargeable even in the absence of an express exception.
Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
46. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 798 (liabilities for seduction and criminal
conversation); Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 153, 39 Stat. 999 (seduction nondischargeable only if
breach of a promise to marry accompanied by seduction); Act of Jan. 7, 1922, ch. 22, 42 Stat.
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ees' claims for wages earned shortly before bankruptcy.4"
As to the operation and effect of a discharge, the Act provided
only that it "shall release" a bankrupt from all his dischargeable
debts.48 Under prior common-law doctrines, however, the discharge
was not regarded as extinguishing liabilities but merely as interposing a bar to their judicial enforcement, much like a statute of
limitations. 49 That approach was quickly embraced in the Act's interpretation. As a result, because the debtor's "moral obligation"
to pay survived the discharge, he was held to be capable of reviving
the legal obligation by an express reaffirmation following bankruptcy.5 0 Similarly, because the discharge was an affirmative defense, it was deemed to have been waived if not timely pleaded in
any postbankruptcy suit by the creditor. 5' Moreover, because the
discharge was a bar only to legal enforcement of the debtor's personal liability, the creditor remained wholly free to enforce prebankruptcy lien rights,52 even in exempt property,53 and could seek re54
payment by informal means.
The shape of this "fresh start" policy as defined by the Act and
the early judicial decisions reflected in large part a federal adoption and refinement of the policy concerns that had underlain the
Act's state law predecessors. Most apparent was a continuing reliance on the notion that relief measures served the public welfare
by restoring the overburdened debtor to economic productivity. As
354 (seduction or breach of a promise to marry accompanied by seduction). As it had relative to support obligations, supra note 45, the Supreme Court had already concluded prior
to the amendment that criminal conversation liabilities were nondischargeable. Tinker v.
Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904) (criminal conversation constitutes "willful and malicious"
injury).
47. Act of Jan. 7, 1922, ch. 22, 42 Stat. 354.
48. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 35, § 17, at 550-51.
49. See Jersey City Ins. Co. v. Archer, 122 N.Y. 376, 25 N.E. 338 (1890); Hill v. Trainer,
49 Wis. 537, 5 N.W. 926 (1880); Another Question under the Bankrupt Act of 1867, 4 ALB.
L.J. 294 (1871).
50. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913). See generally Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral
Obligation to Pay His DischargedDebts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47 IND. L.J. 36 (1971).
51. See, e.g., Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942). See generally 8 H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 3240 (6th ed. 1955).
52. See, e.g., Sample v. Beasley, 158 F. 607 (5th Cir. 1908). See generally 8 H. REMINGTON,
supra note 51, at §§ 3230-3231.
53. See 8 H. REMINGTON, supra note 51, at 3233; see also Lockwood v. Exchange Bank,
190 U.S. 294 (1903) (bankruptcy court may stay entry of discharge to permit creditor to
create lien on exempt property pursuant to prebankruptcy exemption waiver).
54. See, e.g., Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977); McClendon v.
Kenin, 235 Or. 588, 385 P.2d 615 (1963).
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summarized by the Supreme Court in phrasings that have since
provided the standard labels for the debtor-relief objectives of
bankruptcy, the discharge was available to the "honest but unfortunate" debtor due to the "public interest" in affording him "a
fresh start in life," a "new opportunity," and "a clear field for future effort." 55 That vision of the appropriate role of the discharge
was strongly influenced by a view of debt and insolvency as largely
the products of business activities. The productivity rationale itself
was rooted in the established conception of financial failure as an
unavoidable consequence of entrepreneurial risk taking. Moreover,
although noncommercial borrowing had been a factor in the economy since well' before adoption of the Act, it had ordinarily taken
forms that underplayed its significance, especially in the bankruptcy context. 56 As a result, in the drafting and early interpretation of the Act, there was a strong tendency to focus on the "typical" insolvent as a commercial actor,57 an orientation that was
most apparent in the statutory and doctrinal limits on the scope
and effect of the discharge. "Pure" tort claims and family obligations, for example, were said to be nondischargeable because they
were unlikely to be the product of commercial activity. 5 Similarly,
55. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605,

617 (1918); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
56. Prior to the early decades of the twentieth century, the primary lawful form of con-

sumer credit was the installment purchase of consumer durables, a marketing device first
attempted on a mass consumption basis and rapidly mastered by the Singer Sewing Ma-

chine Co. in the mid-nineteenth century. See 1 E. SELIGMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF

INSTALLmENTr LENDING 14-19 (1927). In addition, by the end of the nineteenth century, building and

loan societies were engaged in extensive residential mortgage lending. See H. KR0oss & M.
BLYN, A ISTORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 114-15 (1971). Because both these forms of
credit involved the lenders' retention of a security interest (by conditional sale or mortgage),

the bankruptcy discharge would have been of little use to the consumer borrower due to its
limited effect on property interests. Unsecured consumer lending did not become institutionalized until after the widespread enactment of higher usury ceilings under small loan
laws beginning about 1916. Prior to that time, unsecured "salary lending" was generally
confined to the grey market of loansharking, in which the possibilities for informal collections tended to vitiate the utility of any release from merely legal liabilities. See Hailer &
Alviti, Loansharkingin American Cities: HistoricalAnalysis of a MarginalEnterprise,21

AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 125 (1977); Hubacheck, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan
Laws, 8 LAw & CONtEMP. PROBS. 108 (1941).

57. See, e.g., Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273, 277 (1931) (discharge affords relief from
"business misfortunes"); Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 77 (purpose of discharge to provide "a fresh
start in business or commercial life," freed of liabilities "which may have resulted from
business misfortunes").
58. See Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 77; Audubon, 181 U.S. at 577 ("[a]limony does not arise
from any business transaction"); Glenn, Basic Considerations in Tort Claims in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 367, 367-69 (1941) (critically describing

nonprovability of tort claims as founded in focus on commercial credit).
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even if they arose in a commercial setting, fraud and "willful and
malicious" conduct, which would preclude or be excepted from discharge, were seen as far removed from the central concern for socially useful risk taking.5 9 Even limiting the effect of the discharge
was explained less as a limitation than as a means of enabling the
debtor to return to commercial activity by facilitating his acquisition of postbankruptcy credit.6 0
While the encouragement of commercial risk taking was thus established as the chief organizing principle of the bankruptcy "fresh
start" policy, it was by no means the sole consideration shaping
either the policy or its doctrinal embodiment. One additional concern, peculiar to the provision of debtor relief in the specific context of bankruptcy, was the bankruptcy system's historical function as a collections device. It was indeed conventional to declare
that the Act served two purposes, both debtor relief and the facilitation of payments to creditors.6 1 The tension, if not opposition,
between those purposes may not have been fully apparent until
some years later, but their juxtaposition in relation to a single remedial scheme raised, at the least, the possibility that the two
might at times be difficult to fulfill simultaneously. Related to that
concern were generally held assumptions about the redistributive
impact of the discharge. To the extent that bankruptcy released
indebtedness short of full repayment, it was viewed as conferring
an unearned benefit on the debtor and imposing a corresponding
uncompensated loss on creditors.6 2 Although the process causing
this apparent wealth transfer could be justified as advancing the
public welfare, the transfer itself was not universally regarded with
undiluted enthusiasm. In particular, it appears to have been generally taken as a given, first, that the benefits of any such transfer
should be limited to deserving or "worthy" beneficiaries, and second, that its cost should not be borne by those with little ability to
63
bear it.
These additional concerns, relating both to the payments func59. See McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1916); Tinker, 193 U.S. at 489.
60. See, e.g., Schuman Bros. v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Okla. 23, -, 240 P. 647, 648 (1925)
(reason for rule permitting reaffirmation said to be "stronger" relative to reaffirmation made
to obtain new credit), appeal dismissed, 274 U.S. 716 (1927).
61. See, e.g., Stellwagen, 245 U.S. at 617; Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915); Hanover Nat'l Bank, 186 U.S. at 188.
62. See, e.g., Canada S. R.R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883); Baylor v. Rawlings, 200
F. 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1912); In re Evans, 235 F. 956, 961 (S.D. Idaho 1916).
63. See, e.g., Williams, 236 U.S. at 554-55; Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 77.
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tion of bankruptcy and to the perceived redistributive effect of the
discharge, were reflected in a variety of ways. The common rhetorical emphasis on the "honest" debtor's "hopeless" state, 64 for example, suggested not only the debtor's moral worth but also the limited impact of the discharge on his creditors' chances of
repayment. Similarly, the requirement that the debtor surrender
all but the basic assets protected by exemptions, as well as doctrines that facilitated postbankruptcy payments and reaffirmations, tended to reduce the perceived loss to creditors. Likewise,
the nondischargeability of tort liabilities, family obligations, and
wage claims could be said to reflect judgments both as to the relative moral worth of the claimants and as to their capacity to bear
the losses imposed by the discharge."'
C.

The Advent of the Consumer Bankrupt

In a process that began almost immediately, the decades following adoption of the Act witnessed a substantial erosion in the accuracy and persuasive force of some of the assumptions upon which
the Act was based. Of primary significance was the evolution in
volume and importance of consumer credit during that period,
which was accompanied by a steady increase in the resort to bankruptcy by consumer debtors. In 1912, wage-earner bankruptcies
had constituted about one-fifth of voluntary filings;66 by 1930, the
proportion was over half,6 7 and by 1940 closer to three-quarters.6 8
As the "typical" bankrupt thus shifted from merchant to wage
earner, the rationale of the discharge as an entrepreneurial incentive tended to lose its force and the incentive structure established
under that rationale became increasingly problematic. Yet, while
there was certainly no shortage of commentary directed to the apparent mismatch between law and policy, the basic legal structure
and most of the details of the "fresh start" remained unchanged
until the years shortly before the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978.
The chief cause of this legislative inertia appears to have been
64. See, e.g., Dunbar, 190 U.S. at 352; J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONsTrruTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 349 (1883).
65. See, e.g., Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27, 40 (1913); Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 77; Dunbar,
190 U.S. at 352.
66. See 1912 AT'VY GEN. ANN. REP. app. 3, table following p. 200.
67. See 1920 A7T'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 377.
68. See D. STANLEY & M. GmTH, supra note 2, at 18, 25.
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the lack of a strong consensus as to the appropriate role of bankruptcy and of the bankruptcy discharge in the system of consumer
credit. To be sure, there appears to have been little dispute about
the propriety of bankruptcy for consumers whose inability to pay
their debts could be attributed to external economic events or personal misfortune. In those cases, the causes of insolvency (the
Great Depression or catastrophic illness, for example) fit comfortably into the entrepreneurial model's conception of financial difficulties as an unavoidable risk inherent in the economic system.
There was, likewise, a parallel to that model in the perceived social
cost of failing to afford relief to consumer debtors, since the
debtor's loss of employment, and hence a net social loss in productivity, appeared to be among the primary accompaniments of economic distress.6 9 To the extent that relief measures sprang from
moral considerations, the wage-earning victims of economic catastrophe were even more appealing candidates for mercy than had
been their entrepreneurial predecessors. Thus, the source of controversy and the impediment to consensus was not the "unfortuntate" consumer debtor; it was, rather, the "improvident" or
"extravagant" consumer whose financial difficulties stemmed, not
from external events, but from high levels of consumption and
credit use accompanied by misjudgments about his capacity to
repay.
The central difficulty with permitting "improvident" consumers
to resort to bankruptcy was the apparent avoidability and low social utility of the conduct leading to their financial problems. In
the commerical or entrepreneurial model, debtors were expected
and encouraged to take steps that involved a risk of economic failure corresponding to their prospects for economic success. Thus,
when insolvency did occur it was regarded, absent dishonesty, as
an acceptable price for the gains capable of being achieved by risk
taking.7 0 In the entrepreneurial "fresh start," there was thus little
reason to distinguish between ex ante (predefault) incentives to
engage in risk taking and ex post (postdefault) incentives to return
to productive activity. Both were useful and were usefully en69. See, e.g., V. SADD, CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCIES AMONG CONSUMERS 10 (1933); Cover, Consumer Credit and Individual Bankruptcy, 196 ANNALS 86, 87 (1938); Fortas, Wage Assignment in Chicago-State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 42 YALE L.J. 526, 532 (1933);
Note, Wage-Earner Receiverships, 6 U. CE. L. REv. 459, 461 (1939).
70. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Law and Its Administration, 5 ALB. L.J. 3 (1872) (describing
discharge as appropriate not only for merchants who have met with "unforeseen losses" but
also in cases where insolvency is "not so entirely in the nature of an accident").

1986]

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

couraged by the discharge. In the case of the consumer debtor,
however, that harmony between ex ante and ex post incentives
was lacking. In particular, while consumer borrowing was recognized as a boon to the economy, the social gain was not seen as a
consequence of the borrower's willingness to take risks. The consumer borrower was, rather, assumed to have a relatively stable
and predictable probability of future income. This probability, unlike the entrepreneur's prospects, would not be improved by increases in the level of his debt-financed consumption. 7 1 Thus,
whatever the value of incentives for productivity after default,
there appeared to be little social utility in encouraging consumers
to push borrowing to its limits before the fact.7 2 Yet, to the extent
that default was associated with the debtor's own low aversion to
the risk of failure (his "improvidence"), rather than with the unavoidable risk of external events ("misfortune"), the ready availability of a bankruptcy discharge appeared to create precisely that
73
incentive.
Standing alone, that concern might have led to revisions in discharge policy narrowing the scope of the "fresh start" available to
"improvident" or "extravagant" consumers.74 But the concern did
not stand alone. Doubts about the social utility of incentives to
consumer risk taking were accompanied, rather, by doubts about
the economic competence of many consumer participants in credit
markets. In the usual characterization a substantial portion of consumers were depicted as "amateur" debtors who failed to rationally evaluate the costs and risks of borrowing and whose use of
credit was frequently an aid to the pursuit of foolish, illusory, or
overvalued goals.7 5 That vision of the consumer debtor as not necessarily very sensible was complemented by a vision of many con71. See, e.g., Sturges & Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage EarnerBankruptcies,
42 YALE L.J. 487, 514-16 (1933).

72. See, e.g., Hamilton, In re the Small Debtor, 42 YALE L.J. 473, 478 (1933); Radin,
Dischargein Bankruptcy, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 39, 47 (1931) ("discharge loses much of its reason when it is applied to any but business men").
73. See, e.g., MITCHELL, STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, S. Doc.
No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st. Sess. 9 (1932) (accessibility of discharge "encourages reckless
extravagance").
74. For examples of proposals to vary the availability or 6ffect of the discharge according
to the causes of the debtor's difficulties or his repayment of some minimum amount of
claims, see MITCHELL, supra note 73, at 96-98; Douglas, Some FunctionalAspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329, 349-63 (1932).
75. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 69, at 91; Douglas, supra note 74, at 358; Hamilton, supra
note 72, at 478.
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sumer lenders as driven by competitive necessity to "exploit" their
customers' weaknesses and incapacities through the hard selling of
"easy" credit.7" Thus, the financial difficulties of even "improvident" consumers were perceived as partly the product of a kind of
market failure-the result of "excessive" competition by lenders
intent on the profits derived from credit extensions to unsophisticated high-risk consumers without regard to the adverse social and
economic consequences of default. To the extent that one held to
that view, the appropriate focus relative to ex ante incentives was
not the debtor but his creditors. In that regard, the discharge and
other limitations on creditors' remedies seemed capable of serving
a useful corrective function, penalizing lenders with "lax" credit
standards and hence encouraging care in credit extensions.77
These competing policy considerations, with their opposing implications regarding the appropriate scope of relief for "extravagant" debtors, were a chief source of the disagreements and ambivalence which impeded legislative change. The situation was
compounded by the difficulties inherent in drawing meaningful
lines between classes of debtors. The commercial model had fostered a rhetorical and operational division of the universe of insolvents into the "dishonest," who were denied relief, and the "honest
but unfortunate," for whom the "fresh start" was readily available.
Proposals to afford a narrowed or different discharge for a new
class, "improvident" or "extravagant" consumers (who were
neither dishonest in the usual sense nor entirely the victims of misfortune),7 1 depended on the existence of some workable means for
identifying cases in the new class. But the proposals usually classified by paradigmatic example rather than by definition, and were
in any event almost inevitably premised on controversial value
judgments about the acceptability of various consumer behaviors
leading to insolvency. Moreover, even when there might be agreement that a particular cause of financial difficulty was properly
characterized as "improvidence" (and, indeed, even if there were
agreement as to what to do about it), actual cases tended to in76. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 74, at 349-50; Sturges & Cooper, supra note 71, at 51417.
77. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 74, at 352; Sturges, A ProposedState CollectionAct, 43
YALE L.J. 1055, 1056-57 (1934).
78. See, e.g., Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal Control, 42 YALE
L.J. 591, 598-601 (1933); see also Sturges & Cooper, supra note 71, at 514 (noting that any
effort to distinguish between "honest" and "reprehensible" debtors requires moral judgments, "because the classes do not otherwise exist").
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volve a complex medley of causes, including both "improvidence"
and "misfortune, ' 79 and the proposals provided few tools for isolating and weighing the various factors to determine which sort of
discharge would be appropriate.
Given these countervailing pressures, it may not be surprising
that, from 1926 to 1960, there was virtually no significant legislative response to the steady "consumerization" of the bankruptcy
population."0 The congressional failure to significantly alter the
terms of the discharge meant, of course, that the bankruptcy statute drafted as a regulation of commercial credit continued to operate, but in a significantly different world. On the judicial front, the
consequent dissonance required a degree of change in the stated
policy bases for discharge. That was accomplished in part by a reduction of the existing rationales to a series of vague and essentially meaningless phrases ("fresh start," "honest but unfortunate") that were recited more as preambles than as premises in
determination of the proper scope and effect of the discharge.8 1 To
the extent that the modified rationales went beyond that, they
were framed in terms of work incentives: the point of the discharge
79. See V. SAn)D, supra note 69, at 4,10; Douglas, supra note 78, at 596-614.
80. The sole significant congressional nod in that direction was contained in the Chandler
Act, 52 Stat. 840, 930 (1938). That enactment dealt principally with aspects of bankruptcy
that were relevant mainly in business failures, and it left untouched the existing substantive
rules governing the availability, scope, and effect of the discharge. Among its provisions,
however, was an alternative form of bankruptcy relief, the Chapter 13 wage earner's plan,
which was designed specifically for use by consumer debtors. Id. Under Chapter 13, a debtor
could propose a plan of partial or complete repayment (that is, a debtor could propose a
composition or extension) of the claims against him. If accepted by the court, by affected
secured creditors, and by the holders of a majority in number and amount of unsecured
claims, the plan was binding on all affected creditors. Successful completion of payments
under the plan (or an ability to persuade the court that a failure to complete payments was
due to "circumstances for which [the debtor] could not justly be held accountable") resulted
in a discharge essentially identical in scope and effect to the ordinary bankruptcy discharge.
At base, Chapter 13 appears to have been an effort aimed less at sorting the existing
population of consumer debtors than at expanding the availability of relief to the least controversial class of financially troubled consumers, namely those with the desire and capacity
to make substantial payments to their creditors. Resort to a wage earner's plan, however,
offered little advantage over "straight" bankruptcy, even for that group. Most often mentioned was an intended reduction in the supposed "stigma" associated with bankruptcy, but
the existence and importance of social disapproval were open to question and it was equally
doubtful that a debtor's choice of Chapter 13 made a difference. Moreover, even a debtor's
desire to repay could be effectively satisfied in an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding (with a
great deal more flexibility and without any delay in obtaining a discharge) by the simple
expedient of postbankruptcy payment or reaffirmation. There was, in short, not much incentive for consumer debtors to elect Chapter 13 relief, and the Chapter's forty-year history
was characterized by corresponding low levels of use.
81. See, e.g., Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
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was said to be an incentive for employment to the deeply indebted
wage earner, an incentive that would not exist if the debtor's earnings were devoted largely to paying his creditors. s2 To a degree,
that rationale borrowed from and was suggestive of the productivity explanations for the entrepreneurial "fresh start." As did the
entrepreneurial model, the consumer-productivity rationale afforded little basis for drawing distinctions among debtors as to the
circumstances and causes of their financial difficulties. Indeed, by
focusing primarily on the costs and incentives affecting the debtor
after default, the rationales appeared to assume (in accord with
the views of the "exploitation" theorists) that the only significant
ex ante incentive effects of the discharge were those affecting the
behavior of creditors. Thus, the rationale implied, as far as the
bankruptcy system was concerned, distinctions between the "extravagant" and the "unfortunate" were immaterial. Financially
distressed consumers who were not dishonest were by definition
unfortunate."
As one might expect, that judicial focus appears to have fostered
a generally undifferentiated reception to the use of bankruptcy by
consumers.8 4 To be sure, there were some decisions reflecting much
the same ambivalence that could be found in the works of critics
and commentators. Heavy gamblers and uninsured motorists, in
particular, were treated to doctrinal manipulations that limited the
scope or effect of the discharge and that seem explainable only in
terms of an underlying hostility to the "irresponsible" behavior
that had led to the debtor's problems.8 5 Likewise, the distributive
and creditor-payment concerns that had provided grounds for limiting the entrepreneurial "fresh start" remained important rhetori82. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 234, 292 U.S. 245 (1934); J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF
88 (1956); 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at 14.01[6].
83. Thus, denial of discharge was not permitted on the basis of "general equitable considerations" or on any ground other than the particular species of misconduct set out in the
Act. Shelby v. Texas Improvement Loan Co., 280 F.2d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 1960); see also
Jones v. Gertz, 121 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1941); In re Boner, 169 F. 727 (N.D. W. Va. 1909); cf.
Talcott v. Friend, 179 F. 676, 682 (7th Cir. 1909) (earlier references to discharge as a "privilege" tended to give way to an emphasis on the debtor's "right" to relief), aff'd, 228 U.S. 27
(1913). But see Dixwell v. Scott, 115 F.2d 873, 874 (1st Cir. 1940).
84. See 7 H. REMINGTON, supra note 51, at 104 (noting in 1955 the tendency "of recent
years" toward liberality in granting discharge).
85. See, e.g., Reitz, 314 U.S. 33 (upholding motor vehicle financial responsibility act);
Klein v. Morris Plan Indus. Bank, 132 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1942) (denial of discharge to window dresser for failure to keep records of gambling losses); In re Bank, 34 F. Supp. 706
THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY

(W.D.N.Y. 1940) (denial of discharge where debtor failed to keep records of gambling
losses).
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cal themes, even in consumer bankruptcies. s6 In the main, however, judicial administration of the discharge was characterized by
a readiness to adjust doctrine in ways that enlarged the effectiveness of the discharge in consumer cases. For example, in the seminal consumer "fresh start" case, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt s7 the Supreme Court carved a wage earner exception to its long-standing
reliance on state law to define the existence vel non of liens that
would survive the discharge. Relative to the postbankruptcy effects
of wage assignments, the Court held, the federal "fresh start" policy provided the governing standard and required that the debtor
hold his future earnings entirely free of discharged claims, without
regard to state-created lien rights.88 Similar doctrinal accommodations of value, mainly to consumer debtors, took place in a variety
of other settings.8" More importantly, the accommodations, taken
together with existing doctrines, established a consumer discharge
system in which neither the availablility nor the scope of relief was
ordinarily limited or defined by reference to the causes of the
debtor's failure.
D.

The Consumer Law "'Revolution"and the 1978 Code

Given the generally accepted limits of the judicial function, a
posture of openness to the phenomenon of consumer bankruptcy
was not and could not be, in the absence of legislative change, a
sufficient basis for a wholesale restructuring of bankruptcy doctrines. Thus, the basic legal theory of the discharge as a waivable
86. For example, in Klein, 132 F.2d 809, a failure to keep records of gambling losses was
held to bar discharge. The court rested its view in part on the utility of the records to the
trustee in pursuing restitution from the winners, on behalf of the estate.
87. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
88. Id. at 242-45. The focus of the decision on consumer debtors was particularly evident
in the emphasis given to the character of the property as earnings. As to other forms of
future property (expectancies, for example, or future crops), state law appears to have been
regarded as still dispositive of the existence of liens. See 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 15, at 1742.12. But see Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1966) (dictum suggesting a contrary view).
89. In Local Loan Co., for example, the Court authorized federal injunctive relief against
state court collections procedures in cases in which the bankrupt's ability to claim his discharge in state court was limited by settled state practice and the financial burdens of an
appeal. Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 239-43. The latter condition tended to limit the utility
of the Local Loan Co., injunction to any debtors but consumers. Similarly, consumer debtors were generally immunized from the Act's provision for denial of discharge to those who
had failed to keep adequate financial records. See, e.g., Morris Plan Indus. Bank v. Henderson, 131 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Pinko, 94 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1938). But see supra
note 85 and accompanying text.
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bar only to legal enforcement of the debtor's personal liability remained essentially unchanged until enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978. Preserved with that theory were longstanding doctrines establishing the postbankruptcy enforceability of reaffirmations and security interests as well as those permitting extrajudicial collections methods. The judicial capacity for doctrinal change
was further limited by the peculiarities of bankruptcy jurisdiction,
which generally relegated to state courts the resolution of disputes
over the dischargeability of specific debts.9 0 Those courts were not
(or at least did not appear to be) as taken as their federal counterparts with the notion of a broadly drawn consumer "fresh start"
policy.,,
Notwithstanding these limitations, however, the "official" judicial theory of the discharge and its hospitable implications for consumers did much to set the framework and direction for the policy
debates and legislative changes of the 1960's and 1970's which
culminated in adoption of the Code. Nonbusiness bankruptcies
during that period had reflected a dramatic increase, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of total filings.2 At the same
90. The jurisdictional division was not explicitly stated in the Act. It was, however, routinely adhered to by lower federal courts, apparently on the basis of practice under earlier
enactments. See, e.g., In re Bernard, 280 F. 715 (2d Cir. 1922). The approach was implicitly
ratified by the Supreme Court's decision in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934),
which authorized injunctive intervention in state dischargeability litigation "under unusual
circumstances." Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 241; see supra note 89.
91. The difference in receptivity to a broad "fresh start" was a widely accepted hunch
throughout the period. See, e.g., Smedley, Determination of the Effect of a Discharge in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 49, 59 (1961). Anecdotal evidence of the difference could be
derived from a comparison of reported federal and state holdings as to the scope of particular exceptions to discharge. See, e.g., Jaco v. Baker, 1-74 Or. 191, 148 P.2d 938 (1944) (characterized in J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 82, at 103, as "[i]mputing an animal's malice to its
owner"). Compare, e.g., Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934) (malicious injuries exception requires actual malice) with Greenfield v. Tucillo, 265 A.D. 343, 38 N.Y.S.2d
758 (1942) (liability for injuries caused by running a red light, with no apparent aggravating
circumstances, held nondischargeable). A statistical test of the hunch was made possible by
the 1970 amendments which conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to hear the most commonly raised claims of nondischargeability. See infra note 142. Notably, while there was a
decline in the rates of dischargeability challenges and of default judgments, there appeared
to be no significant alteration in success rates as to litigated challenges. See Schuchman,
Impact Analysis of the 1970 Bankruptcy Discharge Amendments, 51 N.C. L. REv. 233
(1972). But cf. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984) (discussing the limited utility of litigation success rates as evidencing a tribunal's
bias for or against particular kinds of claims).
92. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL
TABLES iii (1982) (table summarizing annual filings 1970 through 1981) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL TABLES]; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES
OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS 6 (1969) (figure summarizing filings from 1954 through 1969).
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time, the "consumer law revolution" had begun, and with it came
intensified interest in questions regarding the adequacy of the legal
structure protecting consumers of credit. Discussion of these concerns was fueled in part by the work of social scientists, who had
produced a remarkable mass of statistical data on financially distressed consumers in general, and consumer bankrupts in

particular.9 3
One relatively immediate and pervasive consequence of these developments was an enlarged conception of the social costs that
were the foundation of the "fresh start" policy. Armed with empirical studies of wage garnishment, critics of the coercive collections
system argued that debt burdens were not merely a disincentive to
productive employment, but an affirmative impediment even for
the willing worker, since one common result of garnishment appeared to be the debtor's involuntary loss of employment.9 4 Beyond questions of productivity, cost conceptions were further
broadened by data suggesting the existence of significant adverse
psychological and health consequences resulting from financial difficulties.9 5 Moreover, consciousness of the social nature of these
personal and economic costs was sharpened by the existence of social insurance and public assistance programs, which added actual
public expense to what might otherwise be somewhat remote notions of productivity and net social welfare."
93. See, e.g., J. BRoSKY, A STUDY OF PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY IN THE SEATTLE METROPOLITAN
(1965); G. BRUNNER, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCIES: TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS (1965); D.
CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974); H. JACOB, DEBTAREA

ORS IN COURT THE CONSUMPTION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES

(1969); Dolphin, Characteristics

of the Financially Distressed, BANKING, Jan. 1967, at 55; Hermann, Families in Bankruptcy-A Survey of Recent Studies, 28 J. MARR. & FAh. 324 (1966); Shuchman, Little
Bankruptcies in New England, 56 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1976); Siporin, Bankrupt Debtors and
Their Families, 12 SOC. WORK 51 (1967).
94. See, e.g., D. CAPLOVrrZ, supra note 93, at 275-79; Anderson, Coercive Collection and
Exempt Propertyin Texas: A Debtor's Paradiseor a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REV. 84, 12628 (1975); Countryman, ConsumerBankruptcy-Some Recent Changes and Some Proposals, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 165, 166 (1971); Project, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An
EmpiricalStudy, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743, 758-66 (1968); Comment, Wage Garnishment:Still
Driving the Wage-EarningFamily to the Wall, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 631, 657-58 (1977).
95. See, e.g., D. CAPLOVrrz, supra note 93, at 280-85; H. JACOB, supra note 93, at 114;
Anderson, supra note 94, at 132; Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive
Revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 Am. BANKR. L.J. 99, 152 (1975); Greenfield, Coercive Collections Tactic-An Analysis of the Interests and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q.
1, 9; Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L.J. 461, 471-72 (1973).
96. See, e.g., Avis, An Economic Rationale for Statutory Interest Rate Ceilings, 13 Q.
REV. EcoN. & Bus. 61 (Autumn 1973) (defense of usury ceilings as limiting credit available
to high-risk borrowers and hence limiting externalization of collections costs to social insurance programs); Discussion, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 123, 142 (Autumn 1977) (Prof.
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With respect to bankruptcy in particular, the revised perception
of the costs of financial difficulty was accompanied by concerns
over the efficacy of the bankruptcy system as a means of reducing
those costs. There was at least a suspicion, confirmed in part by
studies, that a substantial number of debtors who were eligible for
and would benefit from bankruptcy nonetheless failed to file.9 7
More importantly, even for those who did file, limitations on the
scope and effect of the discharge raised questions as to its capacity
to relieve existing debt. These questions revolved in the main
around the apparently high rates of reaffirmation or revival of
debts following discharge, which were in turn regarded as a product of the significant postbankruptcy leverage afforded creditors by
security interests, informal collections, and state jurisdiction of
dischargeability issues. To the extent that dischargeable obligations survived bankruptcy, or were revived shortly thereafter,
many of the problems that were thought to warrant the availability
of a discharge appeared to remain unsolved."e
A different set of concerns, somewhat opposed to those above,
was raised by the absence from the bankruptcy system of any express criterion of need for relief as a condition to the availability of
the discharge. The conventional theory for accommodating the
tension between the system's creditor payment and debtor relief
objectives had long been premised in large part on the "hopeless"
state of the debtor's finances. This premise rested on a view that,
given his balance sheet and prospects, neither the debtor nor his
creditors could have much realistic expectation of significant payLogue, suggesting that discharge may be warranted to limit public assistance externalities);
Rendleman, Bankruptcy Revision: Procedure and Process, 53 N.C.L. REv. 1197, 1231-35

(1975) (drawing extended analogy between bankruptcy and public welfare programs); Trebilcock & Shulman, The Pathology of Credit Breakdown, 22 McGILL L.J. 415, 458-59 (1976)
(suggesting that exemption levels for earnings should be set above amount of public welfare
benefits to limit disincentive to work); Project, supra note 94, at 766-67 (description of garnishment as preventing efforts of General Relief beneficiaries to become self-supporting);
Comment, Discharge: The Prime Mover of Bankruptcy, 15 Sw. L.J. 308, 326 (1961) (dis-

charge characterized as a buttress to capitalist economy, since it limits likelihood of development of welfare dependent class of poor).
97. See REPORT, supra note 5, at 46-47, 76; Rendleman, supra note 96, at 1229;
Shuchman, An Attempt at a Philosophy of Bankruptcy, 21 UCLA L. REv. 403, 412-13
(1973).
98. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 5, at 169, 173-78; S. ENZFA R. DzBRmARD & F. LAzAR,
SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING BANKRUPTcY REFORM 86-90 (1973); D. STANLEY & M.
GIRTH, supra note 2, at 329; Lee, What Shall We Do for the Consumer Bankruptcy?, 44 J.
NAT'L CONF. REF. BANKR. 9, 10-11 (1970); Cowans, An Agenda for Bankruptcy Reformers, 43

J. NAT.

CONF. REF. BANKI.

3 (1969).
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ment even if no discharge were available.9 9 In that context, the
term implied both the debtor's present inability to pay debts and a
predictive judgment that the inability would continue to exist to
some degree for some time in the future. At the same time, although perhaps less strongly, the term implied that discharge
would be less appropriate for a debtor with a present ability to pay
or whose difficulties were relatively certain to be brief in duration.
Nonetheless, perhaps due to the obvious difficulties inherent in defining "ability to pay" and in making confident predictions of future economic condition, the statute contained no test or standard
which would limit relief to cases of "hopeless" indebtedness.
Rather, eligibility for voluntary bankruptcy required only that the
debtor petition for relief and that he surrender all his nonexempt
assets for liquidation and distribution to creditors. Neither solvency nor a present or predicted ability to pay were grounds for
denial of relief. 00
In commercial or business bankruptcies, the absence of an express-need criterion does not appear to have been particularly disturbing. Because even troubled business entities were likely to
have significant assets, 101 the Act's requirement of asset surrender
served as a crude proxy for any missing need standard. Generally
speaking, a business debtor's willingness to offer up his property
strongly bespoke both his present inability and his firm belief that
things were unlikely to turn around in the foreseeable future. 10 2 In
consumer bankruptcies, however, the use of assets as a proxy for a
need standard was far more problematic. The tangible assets of the
usual consumer debtor were believed to consist mainly of used consumer goods which were likely to be exempt and, in any event, to
99. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
100. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4a, 30 Stat. 541, 547 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 301 (1982)); see Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190-91 (1902) (filing
"establishes... [inability to pay] so far as a decree in bankruptcy is concerned, and...
[t]his is not an issuable fact ....
[The bankrupt] may be, in fact, fraudulent and able and
unwilling to pay his debts; but the law takes him at his word") (quoting In re Fowler, 9 F.
Cas. 614, 614 (D. Mass. 1867) (No. 4998)); In re Fox West Coast Theatres, 88 F.2d 212 (9th
Cir.) (pleading or proof of insolvency unnecessary for voluntary petition), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 710 (1937).
101. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 2, at 58, 88 table 5-2 (difference in percentage of asset cases among business and nonbusiness individual bankruptcies).
102. That was particularly so given the notorious overoptimism of business bankrupts
regarding their chances of success. See Cyr, supra note 95, at 163-64; Furth, The Critical
Period Before Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 853, 861-62 (1932); Seligson, Major Problems for
Considerationby the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 45 Am.
B~aKR L.J. 73, 86 (1971).
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have little market value. 10 3 The consumer's chief form of wealth
was seen, rather, as his potential for future earnings. Income, of
course, was not an asset until earned, but the present capacity to
earn could itself be regarded a present asset-the economist's
"human capital.' 10 4 In the context of consumer credit, there was
an increasing recognition that the value of that asset was more
than an economic construct, since consumer lending was in fact
done largely in reliance on the debtor's earning prospects and not
on the basis of his tangible property. 10 5 In bankruptcy, however,
the debtor's human capital was not treated as property or as an
asset subject to surrender as part of the price of discharge. 06 That
exclusion of future income from consideration, taken together with
the presumptively minimal value of most consumer goods, tended
to place in doubt the reliability of asset surrender as a test of need
in consumer cases. A consumer debtor with no prospective inability to pay, it was suggested, might willingly surrender nonexempt
assets and would thus have an incentive to avail himself of bankruptcy without regard to need. To the extent that that was the
case, it was argued, the creditors' legitimate interest in and reliance on a still-valuable asset would have been frustrated. 0 7
These concerns and the accompanying doubts regarding the
availability and effect of relief measures were expressed during the
103. See MacLachlan, PuritanicalTherapy for Wage Earners,68 COM. L.J. 87, 88 (1963);
Note, Discharge Provisions in Consumer Bankruptcy: The Need for a New Approach, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251, 1265 (1970).
104. See Discussion, supra note 96, at 156-59.
105. See, e.g., S. ENZER, R. DEBRIGARD, & F. LAZAR, supra note 98, at 7; Discussion, supra
note 96, at 156-58; Driver, Proposal-ToAmend the Bankruptcy Act to Require that Consideration Be Given to the Use of Chapter XIII, 18 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 41, 42 (1964);
Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLuM. L. REV.
445, 480 n.101 (1968); MacLachlan, supra note 103, at 89; Meckling, Financial Markets,
Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAW & CoNrrMP. PROB. 13, 28-29 (Autumn 1977); Note, supra note 103, at 1265; see also AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN INST., LENDING PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES 75-76 (1971) (importance of income in decisions as to
creditworthiness of consumer borrower).
106. The exclusion of human capital from the reach of creditors in bankruptcy was a
necessary consequence of the definition of the estate as essentially including only the
debtor's present assets. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 541, 565-66 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982)). It was also a consequence of the Supreme Court's
decision in Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 242-45, which precluded the enforcement of prebankruptcy liens on postbankruptcy earnings. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., S. ENZER, R. DEBRIGARD & F. LAZAR, supra note 98, at 7; Cyr, Bankruptcy
Courts in Transition Toward Debtor Rehabilitation, 22 ME. L. REV. 333, 335-37 (1970);
Dolphin, supra note 93, at 55; MacLachlan, supra note 103, at 90-91; Meth, Is Bankruptcy
Outmoded?, 19 Bus. LAW. 673 (1964); Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROS. 107, 113 n.10, 121 (Autumn 1977); Note, supra note 103, at 1265-67.

19861

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

1960's and 1970's in wide-ranging debate and in a myriad of proposals for revision of consumer credit regulation generally, and of
the bankruptcy system in particular. Notwithstanding the number
and variety of contributions to these controversies, each approach
tended to follow one of a limited number of patterns determined
by the particular critic's assumptions about the operation of the
consumer credit system. As related to bankruptcy law, there were
essentially two such patterns or "theories" of debtor relief. The
first focused on limited consumer competence as the source of consumer financial difficulties; its proponents tended to regard a relatively generous discharge policy as an essential corrective for those
difficulties. The second, by contrast, defined the propriety of relief
by reference to economic theory and the economics of consumer
credit markets. In general, its proponents regarded proposed expansions of the discharge and other relief measures with caution, if
not outright hostility.
Consumer incompetence theory was in large part a refinement
and extension of the earlier "exploitation" model with its twin assumptions of "amateur" borrowing and "excessive" lending.10 8 At
times, the theory was framed in moral terms, as by an emphasis on
the "suffering" of the financially distressed or the "oppressiveness"
of coercive collections.10 9 The theory also seemed to express distributive preferences and a corresponding vision of debtor relief as
an amelioration of the consequences of poverty.1 10 But neither
moral nor distributive concerns were essential to the central point
of the theory, which was that consumer financial difficulties and
their attendant social costs were ordinarily a product of the
debtor's failure either to accurately judge his repayment capacity
or to make adequate provision for adverse changes in his financial
108. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Countryman, Some Good and Some Bad Features of the Proposed New
Bankruptcy Act, 7 U.C.C. L.J. 213, 224 (1975) (description of creditors as obtaining reaffirmations by trickery and coercion); Cyr, supra note 95, at 152 (discharge described as
protecting "young marrieds the very integrity of whose domestic and economic existence is
threatened," and as permitting "young families to maintain their dignity and integrity").
110. See, e.g., Brendes & Schwartz, Schlockmeister's Jubilee: Bankruptcy for the Poor,
40 J. NAT'L CONF. REF. BANKS 69 (1966); Countryman, supra note 94, at 166 (disclosurestyle consumer protection "of little value" to low-income, blue-collar consumer bankrupts);
Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L.
REv. 441, 449 (1967) (rate ceilings and disclosure requirements described as "largely middleclass solutions ... to what has increasingly become a lower-class problem"); Wallace, supra
note 95, at 477 (attributing some reform proposals to desire to "reduce the suffering and
injustice" occasioned by existing wealth distribution).
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circumstances. Those failures were in turn attributed to several
causes. First, many consumers were said to underestimate both the
risk and the consequences of default, while overestimating the
value of immediate credit."' Second, the economic circumstances
of low-income consumers were seen as frequently preventing the
maintenance of a cushion against even small financial reverses." 2
Third, creditors were charged with compounding these difficulties
by the aggressive marketing of credit and by the failure to adequately screen consumer credit risks." 3 Thus, default was characterized as the product of personal weakness or of a credit market
failure, or both.
Within the framework established by these premises, incompetence theory came in essentially two forms. In the more moderate
version, the proper function of the discharge and the primary determinant of its scope was the direct alleviation of the effects of
financial failure. This goal was to be accomplished by assuring that
the discharge in fact completely extricated the distressed debtor
from his existing debt burdens. Proponents of this rescue approach
thus argued for enlarged exemptions, limits on the degree to which
security interests survived discharge, and broad prohibitions of
even informal postbankruptcy collection efforts. 11 4 Given their em111. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 5, at 53; Grau & Whitford, The Impact of Judicializing
Repossession: The Wisconsin Consumer Act Revisited, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 983, 987 n.21 (suggesting possible consumer "hyperproclivity" to credit use); Jordan & Warren, supra note
110, at 448 (low-income debtors overcommitted because they are not able to rationally manage finances); Seligson, supra note 102, at 111-13; Wallace, supra note 95, at 472 (suggestion
that debtors may underestimate the probability of default and the gravity of its consequences); Note, supra note 103, at 1264 (suggestion that debtors may underestimate the
probability of default and the gravity of its consequences). Various empirical studies likewise suggested that among the chief causes of financial difficulties were the debtor's financial management and "overuse" of credit. See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 93, at 329; Ryan &
Maynes, The Excessively Indebted: Who and Why, 3 J. CoNs. AFF. 107, 124 (1969).
112. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 5, at 54-55; D. CAPLOvrrz, supra note 93, at 58; Siporin,
supra note 93, at 61; Comment, supra note 94, at 658. The lack of a cushion was further
suggested by the greater tendency of problem debtors (relative to the population as a whole)
to employ credit as a means of meeting current needs, rather than to obtain durables. See
Hermann, supra note 93, at 326, 328. See generally G. BRUNNER, supra note 93.
113. See, e.g., Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1452, 1458-60
(1964); Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L.
REv. 1 (1975); Herzog, Bankruptcy Tomorrow, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 57, 62, 65-66 (1971); see
also Shuchman, supra note 12, at 363 (relative to Israeli creditors' remedies: "[p]rospective
creditors might be more prudent if there were not the power to imprison and garnish
wages").
114. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 5, at 75-76, 169-75, 177; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra
note 2, at 206, 208, 210; Brendes & Schwartz, supra note 110; Countryman, For a New
Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 678 (1960); Kennedy, Reflections on
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phasis on the effects rather than the causes of insolvency, rescue
proponents ordinarily rejected proposals aimed at differentiating
the relief available to debtors according to differences in the
sources of their problems. 115 In part, this emphasis may have reflected a view that the availability of the discharge had little effect
on consumer behavior in incurring debts." 6 In addition, efforts to
differentiate debtors or forms of relief were regarded both as impractical and as likely to impair the broad relief believed necessary
to effectively reduce the costs of failure. 117 Similarly, while conceding the theoretical propriety of limiting the discharge to those in
need, commentators of the rescue school usually concluded that
the matter was primarily a theoretical concern, and that in the real
world no workable standard could be devised that would not deny
relief to a substantial number of debtors in actual need." 8 For rescue theorists, the creditor-payment objectives of the bankruptcy
system were immaterial in consumer bankruptcies," 9 and concerns
with awkward wealth transfer effects were best handled by nar20
rowly drawn exceptions to dischargeability.
In the more sweeping version of incompetence theory, the central point of bankruptcy was the consumer debtor's "rehabilitation."'12' Proponents of this approach shared the rescue theorists'
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REv.
427, 445-50 (1974); Lee, supra note 98, at 10-11; Comment, Section 14f(2) of the Bankruptcy Act: Half a Loaf to the Bankrupt, 14 Hous. L. REv. 486, 495-99 (1977).
115. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 98, at 10.
116. That would certainly have been true to the extent that the difficulties encountered
by debtors, even those arising from excess reliance on credit, were regarded as a function of
matters essentially beyond their control. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 5, at 55.
117. These points were usually made in objection to rehabilitation proposals. See infra
notes 121-23 and accompanying text; see, e.g., REPORT, supra note 5 at 83; Walker, Is Chapter XIII a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State?, 33 J. NAT'L Assoc. REP. BANK. 7
(1959); see also Wallace, supra note 95, at 473-74.
118. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 5, at 158-59; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 2, at
38-39, 205; Countryman, ProposedNew Amendments for ChapterXIII, 22 Bus. LAw. 1151,
1153 (1967); Lee, supra note 98, at 10.
119. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 94, at 167-68; Shuchman, The FraudException in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 23 STAN. L. REv. 735, 739 & n.18 (1971).
120. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 5, at 78-79, 80; see also D. STANLEY & M. GmTH,supra
note 2, at 208 (suggesting that use of nondischargeability to prefer claims other than those
for support would unduly impede "fresh start" ).
121. See, e.g., S. ENZFR, R. DEBRIGAD & F. LAzAR, supra note 98, at 8; Cowans, supra
note 98, at 4-5; Cyr, supra note 107, at 338-39, 342-43, 345-46; Herzog, supra note 113, at
62-63; Seligson, supra note 102, at 105, 110-13; Note, supra note 103, at 1269-77. As noted
by Judge Lee, the term "rehabilitation" as used in discussions of the "fresh start" suffers
from serious ambiguity. Lee, supra note 98, at 13 n.12; see also Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C.L. REv. 723, 726 (1980). As sometimes
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preference for a broadly drawn discharge and usually, although not
inevitably, shared an aversion to express need or inability to pay
criteria. 122 Unlike the rescue approach, however, rehabilitation theory regarded the bankruptcy system as an appropriate vehicle for
directly addressing the underlying causes of consumer financial
difficulties. In part, the theory involved a revival of the distinction
between the "improvident" and the "unfortunate" debtor. 1 23 It assumed that a significant and identifiable portion of the consumer
bankruptcy population consisted of debtors whose difficulties were
caused by financial incompetence, rather than simple economic
vulnerability. The importance accorded the distinction was not,
however, a matter of the discharge's ex ante incentive effects; it
related, rather, to concern for the full ex post effectiveness of the
"fresh start." In particular, rehabilitation theory assumed that the
specific deficiencies involved in consumer defaults were capable of
being identified and corrected by the institutions that administered the discharge. Indeed, the correction of those deficiencies was
regarded as essential to assuring that the debtor's financial difficulties would not recur. Thus, proponents of the theory argued for
reforms linking the discharge to the debtor's participation in some
type of rehabilitative or therapeutic program appropriate to his
circumstances. Precise recommendations as to the nature of the
program varied widely, from consumer education through psychological counselling to long-term third party supervision of the
debtor's finances, but all shared a relatively strong faith in the
powers of training and education.
Set off against the rescue and rehabilitation versions of incompetence theory was the body of commentary in which the propriety
and scope of relief measures were defined by economic theory and
the economics of credit markets. Central to this approach was the
now-familiar premise that contracts arrived at by parties in a competitive market could ordinarily be expected to reflect an optimal
mix of contract terms which maximized the welfare of each party
and minimized the total cost of the transaction. For the economic
theorist, the existence or nonexistence of particular collection
rights was an implied term in each credit contract. The content of
used, rehabilitation means no more than the debtor's return to a more or less debt-free
condition, and it is in that weak sense essentially synonymous with the discharge from legal
liability. More commonly, and as used here, it refers to the personal or psychological "rehabilitation" of the debtor's postbankruptcy values and behavior regarding credit.
122. See, e.g., Cowans, supra note 98, at 5-6.
123. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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that term would be expected to directly affect the creditor's costs
by affecting his costs of collection and risks of noncollection. 2 4
Moreover, it was argued, the impact of those costs would not be
borne by creditors but would be directly reflected in the cost of
credit to borrowers in the form of interest rates, credit availability,
security requirements, and the like. Thus, according to the theory,
any expansion in the availability or extent of the bankruptcy discharge would, by narrowing collection rights and increasing creditors' costs, increase the cost of borrowing for consumers, or more
precisely, the increased costs caused by borrowers availing themselves of the discharge would be borne by those borrowers who did
not. 125 In the view of economic theory, this debtor-to-debtor subsidy effect of relief measures was necessarily incompatible with distributive explanations offered by those who proposed such measures. 126 More importantly, the nonwaivability of the discharge was
regarded as, in effect, imposing a particular collection rights term
and its attendant costs on all credit contracts without regard to the
preferences of the parties; that is, each borrower was required to
"buy" a particular degree of protection from collections whether or
not he wanted it, and whether or not he regarded the protection as
worth the increased price. Any increase in the scope of that compelled protection was troublesome to economic theorists because it
necessarily involved a departure from the preferences of some consumers, resulting in less-than-optimal credit contracts and hence
127
in decreased social welfare.
Carried to its logical conclusion, economic theory appeared to
counsel the abolition of any discharge rights except those agreed to
128
by the parties. Some critics came close to espousing that view.
Others were content simply to reject as theoretically or factually
unsound the arguments of relief proponents based on consumer in124. See, e.g., R. JOHNSON, COsT/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CREDrrORS' REMEDMS 24-28 (Credit
Res. Center, Purdue Univ. Monograph No. 12, 1978); Meckling, supra note 105, at 13-17, 2123, 27-29; Trebilcock & Shulman, supra note 96, at 452.
125. See, e.g., Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Per Cent Simple: The Arkansas Case,
1968 U. ILL. L.F. 592; Meckling, supra note 105, at 23-24; Trebilcock & Shulman, supra note
96, at 452-53; Weistart, supra note 107, at 118-19; R. JOHNSON, supra note 124, at 34-35; A.C.
SULLIVAN, THE RESPONSE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS TO RATE CEILINGS AND RESTRICTIONS ON

REMEDIES ON CONSUMER CREDrr CONTRACTS 20-22 (Credit Res. Center, Purdue Univ., Working Paper No. 32, 1979).
126. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 105, at 479; Weistart, supra note 107, at 119.
127. See, e.g., R. JOHNSON, supra note 124, at 34-37, 74-75; Meckling, supra note 105, at
29.
128. See, e.g., Meckling, supra note 105, at 29.
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formation deficiencies, inequality of bargaining power, and the "irresponsibility" of lenders. 129 More commonly, however, economic
theorists sought to identify some function for the discharge that
would be at least arguably compatible with efficiency considerations; thus, their operational recommendations tended to center on
ways to frame the discharge so that it would serve the identified
function in the least disruptive way. As was true of incompetence
theory, these economic theories of the discharge came in essentially two versions.
In the first, the discharge was returned to its nineteenth-century
role as an aid to the original purpose of the bankruptcy system,
facilitating the collection efforts of creditors. 13 0 In contrast to the
nineteenth-century model, however, the discharge was not conceived as a reward for the cooperative debtor. It was, rather, said
to be a device by which creditors could efficiently discover that
their debtor's financial circumstances rendered further collection
efforts pointless.13 1 For the debtor, the advantage to the device
would be the cessation of collections. For creditors, the discharge
would remove uncertainty as to the value of continued collection
effort and permit collection resources to be devoted to more productive uses. From that perspective, the credibility and hence utility of the discharge was directly dependent on its accuracy in identifying debtors who could appropriately be written off as
uncollectible. Thus, in contrast to both brands of incompetence
theory, this collections approach placed controlling emphasis on
the debtor's actual capacity to pay, which included consideration
of his future earnings possibilities. 13 2 That emphasis was reflected
rhetorically in appeals to the moral value of payment and to the
creditor-payment objectives of the bankruptcy system.133 Operationally, it blossomed in proposals to limit unconditional discharge
to those truly in extremis, while affording relief in other cases, if at
129. See, e.g., Cayne & Trebilcock, Market Considerations in the Formulation of Consumer ProtectionPolicy, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 396, 418-19 (1973); Newton, Economic Rationality of the Poor, 36 HuM. ORG. 50 (1977); Schwartz, Seller Unequal BargainingPower and
the Judicial Process, 49 IND. L.J. 367 (1974); R. JOHNSON, supra note 124, passim.
130. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Discussion, supra note 96, at 150-51,152-54, 170; MacLachlan, supra note
103; see also Weistart, supra note 107, at 110 (suggesting but not quite adopting this view).

132. Consistent with that emphasis, proponents of this approach did not ordinarily advocate sorting of debtors by the causes of their difficulties.
133. See, e.g., MacLachan, supra note 103; Meth, supra note 107.
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all, only upon the debtor's completion of a court-supervised pay34
ment plan.1
The second version of economic theory posited a somewhat different function for the discharge, focusing on its influence at the
time of contracting rather than at default. According to the theory,
by limiting the debtor's liability at default, the discharge limited
the risks the debtor bore at the time of contracting, particularly
the risk that the actual condition of his finances when payment
came due would fail to meet his expectations at the time he incurred the debt. As an initial matter, the theory held, the limitation increased the risk to the creditor, since the creditor would
bear a greater loss if the contingency materialized. With other less
risky lending alternatives available, it was pointed out, the creditor
would only accept the added risk at a higher price for credit
granted to the debtor and others similarly situated. Thus, the theory characterized the implicit discharge term in each credit contract as, in effect, compelling the debtor's purchase of insurance
against the risk of adverse changes in his finances while the loan
was outstanding, insurance which was paid for by an implicit premium in the price of the loan."5 Viewed as insurance, the discharge could be said to perform the socially useful function of interpersonal risk spreading among debtors.'36 That characterization
did not of itself, however, explain the compulsory nature of the
risk allocation or define the appropriate contours of the "fresh
start." For insurance theorists, both of those matters were ad134. See, e.g., Dolphin, supra note 93, at 29; Driver, supra note 105, at 47-48; MacLachIan, supra note 103, Meth, supra note 107; Twinem, American Bar Association Approves
ProposedAmendment to Bankruptcy Act, 19 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 109, 110 (1965). The most
widely debated proposals were those that sought to limit "straight" (asset liquidation) bankruptcy to those consumers for whom a Chapter 13 plan would not be feasible. See generally
Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Seass. (1967).
135. See, e.g., K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 139-40 (1971) (discharge
operates as substitute for insurance); R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 293 (2d ed.
1977) (discharge as risk allocation similar to corporate limited liability); G. TuLLOCK, THE
LOGIC OF THE LAW 54-55 (1971) (nonwaivability of discharge as limiting risks); Kripke, supra
note 105, at 485 (discharge analogized to insurance); Weston, Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 59-61 (1977) (discussion
of discharge as insurance); see also Discussion, supra note 96, at 159-65 (analogy of discharge to risk-allocation function of impossibility doctrine in contract law); Weistart, supra
note 107, at 110-12 (analogy of discharge to risk-allocation function of impossibility doctrine
in contract law). The insurance characterization was not entirely novel. See 2 R. ELY. PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 730-31 (1914)
(creditors ought not complain over discharge since they receive "in the price of an insurance
premium with a higher rate of interest for deferred payments").
136. See, e.g., K. ARROW, supra note 135, at 141.
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dressed by reference to the problem of "moral hazard." One effect
of insurance coverage is to reduce the insured's incentive to avoid
the peril insured against, together with a related increase in his
incentive to unnecessarily avail himself of the insurance "payoff."'137 In the context of bankruptcy, it was suggested, the exis-

tence of moral hazard explained at least in part the absence of
markets in insurance against the perils dealt with by the discharge,
and provided a rationale for intervention to achieve a nonmarket
allocation of risks. 138 In addition, the need to limit moral hazard
was viewed as an important determinant of the availability and
scope of the discharge, since relatively easy access to relief could be
expected to increase both excessive borrowing and excessive resort
to bankruptcy.'
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, legislative and judicial development of the doctrines embodying the "fresh start" policy appeared to follow the assumptions and implications of the rescue
version of incompetence theory. There were some notable exceptions, as in the 1977 addition of federally guaranteed student loans
to the list of nondischargeable obligations. 140 More commonly,
however, proposals to strengthen the hands of creditors in consumer bankruptcies (not infrequently attached to reminders of the
system's creditor-payment objectives) simply languished for want
of congressional interest.'14 And when Congress did act, the statu-

tory changes were ordinarily directed to expanding the effect of the
discharge or to foreclosing creditors' opportunities to circumvent
137. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text (full discussion of moral hazard).
138. See, e.g., K. ARROW,supra note 135, at 140-43; see also J. LAFFONT, ESSAYS IN THE

87-102 (1980) (relative to insurance generally, advantage of government institution as device for acquiring information needed to reduce moral hazard);
Pauly, Overinsuranceand Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and
Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44, 44 (1974) (advantage of government institution as device for acquiring information needed to reduce moral hazard).
139. See, e.g., Kripke, Collection Spite, An End to Academic Overreaction,and the Next
Curricular Step, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 681, 687 (1972) (amending the views expressed in
Kripke, supra note 105, at 480 n.101); Trebilcock & Shulman, supra note 96, at 465; Weistart, supra note 107, at 121. But see Weston, supra note 135, at 59-61 (suggesting that
bankruptcy law suffers from an "overproduction" of moral hazard controls).
140. Act of Oct. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 439(a), 90 Stat. 2141 (formerly codified at
20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (repealed 1978)). Under the amendment, guaranteed student loans became dischargeable after the expiration of five years from the due date of the debtor's first
payment, and they were dischargeable within the five-year period if the bankruptcy court
determined that payment would impose "an undue hardship on the debtor or his dependents." Id.
141. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY
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its effects. The 1970 discharge amendments,1 42 for example, effectively deprived state courts of jurisdiction to decide the claims of
nondischargeability most commonly invoked in consumer cases.
Under the amendments, creditors who failed to raise claims of
fraud and of "willful and malicious" injury in a bankruptcy case
were barred from later litigation of the issue. Moreover, the discharge was not, as it traditionally had been, merely a waivable affirmative defense to such claims in later proceedings. It functioned,
rather, as an injunction against any subsequent judicial collections
activity and rendered any judgment on the discharged claim "null
and void. ' 143 The express point of these procedural and doctrinal
changes was to compensate for the perceived inability of consumer
debtors to enforce their discharge rights after bankruptcy: far too
many of them, according to the legislative history (and in accord
with the tenets of rescue theory), were too ignorant or too poor to
14 4
protect their interests after bankruptcy.
A similar orientation to broadening the effectiveness of the discharge and reducing the postbankruptcy leverage of creditors was
apparent in judicial doctrines as well. Thus, statements of the
"fresh start" policy evidenced a subtle shift away from productivity incentives to a far less-focused emphasis simply on complete
relief from prebankruptcy claims, 145 an emphasis that did not admit of much in the way of limitations or countervailing policy concerns. That altered vision of the policy was more than merely rhe14 6 for example, the Supreme
torical. In Lines v. Frederick,
Court
held that a wage earner's nonexempt vacation pay, earned but not
yet paid, was nonetheless not subject to creditors' claims in bankruptcy, since it would detract from the "fresh start" if the debtor's
postdischarge leisure were burdened with predischarge obligations.1 47 Likewise, in Perez v. Campbell,14 8 the Court held that, at
least in some circumstances, the Supremacy Clause precluded enforcement of state motor vehicle financial responsibility laws relative to debtors whose accident liabilities had been discharged in
142.
143.
17, 30
144.

Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990.
Id. §§ 2, 7, 84 Stat. at 990-92 (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 14(b),
Stat. 544, 550-51, as amended).
H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 US. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4156, 4156-57.
145. See, e.g., Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970).

146. Id.
147. Id. at 20.
148. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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bankruptcy. According to the Court, the broad relief contemplated
by the "fresh start" policy was incompatible with the postbankruptcy leverage afforded tort claimants by such otherwise
149
valid statutes.
Taken together, these and similar changes in the legal and doctrinal structure of the "fresh start 150 tended to establish the precedence of rescue theory as a description of the "official" policy of
the consumer discharge. The virtually complete (albeit temporary)
triumph of that theory came with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.'11
As has often been said, the most notable characteristic of the
Code in the consumer setting was the generous availability and
52
breadth of the "fresh start" it afforded the bankrupt debtor.1
There were, to be sure, various statements in the legislative history
that offered at least a nod to the view of collections theorists that
the consumer bankruptcy system should facilitate payments to
creditors.5 5 But in the statute itself, as applied to consumer debtors, expressions of that policy were difficult to find. Thus, as had
prior law, the Code imposed no express criterion of need or inability to pay as a precondition to discharge. 54 The drafters were not
entirely unresponsive to the problems posed by the human capital
of future earnings in consumer cases. Their response, however,
took a form consistent with the view of rescue theory that limits on
the availability of the discharge would defeat its primary function
of effectively extricating the overburdened from their debts.
In particular, the Code offered the consumer debtor a choice of
bankruptcy proceedings: Chapter 7, in which the discharge was, as
it had been in the past, dependent only on the surrender of nonexempt assets, without consideration of earnings capacity; 55 and
149. Perez, 402 U.S. at 649-51.
150. See, e.g., Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-621, § 1, 74 Stat. 408 (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 541, 550 (limiting to business cases the denial of
discharge for obtaining credit by use of a false financial statement)).
151. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
152. See supra note 8.
153. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5798.
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) (commencement of case constitutes an order for relief);
see also S. REP., supra note 153, at 94, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5880 (dismissal provision "does not contemplate ... that the ability of the debtor to repay his debts
in whole or in part constitutes adequate cause for dismissal").
155. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. at 2604 (codified as
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Chapter 13, in which the debtor could substitute earnings for assets as the price or the discharge, retaining even his nonexempt
property while carrying out a plan of partial or full repayment of
debts over a period of up to five years. 156 The choice between these
options was left entirely to the debtor, the sole directive force of
the Code being the greater attractiveness of Chapter 13 for some
kinds of debtors. 157 Thus, there were only minimal express constraints on the amount of earnings required to be devoted to payments under a Chapter 13 plan.15 8 Similarly, the Chapter 13 discharge included all of the debtor's liabilities except tax liabilities
and family support obligations,159 while in Chapter 7 at least some
claims that had traditionally been nondischargeable (such as some
tax obligations, and liabilities for fraud or for malicious injuries)
continued to survive bankruptcy.8 0 But these and other attractions of Chapter 13 operated solely as incentives, and the choice
between earnings and assets remained the debtor's.
The influence of rescue theory apparent in the Code's cautious
handling of the human capital problem was evident as well in the
statutory provisions defining the scope and effect of the discharge
in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases. Most of all, those proviamended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982 & Supp. H 1984)).
156. Id. at 2645 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)).
157. The choice remained the debtor's because there could be no involuntary petitions
under Chapter 13. See 92 Stat. at 2559 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982)). A Chapter 7
case could not be converted to a Chapter 13 case except on the debtor's request. See 92
Stat. at 2606 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 706(c) (1982)). The greater attractions of Chapter 13
included not only a broader discharge, see infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text, but
also a stay of collections actions directed against codebtors of the bankrupt debtor, 92 Stat.
at 2645 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982)) (amended 1984), and a stay of enforcement
action by holders of security interests in (or other liens on) the debtor's property. Id. at
2570 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(4), 1301 (1982) (§ 1301 amended Supp. II 1984)); see
also infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
158. See 92 Stat. at 2649 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. II 1984))
(requiring that the plan provide for payments having a present value at least equal to what
the creditor would have received under Chapter 7); see also infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text (discussing use of "good faith" requirement, 92 Stat. at 2648 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) (1982)), to require payments beyond the § 1325(a)(4) minimum).
159. Family obligations were expressly made nondischargeable. 92 Stat. at 2650 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982)) (excepting from Chapter 13 discharge the support obligations
described in § 523(a)(5)). Tax liabilities, while technically dischargeable in Chapter 13, were
effectively nondischargeable by reason of their status as priority claims, 92 Stat. at 2584
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (1982)) (renumbered as (a)(7), Supp. II 1984), since the
Code required that each plan provide for payment of priority claims in full. Id. at 2648
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (1982)).
160. See Id. at 2590, 2610 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a) & 727(b) (1982 &
Supp. 1I 1984)).
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sions manifested an overriding concern with assuring the practical
effectiveness of the relief afforded by the discharge. Thus, the injunctive effect introduced by the 1970 amendments was extended
beyond judicial collections to forbid "any act" by a creditor to recover a discharged debt.'6 1 Similarly, the Perez16 2 doctrine was
codified and expanded as a general prohibition of governmental
discrimination against debtors who had filed bankruptcy or whose
debts had been discharged.' Likewise, the range of nondischargeable debts in Chapter 7 cases was smaller than it had been under
the Act, 6 4 and exemption rights were bolstered by affording the
debtor the power to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase money liens
on exempt propertylea
At the same time, these evident concerns with the effectiveness
of the discharge were accompanied by provisions that, consistently
with rescue theory, manifested a lack of faith in the average
debtor's economic
competence.
Thus, the long-standing
nonwaivability of the right to discharge 6 6 was accompanied by new
provisions rendering unenforceable any prebankruptcy waivers of
exemption rights or lien avoidance powers, state law to the contrary notwithstanding. 6 7 Even more striking in that regard were
the provisions governing reaffirmations. Under the Code, the
debtor was disabled from entering any enforceable reaffirmation
after discharge, and postbankruptcy agreements entered into prior
161. Id. at 2592 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. II 1984)).
162. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (discussed supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text).
163. 92 Stat. at 2593 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 525 (Supp. H 1984)).
164. In particular, the Code abolished the nondischargeability of wage claims and of liabilities for criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of a promise to marry accompanied
by seduction. Id. at 2591 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. II
1984)); see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. In addition, the Code eliminated
"provability" as an element of dischargeability, see supra note 39 and accompanying text,
and substituted a broadly drawn definition of "claim" as including any right to payment. 92
Stat. at 2550 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982)); see also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274
(1985)). Thus, previously nondischargeable (because not "provable"), unliquidated pure tort
claims became subject to discharge. Liabilities for fines and penalties, which were ordinarily
not regarded as provable "debts" under the Act, see supra note 39, came within the Code
definition of "claim" but were added to the list of specific exceptions from discharge. 92
Stat. at 2591 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(7) (1982)).
165. 92 Stat. at 2589 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982)).
166. Under the Act, prebankruptcy waivers of discharge were denied enforcement as contrary to public policy. See 7 H. REMINGTON, supra note 51, § 2997. That rule was made
statutory by the Code. 92 Stat. at 2610 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10) (1982)) (discharge
to be granted unless court approves written postfiling waiver).
167. 92 Stat. at 2588 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522(e) (Supp. II 1982)).
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to discharge could be enforced only if approved by the court on a
finding that reaffirmation was in the debtor's "best interest" and
would not impose an "undue hardship."' 8
E. The Retreat from Rescue Theory: The 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments Act
As had been true of the 1898 Act, the adoption by the Code of a
specific approach to debtor relief by no means served to end discussion of the matter. The quality and direction of the postenactment debates were shaped by several related developments that,
while perhaps forseeable, were nonetheless not foreseen. Prime
among these was an apparently sudden and undoubtedly large increase in the number of consumer bankruptcy filings almost immediately following the Code's effective date.16 9 While the existence
or extent of any causal relation between the Code and the increased filings was a matter of some dispute,17 0 the timing was at
least enough to command serious attention. Accompanying the increased filings was a spreading concern (or at least suspicion) that
some significant portion of consumers resorting to bankruptcy
might be doing so in the absence of "real need," obtaining a discharge notwithstanding a capacity to repay and an absence of financial distress.17 1 At the same time, the case reports began to in168. Id. at 2592 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (1982 & Supp. II 1984)).

In 1984, the requirement of judicial consent was abolished as to reaffirmations by debtors
with counsel. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (Supp. M 1985).
169. See BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL TABLES, supra note 92, at iii (196,976 nonbusiness cases

filed in fiscal year 1979, the last full year governed by the Act; in fiscal year 1980, 314,856
debtors filed nonbusiness cases; and in fiscal year 1981, 452,145).
170. CompareBankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts
of the Comm. on the Judiciary (part 1), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1981) (statement of An-

drew Brimmer estimating "conservatively" that "between 136,000 and 150,000 'excess' bankruptcies" followed in the five quarters after enactment of the Code) [hereinafter Reform Act
Hearings] and A.C.SULLIVAN, ECONOMIC FACTORS ASSOCIATED wITH PERSONAL BANKRUPrCIS
16 (Credit Research Center, Purdue Univ., Working Paper No. 47, 1983) ("[albout half" of

1982 filings (i.e., about 200,000 filings) attributable to the increased generosity of the Code)
and Shepard, PersonalFailuresand the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 27 J. L. & ECON.
419, 435 (1984) (effect of Code to double the annual number of filings) with GAO STUDY,

supra note 2, at 16-17 (Code accounts for no more than 12% of total 1982 filings and could
be less if factors such as attorney advertising could be estimated). See also A.C. SULLIVAN,
ASSET EXEMPrIONS AND PROPENSITY TO FILE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY (Credit Research Center,
Purdue Univ., Working Paper No. 44, 1982) (concluding that higher exemption levels increase tendency to file bankruptcy); Woodward & Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive
to Voluntary Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study, 57 Ams BANKR. L.J. 53 (1983) (finding no
correlation between exemption levels and bankruptcy rates).
171. See, e.g., Future Earnings Hearings,supra note 2, passim. At the center of the sus-
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dicate both the apparent manipulability and the attractiveness of
the Code's broadened "fresh start," while also heightening consciousness of the general absence of enforceable limits on access to
its benefits. 17 2
These concerns were evident in a number of settings but they
crystallized in particular around two specific statutory issues:
whether to impose some variety of need criterion in Chapter 7
cases, and whether to adopt a more stringent minimum-payments
requirement in Chapter 13 cases. In the debates over both issues,
the underlying assumptions and theoretical frameworks that had
evolved in preCode analyses were evident yet again, but with some
significant differences. The most obvious change in the academic
commentary was a widening acceptance of the terminology and, to
a lesser extent, the implications of pre- and postCode economic critiques. There were, to be sure, continued contributions by unreconstructed rescue or rehabilitation theorists, for whom the central concerns of discharge policy were distributive justice, the
irresponsibility of creditors, or the economic vulnerability of debtors. 17 3 There was likewise a continuing production of rhetoric

framed in terms of moral arguments, addressing either the obligations of just debts1 74 or the putative "wage slavery" of the excessively indebted.17 5 More commonly, however, the postCode dispupicion was the widely cited "Purdue Study," the authors of which concluded that "depending on the assumptions made [regarding living expenses and repayment periods], 15 percent
to 30 percent of bankruptcy debtors probably could repay all of their nonmortgage debts

out of their future income."

CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
MANAGEMENT, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY VoL I, CONSUMERS' RIGHT TO BANKRUPTCY: ORIGINS AND EFFECTS 72 (PURDUE UNIVERSITY MONOGRAPH No. 23 (1982)) [hereinafter CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY]. Not infrequently, the conclusion was repeated in terms solely of

the high end of the range, and without the qualifying language. See, e.g., Future Earnings
Hearings, supra note 2, at 19 (testimony of Robert Johnson, director of the Purdue study"We did find that ... 29 percent could have repaid all of their nonmortgage debts in full in
a 60-month period."). The methodology and conclusions of the study are extensively criticized in Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access to the Bankruptcy Discharge:An
Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 109 [hereinafter Limiting Access]; see
also Sullivan, Reply: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge,1984 Wis. L. REV. 1069 (defense of the study) [hereinafter Reply]; Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Rejoinder: Limiting
Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 1087 [hereinafter Rejoinder].
172. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 185.
173. See, e.g., Future Earnings Hearings, supra note 2, at 129-34; Ayers, supra note 3;
Countryman, supra note 3; Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327 (1982).
174. See, e.g., Future Earnings Hearings, supra note 2, at 219 (statement of Paul G.
Tongue, Chase Manhattan Bank); Reply, supra note 171, at 1076-77; Young, The
"Straight" Bankruptcy Ripoff, 35 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 131 (1981).
175. See, e.g., Future Earnings Hearings, supra note 2, at 141-42 (statement of Ven
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tants were likely to share at least some common assumptions,
although in ways that sharpened the focus of their differences.
One common theme was an increasing acceptance (if only for the
sake of argument) of the risk-allocation or insurance characterization of the discharge posited by economic theorists, 76 together
with a related tendency to incorporate as accurate the economists'
177
views of the debtor-to-debtor transfer effects of relief measures.
A byproduct of this development was increased attention to explaining the compulsory aspect of the discharge "insurance," that
is, to offering justifications for the rules of nonwaivability governing particular facets of the "fresh start.'17 8 It was suggested
that interference with debtors' insurance choices might be warranted in order to limit the externalities related to collections-productivity losses or social insurance costs' 7 -or due to
the perceived limits on the capacity of consumer debtors to rationally account for the risks of default in credit decisions. 8 0
Countryman suggesting that the effect of limiting access would be "to enact a mass peonage
statute"); Limiting Access, supra note 171, at 1146 ("We should not permit purveyors of
high risk credit to lure the undisciplined further into debt and then to use the great, expensive engine of the law to collect their debts by making the undisciplined live for five years at
the poverty level."). Efforts to assimilate the burdens of the indebted to the condition of
slaves (and hence to characterize relief as the moral equivalent of abolition) have been a
part of bankruptcy debates for more than a century. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st
Sess. 318 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Roosevelt quoted supra note 25).
176. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 981-83; Jackson, supra note 5, at 1399-401;
Limiting Access, supra note 171, at 1142; Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts,
92 YALE L.J. 763, 776 (1983); LoPucki, "Encouraging"Repayment Under Chapter13 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 18 H~Av. J. ON LEGIS. 347, 386-87 (1981); Rendleman, supra note 8,at
726; Reply, supra note 171, at 1070-73.
177. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 173, at 364 n.203; LoPucki, supra note 176, at 386-87;
Rejoinder,supra note 171, at 1096. Notably, at least some commentators with a bent toward
economic analysis tended to be less confident than their peers about the incidence of costs.
See, e.g., Reform Act Hearings, supra note 170, at 42 (testimony of Jonathon Landers suggesting that "in many cases" lenders are unable to pass on costs to other consumers); Jackson, supra note 5, at 1421, 1427 n.111 (noting that the extent to which costs of discharge are
borne by debtors as a group is a matter of "some debate").
178. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 5, at 1404-24; Kronman, supra note 176, at 776, 778,
785-86; Rea, Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit,and PersonalBankruptcy, 22 ECON. INQUIRY
188 (1984). Notably, with the exception of Professor Jackson (and as pointed out by him,
supra note 5, at 1394), commentators who addressed the issue of compulsion did not tend to
extend their analysis to derive guidance as to the specific contours of discharge rights.
179. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 5, at 1401-04, 1418-24; Limiting Access, supra note
171, at 1133-34, 1141-42.
180. See, e.g., Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REV.
303, 335-38 (1983); Jackson, supra note 5, at 1408-18; see also Kronman, supra note 176, at
785-86 (arguing that changes in personality and goals over time render earlier decisions irrational from later perspective, and that relief from performance is appropriate to limit demoralization attendant on enforced pursuit of goals that have become irrational or
abhorrent).
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Within the framework of their common assumptions, the differences between the various approaches to the "fresh start" were
narrowed in large part to differences over the moral hazard or incentive effects of the discharge. In particular, these differences related to the existence or significance of discharge-created incentives for the debtor either to overextend himself in the first place
or, once indebted, to resort to bankruptcy in the absence of need.
For the heirs of rescue theory, as for the predecessors, the former
incentives were de minimis, and while the latter were more plausible, it remained in their view neither possible nor desirable to address them by means of limits on the availability or the breadth of
the discharge. Rather, it was argued, the risk-distribution function
of the "fresh start" could be accomplished only by means of a
broadly drawn and readily accessible discharge. 1" For the postCode economic theorists, by contrast, both kinds of moral hazard
were real. And, while concerns with prebankruptcy incentives to
incur debt were somewhat muted,182 the impact of the Code's provisions on "unnecessary" filings was regarded as particularly troublesome. 183 The control of those incentives, it was argued, was essential to the proper functioning of the discharge system and could be
accomplished only by limiting the availability or attractiveness of
1 84
relief in bankruptcy.

The legal system's response to these conflicting visions of the
"fresh start" was largely ambiguous. For the judiciary, the dispute
was played out in several contexts, but the tensions inherent in the
"fresh start" policy were probably most obvious in the brief but
lively controversy over the so-called "de minimis" Chapter 13 plan.
Under such a plan, a debtor would propose to pay nominal
amounts, or even nothing, to his creditors." 5 The Code itself re181. See, e.g., Future Earnings Hearings, supra note 2, at 129-35 (statement of Ellen
Broadman, Consumers Union); Ayers, supra note 3; Harris, supra note 173, at 351-60; Limiting Access, supra note 171, at 1141; LoPucki, supra note 176, at 387-88; Rendleman, supra
note 8, at 749-50. See generally Countryman, supra note 3.
182. See, e.g., Future Earnings Hearings, supra note 2, at 12 (testimony of James Barr,
Credit Union National Association, that discharge is appropriate "even [for those debtors]

who may have arrived at that condition [of financial difficulty] due to the unwise use of
credit"). But see Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 979-80; Shepard, supra note 170, at 437.
183. See, e.g., Future Earnings Hearings, supra note 2, passim.
184. See, e.g., Brimmer, Economic Implications of Personal Bankruptcies, 35 PERS. FIN.
L.Q. REP. 187, 191 (1981); Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 976-88; Evans & Johnson, Proposals
for Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 37 Bus. LAW 1117 (1982); Reply, supra note 171, at
1071-73; Young, supra note 174.
185. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 6 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Berry, 5 Bankr.
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quired only that the present value of any objecting creditor's proposed receipts under the plan be at least equal to the amount
which he would have received under Chapter 7 ,1as a requirement
usually referred to as the "best interests of creditors" test. For the
asset-poor but income-earning consumer debtor, the proposed payment of nothing or next to nothing could easily satisfy that standard, leaving his income free and affording him the benefit of
Chapter 13's substantial advantages over Chapter 7 in such matters as the scope of the discharge and the treatment of secured
claims. 187 According to a number of objecting creditors, however, a
nominal payments plan that satisfied the "best interests" test
would nonetheless violate the Chapter 13 requirement of "good
faith, "1s since it would permit a debtor to sacrifice neither assets
nor income, yet capture benefits that were legislatively intended to
be bought with earnings.
The matter was ultimately addressed by Congress in the 1984
Bankruptcy Amendments Act,18 9 but in the interim the courts of
appeals (with one exception) arrived at a consensus of sorts. 0
Those courts firmly eschewed any reliance on particularized or per
515 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). The de minimis plans generated an immense body of law
review commentary and thus may have posed less threat to the interests of creditors than
they did to the forests of the Pacific northwest. Among the more helpful discussions are Cyr,
The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis and Proposal for Change, 55 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 271 (1981); LoPucki, supra note 176; Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978: An Alternative Approach, 71 GEO. L.J. 1129, 1135-38 (1983); Note, "Good Faith"
and Confirmation of Chapter 13 Composition Plans: Analysis and a Proposal,65 MINN. L.
REV. 659 (1981); see also W. DRAKE & J. MoRIus, CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
11.04 (1983).
186. 92 Stat. at 2649 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982)).
187. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
188. 92 Stat. at 2649 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982)).
189. Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, supra note 7.
190. See In re Hines, 723 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1983); Flygare v. Bouden, 709 F.2d 1344 (10th
Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 708 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1983); Kitchens v.
Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Eustus, 695
F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); Goeb v. Heid, 675
F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); Ravenot v. Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982). The exception
was the District of Columbia Circuit, which concluded that the "good faith" limitation was
(like its predecessors under the Act) addressed to misconduct in securing approval of the
plan, rather than to its contents, and that payment levels were therefore irrelevant to confirmation. Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Plans that proposed to
make no payments to creditors (as opposed to some amount, however small), raised distinct
problems, since they arguably failed to meet the eligibility requirement for Chapter 13 that
the debtor have "income... sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to
make payments under a plan." 92 Stat. at 2552 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1982),
presently codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (Supp. 1 1985)) (emphasis added); see also Tenny
v. Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980).
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se tests of the relation between payment levels and "good faith,"
holding instead that the inquiry was whether the debtor's plan was
compatible with the "purposes and spirit" of Chapter 13.191 Among
those purposes, it was said, were both the "fresh start" and "payments to creditors. ' 19 2 Notably, the facts universally cited as material to the "good faith" inquiry included not only payment levels
but also the amount of the debtor's surplus income beyond expenses and plan payments, as well as benefits he would derive from
provisions peculiar to Chapter 13.193 A nominal-payments plan, it
was held, might at times be compatible with the Chapter's "purposes and spirit." At least to some extent, however, the availability
of the Chapter's benefits could indeed be made dependent on the
debtor's surrender of some surplus income to his creditors. The decision as to which of those principles would apply to any given
plan was left to the "discretion" of the trial courts, for decision on
194
a "case-by-case" basis.
To the extent that the de minimis decisions rejected claims of a
necessary link between Chapter 13 relief and the level of a debtor's
payments to his creditors, they appeared to be in full accord with
the theoretical underpinnings of the Code's failure to limit the accessibility of the consumer "fresh start." At the same time, to the
extent that, in the name of payments to creditors, they permitted
relief to be conditioned on the state of the debtor's income or his
apparent capacity to pay, the decisions necessarily involved a retreat from the full implications of that failure. The courts' inability
to reconcile the essential conflict of these considerations was most
evident in their utter failure to suggest a means of sorting the
"good" de minimis plans from the "bad"; trial courts were carefully told what factors to consider, but offered no analytical frame195
work for assessing those considerations.
A similar ambivalence marked the eventual legislative response
to the post-Code debates, which took the form of Code amendments contained in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984.196
191. Ravenot, 669 F.2d at 431.
192. See, e.g., Deans, 692 F.2d at 972.
193. See, e.g., id.; Kitchens, 702 F.2d at 888-89.
194. Ravenot, 669 F.2d at 431.
195. Cf. W. DRAKE & J. MORRiS, supra note 185 § 11.04, at 11-10 (noting the difficulties
posed by the vagueness of the standard, but concluding that the appellate decisions "should
be sufficient to guide the bankruptcy courts").
196. Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, supra note 7. The amendments directed to
consumer bankruptcies are extensively reviewed in Morris, Substantive Consumer Bank-
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That enactment incorporated some provisions enlarging the scope
and effect of the discharge, most notable among them an expansion of the prohibition against governmental discrimination to include private employers as well. 197 Apart from those limited expansions, however, the dominant character of the amendments in
consumer cases was a somewhat hesitant effort to narrow the availability of the discharge. The amendments stopped far short of embracing proposals to impose some variety of express inability-topay standard of eligibility for relief.119 Instead, the matter was addressed by two related modifications of the Code. First, in Chapter
7 consumer proceedings, the courts were empowered to dismiss a
case on a finding that the granting of relief would be a "substantial
abuse" of Chapter 7's provisions.1l9 The relevance of that phrasing
to the debtor's need for relief was arguably suggested by the addition of an income and expense statement to the list of schedules
required to be filed with Chapter 7 petitions.20 0 Second, in Chapter
13 cases, plan confirmation over the objection of the trustee or the
holder of an impaired claim was conditional on the debtor's devoting "all" of his "projected disposable income" for three years to
payments under the plan.20 1
The Chapter 13 amendment had an obvious impact on the question of de minimis plans. More fundamentally, the two amendments taken together had the net effect of permitting the accessibility of the "fresh start" to be limited (for the first time in
American bankruptcy law) by a judicial assessment of the debtor's
need for relief. As were the courts of appeals before them, however,
the drafters were neither prepared to define the concept of need
ruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 91
(1985).
197. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (Supp. HI 1985).

198. See, e.g., FutureEarnings Hearings,supra note 2, at 6 (National Coalition of Bankruptcy Reform proposal to permit Chapter 7 relief for individuals "only if [the debtor] cannot pay a reasonable portion of his debts out of anticipated future income"); Reform Act
Hearings,supra note 170, at 84-85 (consumer credit industry proposal to except from Chapter 7 discharge any "contractual consumer debts," with provision for case-by-case allowance
of discharge "in whole or pro rate part" on a judicial finding that "the debtor's failure or
inability to repay such debts is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly
be held accountable").
199. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. HI 1985).
200. Id. § 521(1).

201. Id. § 1325(b)(1). "Disposable income" was in turn defined as the amount of income
received by the debtor in excess of that "reasonably necessary to be expended" for the support of the debtor and his dependents and for the operation of the debtor's business, if any.
Id. § 1325(b)(2).
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nor even to require its consideration in every case. The standard
was, rather, framed in statutory phrasings of amorphous or at least
ambiguous content; and in Chapter 7 cases the trial courts were
merely authorized, and not required, to apply the standard as
phrased. In short, Congress having briefly experimented with a relatively unequivocal vision of the "fresh start" policy, appears to
have become troubled by what it wrought and to have retreated to
the familiar comforts of statutory obscurity.
III.

THE "FRESH START" AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: AN

INTERPRETIVE THEORY

The evolution of the "fresh start" policy and its legislative embodiments suggests, if nothing else, that it is a bit of an oversimplification to speak of that policy in the singular. It is apparent,
rather, that the idea of the "fresh start" has long incorporated and
been shaped by a complex multiplicity of policy concerns, which
have been founded in turn upon equally complex and often shifting combinations of assumptions about creditors, debtors, credit
markets, and the social function of bankruptcy. As did prior incarnations of the policy, the Code provisions governing the availability and effect of the discharge necessarily express a particular vision of- those concerns and assumptions. At the same time, there
are questions under the Code that can be answered sensibly only
by reference to statutory purposes and policies. Thus, for the judiciary, the task of deriving a relatively clear and coherent theory of
the "fresh start" from its legislative expression is an integral, indeed unavoidable, part of administering the statute.
The task of describing the content of the "fresh start" is complicated, however, by the historical variety and complexity of the policy. Of course, one can readily enough catalog the various concerns
and assumptions that have been thought to be material in the past
and that appear to have some bearing on the present state of a
debtor's discharge rights. That was essentially the approach taken
by the courts of appeals in the de minimis plan decisions, instructing trial courts to take into account a number of competing
considerations: the debtor's ability to pay, the level of payments to
creditors, the circumstances in which particular debts were incurred, and so on.2 °2 But, as becomes clear when one attempts to
apply those decisions to particular cases, a mere listing of the rele202. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
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vant considerations falls well short of providing an interpretively
useful definition or theory of the "fresh start." The problem is that
the full implications of any given consideration are likely to be incompatible both with other considerations and with the Code itself. Simply lumping competing or opposed concerns together suggests that each may be limited by the others, but it offers no
means for sorting out how or in what degree any such adjustments
are to be made. Thus, in order to provide genuine guidance in the
interpretation of the Code, a judicial theory of the "fresh start"
must not merely identify the components of the policy. It must, in
addition, specify the relationships between those components, organizing the disparate strands of the "fresh start" into a coherent
and integrated account of the debtor-relief objectives of bankruptcy as they exist under the Code.
The starting point for such an interpretive theory is the Code
itself. The empirical assumptions and policy concerns underlying
the Code's "fresh start" can be identified by two lines of inquiry.
First is an analysis of the scope and effect of the Code's discharge
provisions as they operate in fact, which may or may not correspond with various theories as to how they ought to operate. Second is an examination of the Code's limitations on the waivability
of the "fresh start" protections, and an identification of the empirically plausible explanations for those limits. 20 3 These lines of inquiry are pursued in the first two sections of this part. In each
case, the analysis provides a framework against which to test the
present relevance vel non of the various theories and concerns historically advanced as determinative of the bankruptcy system's
debtor relief objectives. In addition, as set out in the final section
of this part, the analyses taken together provide a reasonably detailed and integrated description of the assumptions and policy
considerations that define the Code's particular vision of the consumer "fresh start," which is to say, the assumptions and considerations that should guide the interpretation and application of specific elements of the Code's debtor relief structure.

203. Thus, as suggested by Professor Jackson's analysis, the same lines of inquiry as are
appropriately addressed in formulating a normative theory of discharge are equally useful in
framing the positive theory suggested here. Jackson, supra note 5.
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A.

The Discharge and the Risk of Repayment Difficulties

1.

The Discharge as an Allocation of Risks

The first source of any useful description of the Code's "fresh
start" policy is an identification of what the Code's discharge does
in fact. In that regard, there is significant value in the insight afforded by the economic theorists' insurance characterization. 0 4
The immediate and obvious effect of the discharge is, of course, to
release the debtor from at least the legal obligation to pay part or
all of the existing money claims against him. More fundamentally,
however, the existence and availability of the discharge operate to
allocate risks.
Any dischargeable liability arises out of some prebankruptcy
transaction creating a debtor-creditor relationship between the
debtor and the holder of the claim. Whatever the nature of the
transaction (a loan, an automobile accident, the earning of taxable
income), the executory nature of the debtor's obligation necessarily
creates the possibility that, when payment comes due, circumstances will exist that impair his willingness or ability to pay. If
that possibility becomes a reality, one or both of the parties will
bear some portion of the loss occasioned by the circumstances: the
debtor to the extent that he pays or suffers the consequences of
nonpayment imposed by state collections law, and the creditor to
the extent of nonpayment. Legal rules specifying the extent to
which the debtor will or will not be liable operate to allocate that
loss when it occurs, but in so doing they allocate the risk of the loss
prior to its occurence. Thus, if the debtor is and will remain liable
notwithstanding a particular contingency (as, for example, destruction of property purchased on credit 0 5 ), he bears the risk that the
contingency will occur. Conversely, to the extent that certain circumstances (as, for example, illegality or impossibility of performance) will excuse the debtor from liability, the creditor bears the
risk that those circumstances will in fact come to pass.2 0 6 Even absent circumstances of nonliability or excuse, the risks borne by the
debtor are limited, and those borne by the creditor are correspondingly increased by limits on the creditor's legal ability to enforce
his claim. Exemptions, for example, or the prohibition of such rem204. See supra notes 135-39, 176 and accompanying text.
205. See U.C.C. §§ 2-509, 9-207(2)(b) (1977).
206. See generally Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrinesin Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
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edies as imprisonment for debt, limit the debtor's loss and relieve
him of the risk that his liberty or basic personal property will be
20 7
called upon to satisfy his liabilities.
As do rules of nonliability or excuse and limits on coercive collections, the rules governing the availability and effect of the bankruptcy discharge allocate to those creditors holding dischargeable
claims some part of the risk that, prior to payment, the debtor's
circumstances will adversely affect his ability or desire to pay. In
part, of course, the discharge simply duplicates or incorporates the
effect of nonbankruptcy rules (such as exemptions) that would
limit the risks borne by the debtor even without a functioning
bankruptcy system. 208 But the incorporation of nonbankruptcy

rules affecting the relative risks of debtor and creditor by no
means exhausts the effect of the Code's "fresh start." For that reason, the risk allocation particularly attributable to the discharge
can be more precisely defined by the degree to which it adds to the
debtor's nonbankruptcy protections, relieving him or his property
of liability for claims that would be collectible outside bankruptcy.
Those nonduplicative effects are of three kinds. First, and most
significant, the Code discharge limits the debtor's payment burden
to the value of his existing nonexempt assets 09 or, in Chapter 13
cases, to the amount of his disposable income over three years,21 0
thereby freeing his entire postbankruptcy property from otherwise
enforceable claims. Second, by enjoining any postbankruptcy collection activity21

'

and forbidding governmental and employment

discrimination against debtors,212 the Code frees the debtor himself
and at least some of his postbankruptcy activities from the burdens of prebankruptcy liabilities. Third, as to the debtor's assets
207. In addition, certain apparently immutable principles of biology (that is, those regarding one's capacity to extract blood from turnips or stones) will allocate the risk of non-

payment to creditors no matter what the legal rule of liability.
208. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (claim unenforceable under nonbankruptcy law not allowable in bankruptcy); id. § 522(b) (debtor may choose to hold ex-

empt any property exempt under state law, and if state law so provides, debtor is limited to
nonbankruptcy exemptions).
209. See id. § 541(a) (property of the estate composed of debtor's interests as of the commencement of the case); id. § 726(a) (distribution of property of the estate to creditors); id.
§ 522(b) (debtor's exemptions).
210. Id. § 1306(a) (1982) (property of the estate in Chapter 13 includes debtor's § 541
property and property acquired during pendency of case); id. § 1325(b) (Supp. III 1985)

(requirement for plan confirmation that, if creditor objects, debtor must devote all of his
"projected disposable income" for three years to plan payments).
211. Id. § 524(a) (Supp. III 1985).
212. Id. § 525.
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existing at the time of bankruptcy, the Code expands the available
nonbankruptcy protections of exempt property by permitting the
debtor to avoid some categories of otherwise enforceable liens on
that property.21 3
Thus, as an allocation of the risk that the debtor's desire or ability to pay will be impaired prior to payment, the discharge limits
the debtor's possible loss in such circumstances to the value of his
then-owned nonexempt property or disposable income, and it
places the risk on creditors to the extent that they hold dischargeable claims that would be capable of satisfaction either out of the
debtor's postbankruptcy assets or (by reason of security interests)
out of his prebankruptcy exempt property. Cast in terms of the
economic theorists' insurance characterization, the discharge provides the debtor with credit insurance coverage in an amount equal
to his dischargeable liabilities less his nonexempt assets at bankruptcy (or less three years of disposable income in Chapter 13
cases). The peril or risk insured against, as defined by the nonetoo-precise Code limits on the availability of relief, is a change (financial or otherwise) 21 4 in the debtor's circumstances prior to payment that renders payment or the collections consequences of nonpayment more burdensome to him than whatever burdens might
accompany his resort to bankruptcy.
2.

The Analytic Framework of Risk and Insurance

To a degree, a description of the discharge as allocating risks
merely restates its obvious effect in allocating losses. But the riskallocation perspective implicit in the insurance characterization is
not entirely redundant. Its primary advantage is that it provides
an analytic framework that both illumines some aspects of the
Code's discharge structure and focuses one's questions as to others.
The possibility of uncertain future losses is a common enough phenomenon both in law and in everyday life, and the strategies available for dealing with such possibilities are eminently familiar.
Faced with a risk, one can retain it and bear the loss in the event
that it materializes. One can take steps to reduce the risk by reducing either the probability that the loss will occur or the severity
213. Id. § 522(f) (1982).
214. A change, if only of the debtor's mind, is an essential element of the peril insured
against, since a debt incurred without an intent to repay would be nondischargeable as
fraudulently incurred. See id. § 523(a)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
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of the loss in the event that it does occur. Finally, one can transfer
the risk (and hence the loss) to someone else. These strategies will
ordinarily be employed in combination, with the particular mix of
retention, reduction, and transfer dependent at least presumptively on the relative cost and efficacy of each as a means of minimizing the total expected loss.215
One variety of risk transfer is insurance, in which the insured
exchanges a small but certain present loss (the premium) for the
insurer's assumption of the risk of a larger but uncertain future
loss. As a strategy for dealing with risk, however, insurance ordinarily involves not merely risk shifting by the insured, but also the
combination or pooling of risks by the insurer.216 The significance
of pooling is that it serves to reduce risk. Viewed as a present cost,
risk has two components: the present value of the loss, and the
distinct burden of uncertainty as to its occurrence. A simple transfer of those costs to the insurer (or to anyone else) would not ordinarily result in a net reduction in either component.1 When, however, a transferred risk is pooled by the transferee with a large
number of similar risks transferred by others, the transfer is not
the complete effect of the transaction. First, to the extent that premiums are the source of payments when the peril insured against
occurs, pooling substitutes a number of small losses for a single
large loss. That substitution is ordinarily regarded as effecting a
net reduction in the severity of the total loss, since it avoids the
personal and economic dislocations that are usually associated with
individual losses of catastrophic magnitude.218 Second, if a sufficiently large number of risks are combined by the insurer, pooling
reduces the uncertainty component of risk. While uncertainty remains as to the occurrence of any particular insured loss, the expected level of total losses in the insured pool achieves a statistical
predictability approaching certainty.2 19 Thus, pooling affects a net
215, See generally MKGREENE, RISK AND INSURANCE 11-15 (4th ed. 1977); R. MEHR & E.
CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 23-29 (1980); Ehrlich & Becker, Market Insurance,
Self-Insurance and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972).
216. Indeed some purists would limit the use of the terms "insurance" and "self-insurance" to instances of risk pooling. See, e.g., M. GREENE, supra note 215, at 12.
217. Uncertainty as to a loss is a cost only to the extent that the individual bearing the
risk is risk averse. Thus, to the extent that a risk is transferred to a person with less risk
aversion than the transferor, the transfer alone would serve to reduce the net cost. Conversely, net costs would be increased by a simple transfer to a transferee with greater risk

aversion.
218. See, e.g., U GREENE, supra note 215, at 61.
219. This effect is a function of the law of large numbers. See generally id. at 28-37;
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reduction in uncertainty by converting the insured parties' collection of uncertain losses into a combination of certain losses both
for the insured (in premium payments) and for the insurer (in expected total payouts).
In a perfect world, each insurance premium would accurately reflect the precise degree of risk presented by the particular person
insured and would be determined by adding the present value of
the loss (the "pure premium") and the insurer's costs of administering the insurance (his "loading costs"). 22 0 Thus, the payout in
the event of a covered loss would amount to more than a simple
wealth transfer from other insured persons to the party suffering a
loss. Rather, it would constitute the second half of an exchange,
the premium payment having accurately compensated the other
insured parties and the insurer for the subsequent payment. Needless to say, however, it is not a perfect world. First, it is in fact
frequently impossible or prohibitively costly to accurately ascertain the precise degree of risk presented by each insured. 221 As a
result, insurance inevitably involves, to some degree, coverage of
similar but nonidentical risks without differentiation as to the premium paid by each insured. If the premium is set to cover the risk
of the average-risk insured, higher-risk insureds receive an uncompensated transfer in the form of coverage subsidized by the premium payments of lower-risk insureds in the same pool.2 2 2 Second,
to the extent that the insured can affect the probability or severity
of the loss, the existence of insurance coverage will in some circumstances alter his incentives in a manner that tends to increase the
net loss. Thus, insurance coverage may tend to reduce the insured's incentive to take loss-avoidance measures, since it is not
he, but the insurer, who derives the benefit of any reduction in risk
resulting from the use of such measures.22 3 Also, in the event that
the peril insured against does occur, insurance coverage creates an
incentive to exaggerate the loss. Since the premiums have already
been paid there is no added cost to the insured for maximizing his
E. VAUGHAN & C. ELLIoTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 19-24 (2d ed. 1978);
Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. EcON. Rav. 531 (1968).
220. M. GREENE, supra note 215, at 577.
221. Id. at 579.
222. See id.; Hirshleifer & Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An
Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. Lrr. 1375, 1386-90 (1979).
223. See generally Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 Ax
ECON. REV. 537 (1968); Ehrlich & Becker, supra note 215, at 641-43; Hirshleifer & Riley,
supra note 222, at 1390-91; Pauly, supra note 219.
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claim and hence the insurance payoff.2 24 These problems of "moral
hazard" can be addressed in a variety of ways: contractual requirements that the insured take certain avoidance measures; monitoring, to reduce exaggerated claims ex post and to facilitate ex ante
the setting of premiums that accurately reflect the risk created by
the insured's conduct; and deductibles and coverage limitations,
which place a portion of the cost on the insured and thus afford
him an incentive both to reduce the risk and to refrain from unnecessary or exaggerated claims.2 25 In addition, forms of moral hazard that involve the insured's intentional creation of the loss (for
example, liabilities for criminal activity, arson committed by the
owner in fire insurance, or voluntary job loss in unemployment insurance) are often simply excluded from coverage. In part, such
exclusions reflect a judgment that an accurate premium for the
risks involved would equal or exceed the amount of the loss.2 26 In
part, too, especially relative to criminal liabilities, the exclusions
rest on a view that the social value of assuring adequate deterrence
of the conduct in question precludes the use of any device whereby
the actor can avoid the consequences of his activity. 227 In any
event, the effect of moral hazard is to impair the loss-reduction
effects of risk pooling, since it increases total risk if not controlled,
and the available means of control necessarily involve a reduction
in the degree of loss spreading.
3. The Discharge as Insurance: Some Similarities and Some
Questions
In part, the relevance of the foregoing principles to the risk-allocation effect of the bankruptcy discharge may be apparent. It is,
for example, relatively easy to characterize some limits on the discharge as a response to moral hazard problems. Thus, the requirement of asset or income surrender as a condition of relief is readily
seen as a kind of deductible, forcing the debtor to bear part of the
loss in order to limit his incentive to exaggerate his claim (that is,
his need for relief) or to forgo risk-reducing behavior. 228 In like
224. See E. VAUGHAN & C. ELLIOTT, supra note 219, at 9; Pauly, supra note 219, at 532-34.
225. See generally Hirshleifer & Riley, supra note 222, at 1391; Holmstrom, On Moral
Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 80-81 (1979); Pauly, supra note 219, at 535-

36.
226. See J. LONG & D. GREGG, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE HANDBOOK 195 (1965).
227. See 6B J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4252 (1979); R.
KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 287-88 (1971).
228. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 1428, 1428 n.14. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 977
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manner, nondischargeable fines, penalties, and malicious injury liabilities22 e can be regarded as the functional equivalent of perils excluded from coverage due to the debtor's complete control over the
occurrence of the loss and due to the enhanced social importance
of maintaining the deterrent effect of such liabilities. 23 0 Similarly,
the nondischargeability of fraudulently incurred obligations 23 1 can
be attributed to the effect of the debtor's conduct in impairing the
ability of the creditor-insurer to monitor the debtor's actual state
of affairs ex ante in order to establish an accurate premium for the
insurance implicit in the loan. Likewise, the common theme of the
grounds for outright denial of discharge, almost all of which involve the debtor's noncooperation in or interference with the bankruptcy process, can be viewed as an effort to limit the debtor's
ability to avoid the system's ex post moral hazard controls,
whether in the form of monitoring or of deductibles.23 2 But the
parallels between insurance and the discharge are not always complete; in part, the degree to which the two are comparable varies,
rather, according to the nature of the claims that are subject to
discharge.
Thus, the insurance characterization appears to be most accurate relative to discharge of claims held by creditors in the business of consumer lending (banks, credit unions, finance companies,
and the like), which claims also constitute, as it happens, the larg("Debtors are always asked to sacrifice something, to pay what they reasonably can.").
229. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), (7) (1982).
230. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 1440-46.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4) (Supp. III 1985).
232. Id. § 727(a). Denial is permissible if the debtor, in connection with his own case or
the case of an insider, has: conveyed or concealed property within the year prior to bankruptcy with the intent to defraud creditors; unjustifiably concealed, destroyed, or failed to
keep books; given false testimony in the proceeding; failed to satisfactorily explain his financial condition; disobeyed a lawful court order; or received a discharge within the last six
years (subject to exceptions if the prior discharge was under Chapter 13). Id. All grounds
but the six-year bar involve the debtor's interference either with the court's monitoring of
his condition or (in the case of fraudulent conveyances) with the enforcement of the "deductible" of asset surrender. But see Jackson, supra note 5, at 1441-42 (attributing the
grounds for denial of discharge to the efficiency of the sanction in advancing a more general
interest in deterring the underlying conduct); see also supra notes 229-30 and accompanying
text. Even the six-year bar to repeated discharge in Chapter 7 appears to be directed to the
reduction or moral hazard, by raising the debtor's deductible to the cost of a Chapter 13
proceeding in any case in which the debtor has (by his prior filing) demonstrated risk that is
out of the ordinary. See infra note 295. That explanation seems preferable to a view that
the bar is designed to operate for the debtor's benefit, by enhancing his postbankruptcy
credit, since the exceptions to the bar tend to seriously undermine that supposed benefit.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 1443 n.149.
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est part of the obligations discharged in consumer bankruptcy
cases. 233 The risk of future impairment of the debtor's willingness
or ability to repay inheres in every such lending transaction. The
discharge places a portion of that risk on the lender and severely
limits the borrower's ability to contract otherwise. The lender may
be able to shift some part of the discharge risk to the borrower (by
means of security requirements, for example)2 3 4 or to third parties
(for example, co-signers, nonrecourse assignees, or credit insurers).
He can take steps to reduce the size or probability of the loss (by
limiting the amount loaned, for example, or by the use of more
stringent creditworthiness standards). But, as long as he is willing
to lend, there will ordinarily be some irreducible minimum of risk
that he will continue to bear. For the lender, the residual nontransferred risk and the costs of transfer and reduction are all a part of
the cost of lending. Given the apparently high elasticity of supply
relative to demand in credit markets, those costs will ordinarily be
recouped in the cost of loans to borrowers; the risk, that is, will be
one determinant of credit availability, interest rates, and other
terms of lending.23 5 Further, because the common use of credit233. See

CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, CON-

SUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY, VOL. II, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: CAUSES, COSTS AND BENEFITS 28-

29 (Purdue University Monograph No. 24 1982) [hereinafter CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY,
Vol. III; GAO STUDY, supra note 2, at 26; Reply, supra note 171, at 1074; Shuchman, The
Average Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753 Personal Bankruptcy Filings in
Nine States, 88 Com. L.J. 288, 296-303 (1983) [hereinafter Nine States Study]; Shuchman,
New Jersey Debtors 1982-1983: An Empirical Study, 15 SEroN HALL L. REV. 541, 566-75
(1985) [hereinafter New Jersey Study].
234. His capacity to do so will be limited in part by the debtor's nonwaivable power to
avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in exempt property. 11 U.S.C. §
522(f) (1982).
235. The degree to which consumer credit availability, rates, and other lending terms are
generally responsive to changes in costs does not appear to have been extensively tested or
studied, and the question appears to have some room for controversy. Compare, e.g.,
Meckling, supra note 105, at 19-21 (consumer credit supply "virtually perfectly elastic")
with Weston, supra note 135, at 48-51 (questioning the point); see also Discussion, supra
note 96, at 130-34; supra note 177. Nonetheless, the ease with which available funds can be
shifted among segments of the credit market (as illustrated by the large-scale disintermediation experienced by depository institutions in the late 1970's), together with experience as to
some forms of law-generated costs, see, e.g., Crafton, An Empirical Test of the Effect of
Usury Laws, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 135 (1980); Lynch, supra note 125, make it reasonable to
assume, at least as to financial institutions, that the supply of credit is ordinarily responsive
to changes in costs, and that increased costs are ordinarily borne by borrowers rather than
lenders. Whether or to what extent any particular change in bankruptcy law affects creditors' costs is a distinct empirical question, and one that presumably varies according to the
particular change. See, e.g., Shuchman & Jantscher, Correlation of Bad Debt Losses and
Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Rates, 77 COM. L.J. 358 (1972); Woodward & Woodward, supra
note 170.
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screening devices permits the grouping of borrowers into relatively
specific risk classes, the premium paid by any particular borrower
will reflect, with a fair degree of accuracy, the level of risk involved
in his individual transaction.23 6 In short, in the context of formal
or professional consumer lending, the operation of the discharge is
in many respects indistinguishable from the compelled purchase of
credit insurance by borrowers. The risk of each borrower's future
inability or unwillingness to pay is transferred to the lender for a
premium implicit in the cost of the loan, and the lender pools that
risk with other similar risks, thereby spreading losses among borrowers. Moreover, due to the segmentation of the market and the
individualization of risk assessment for each transaction, each borrower's premium more or less accurately compensates for the risk
transferred, with only minimal opportunities for subsidization by
the lender or by other borrowers.
When one turns from professional lending to other forms of contractual consumer credit, the situation departs from the insurance
model in a number of respects, depending on the creditor's volume
of lending, the degree of individual credit screening, and the economics of the creditor's business. In large scale retail sales credit,
for example, if the seller and lender are the same entity,3 7 risk
pooling and loss spreading should occur in much the same manner
as in insurance, but there appears to be a somewhat greater likelihood that the premium paid by the borrower for discharge will be
subsidized by (and a portion of the losses will be distributed to)
cash buyers of goods, due to the apparently greater elasticity of
demand for credit relative to the elasticity of demand for goods. 3 s
Similarly, to the extent that the lender does not segment his market and that credit screening is not particularly individualized (as
in many forms of short-term service credit), the discharge should
236. See Boggess, Screen-test Your Credit Risks, 45 HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1967, at
113; Orgler, Evaluation of Bank Consumer Loans with Credit Scoring Models, 2 J. BANK
REs. Spring 1971, at 31, 36-37; Sexton, Determining Good and Bad Credit Risks Among
High- and Low-Income Families, 50 J. Bus. 236 (1977); The Credit Scoring Movement, 3
CREDIT, no.9, Sept. 1977, at 28.
237. To the extent that the seller, while formally the lender, purchases credit loss insurance or assigns his consumer accounts on a nonrecourse basis to financial institutions, the
situation is indistinguishable from that in which the debtor borrows directly from those
institutions.
238. See W. DUNKELBERG, Tim TRANSFER IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION
27-32 (Credit Research Center, Purdue Univ., Working Paper No. 29, 1979); Dunkelberg &
Smiley, Subsidies in the Use of Revolving Credit, 7 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 469, 471,
489 (1975).
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still result in risk pooling and loss distribution. There is, however,
a greater likelihood of premium subsidization, not only by cash
customers but by other credit customers as well. Finally, in informal consumer-to-consumer lending (that is, the loan by family
member or friend), neither risk pooling nor loss distribution seems
a likely outcome of the risk allocation established by the discharge,
given the presumably small number of loans held by each lender.
At the same time, the sparsity of the loan pool limits the possibilities for subsidization of the debtor's coverage, first because of the
lender's opportunity to evaluate the risk and second because the
only available subsidizer is the lender himself.
Notwithstanding the differences among them, in the various contractual settings in which the discharge operates it is thus probable
both that the creditor will have been compensated for the risk
transfer effected by the discharge and that the debtor will have
borne some part of the compensation cost himself. Moreover, when
the contract creditor is a business creditor, the effect of the discharge appears to include, at least ordinarily, an insurance-like
pooling of risks and spreading of losses that would otherwise be
borne by the debtor alone.
By contrast, when the holder of a dischargeable obligation is a
nonbusiness involuntary creditor (an automobile injury plaintiff,
for example), the effect of the discharge departs significantly from
the features ordinarily characteristic of insurance. Such a creditor
can, of course, take steps to reduce the risk allocated to him by the
discharge (as by increased care in driving prior to any accident and
by aggressive collection activity afterward), and he can transfer a
part of the risk to third parties (as by the purchase of uninsured
motorists coverage under his own automobile insurance policy).
But whatever his response to the risk, the involuntary character of
the transaction and the consequent absence of bargaining over the
terms of the liability preclude him from passing the cost of his response to the debtor.23 9 In addition, because there are frequently
practical limits to an involuntary creditor's capacity to insure the
complete risk allocated by the discharge,2 40 one has substantially
less reason to expect that the risk will be pooled or the loss distributed over a relatively large group. Thus, as to involuntary nonbusi239. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 1422.
240. See M. GREENE, supra note 215, at 343-44 (uninsured motorists coverage usually limited to minimum liability limits established by particular state's financial responsibility
law).
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ness claims, the discharge operates as insurance only in a limited
sense, and its effect is more often simply the uncompensated transfer of the discharge risk from debtor to creditor with only occasional reduction in net losses by means of pooling and distribution.
As noted above, debts owed to those in the business of lending
constitute the largest share of obligations discharged in consumer
bankruptcies. The more inclusive class of contractual obligations to
business creditors of all kinds appears to account for more than
ninety percent of discharged obligations."' Involuntary claims of
nonbusiness creditors, on the other hand, seem to be a highly infrequent, indeed rare, phenomenon.24 2 Thus, in respect to loss
pooling and the incidence of costs, the effect of the Code's discharge in practice is largely indistinguishable from the imposition
of compulsory credit insurance as to most discharged obligations.
As to all but a few discharged obligations, it mimics insurance in
those respects except for the degree to which one might expect any
given debtor's premium payment to be subsidized by the creditor's
other customers. Of course, the limited empirical significance of
the remaining group of dischargeable claims (that is, liabilities to
involuntary nonbusiness creditors) does not warrant one in simply
ignoring them. Moreover, even in the context of professional contract lending, there are other aspects of the Code's discharge that
appear at least facially to depart from the analytic framework suggested by the insurance characterization.
Relative to moral hazard reduction, for example, the Code's discharge structure is remarkable for its moderate approach to the
control of undesirable prebankruptcy incentives. In particular,
with the exception of fraud, malicious injury, and similar claims, as
described above, the Code is essentially devoid of limitations on
discharge based on the debtor's behavior leading to his financial
difficulties. Even moral hazard as reflected in reckless prebank241. See sources cited supra note 233.
242. None of the post-Code empirical studies reports any dischargeable tort liabilities
among the samples of bankrupt consumer debtors. See sources cited supra note 233. At a
minimum, that suggests that the number is at least too small to merit a category distinct
from each study's "Miscellaneous" or "Other" category. But the Nine States Study, supra
note 233, appears to break its count of "Miscellaneous Unsecured Debt" into individual

types, id. at 299-301, 300 table X, and that breakdown reflects no tort liabilities. The Brookings Study, D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 2, reported that automobile accident liabili-

ties were "rarely" found in its sample of nonbusiness debtors under the Act. Id. at 48. That
result may have been affected, however, by the somewhat narrower dischargeability of such
liabilities under the Act. See supra notes 39, 164 and accompanying text.
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ruptcy "overindulgence" in credit is thus a subject that does not
appear to have particularly concerned the drafters. At the same
time, there are substantial limits on the scope of the discharge
(most notably the nondischargeability of tax and family obligations 243 ) that have no immediately apparent relationship to moral
hazard reduction or other insurance considerations.
Similarly, when measured against the ordinary structure of insurance arrangements, the Code is strikingly vague in its definition
of the perils insured against. As already noted, eligibility for relief
under the Code depends neither on the occurrence of any particular contingency (catastrophic illness, for example, or loss of income) nor on any express standard of need or inability to pay.
Rather, the availability of discharge is dependent on essentially
nothing more than the debtor's choice to file a petition.24 4 Framed
in the context of the insurance characterization, the insured
debtor's decision to make a claim (file a petition) will ordinarily be
treated as conclusively establishing that the (unidentified) perils
insured against have in fact occurred.
Given the descriptive accuracy of the insurance characterization
in most contexts, these apparent departures from the insurance
model in the existing structure of the discharge are even more
striking. As described in the following section, however, an examination of the distinct question of compulsion, that is, the policy
underpinnings of the rules of nonwaivability that in effect require
the purchase of insurance in each credit transaction, provides a basis for explaining these otherwise anomalous aspects of the Code's
"fresh start." In addition, the implications of the insurance characterization and the justifications for nonwaivability, taken together,
provide a framework for evaluating the present relevance of various other policy concerns historically advanced as influencing the
scope and effect of discharge rights.
B.

The Discharge as Compelled Insurance

1.

The Rationale for Rules of Nonwaivability

A conception of the bankruptcy "fresh start" as compelled insurance is founded on the stringent rules limiting the debtor's ca243. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) & (5) (Supp. m 1985).
244. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. The role of the "substantial abuse" test,
see 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. HI 1985), as imposing an eligibility standard is discussed infra
notes 367-415 and accompanying text.
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pacity to waive or otherwise enforceably limit in advance the availability of the discharge or the scope of its protections for exempt
property or for future income. 245 As discussed above, insurance
(whether or not compelled) is by no means the only nor always the
best method for dealing with untoward risks. The ordinary response to risk is, rather, a combination of strategies: insurance or
other forms of risk transfer, self-insurance, and preventive activities with the optimum mix as to any given risk determined by the
perceived relative costs and benefits of each component.24 6 Because
each possible response is a substitute for the others, the
nonwaivability of discharge rights has two additional effects beyond compelling each borrower to purchase and each lender to sell
insurance as an implicit term in the loan contract. First, by placing
the creditor in the position of insurer, the discharge increases that
party's incentives both to engage in preventive activities himself
and to require preventive steps on the part of the debtor. Second,
the combination of compelled insurance and the enhanced likelihood of creditor-compelled prevention effectively limits the
debtor's opportunities to rely on self-insurance as a substitute for
those strategies in dealing with the risks covered by the discharge.
Compelled contract terms (whether express or, like the discharge, implicit in the form of nondisclaimable rights or duties)
and other forms of interference with the capacity of parties to
choose alternative arrangements are not, of course, unknown to
American contract law. That law is, however, generally founded on
strongly held assumptions about the social, economic, and ethical
value of individual autonomy in exchange relationships. 24 7 As an
apparent departure from those principles of autonomy, the
nonwaivability of discharge rights may not be unique, but it does
warrant some explaining.
Notably, until recently neither courts nor commentators found it
necessary to engage in extensive defense of limiting the power of
debtors to bargain away their discharge rights. In the conventional
view, it is simply self-evident that if debtors could contract out of
the availability of bankruptcy, they would do so: creditors would
inevitably and routinely demand waiver clauses in loan agreements, debtors would just as inevitably sign them, and the institution of discharge together with its value to debtors and society
245. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.

247. See E. A. FARNSWORTH,

CONTRACTS

3-10 (1982).

1986]
would be "nullified.

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

248

Stated in that stark form, of course, the explanation is incomplete. Even if it were correct that creditors would routinely exact
discharge waivers it would not necessarily follow that the values of
insurance would be lost. Under some circumstances, self-insurance
is a sensible (that is, cost-effective) substitute for insurance or prevention. 4 9 Moreover, if the insurance compelled by the discharge
had a value to debtors greater than its cost to providers (that is,
more cost-effective to debtors than self-insurance or prevention),
one could reasonably expect there to be sufficient demand to support at least some market in insurance substitutes for the waived
discharge protections. In fact, there are existing markets in credit
insurance and various forms of private income insurance that afford coverage for many of the same perils (loss of employment, for
example) that are effectively insured against by the discharge.250
Thus, the stated premise that debtors would waive discharge if
given the chance is not by itself enough to explain the point of
nonwaivability rules that compel insurance, increase levels of cred248. Federal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157, 159, 148 N.E. 379, 380 (1925). See also
J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK

OF THE LAW OF BANKRuPTcy

98 (1956) ("The policy of the Bank-

ruptcy Act in relation to discharges would obviously be defeated if creditors could prevail by
a routine of exacting such waivers .... ).
249. Due to the existence of loading costs, nonsubsidized market insurance inevitably has
a price higher than the present value of the loss. For the risk-averse insured the extra cost is
offset by a reduction in risk, but the reduction is not necessarily equivalent in value to the
amount by which the cost exceeds the pure premium. See Ehrlich & Becker, supra note 215,
at 637-41; Pauly, supra note 219, at 531-32.
250. See generally C. HUBBARD, CONSUMER CREDrr LnsE AND DIsABiLrrY INSURANCE 7-27
(1973). This is not to imply that there are existing or extensive markets in insurance for the
entire range of risks allocated to creditors by the discharge. As noted, moral hazard severely
limits the insurability of some perils, such as voluntary job loss in employment insurance. It
has likewise been suggested that the related phenomenon of adverse selection (that is, the
tendency of insurance to attract a disproportionate level of high-risk insureds in circumstances in which insurers are less able than the insured to identify individual differences in
risk and thus unable to discriminate effectively in premium setting) may limit the insurability of credit risks to the extent that debtors cannot credibly signal or communicate their
risk level to an insurer. See Rea, supra note 178. Nonetheless, there are existing markets in
disability income insurance, see C. HUBBARD, supra at 16-18, 31-32 (credit disability insurance); E. VAUGHAN & C. ELLioTT, supra note 219, at 242-54 (accident and illness income
insurance), and there have been recent efforts to market credit insurance covering income
interruptions due to other causes. See Your Money: Debt Insurance After Job Loss, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 26, 1983, at 30, col. 1. Similarly, there is a well-established market in insurance
for medical and health care costs. See E. VAUGHAN & C. ELLIOTT, supra note 219, at 255-72;
see also CONSUMER BANKRuPTcy STUDY, Vol. 11, supra note 233, at 37 (medical bills are the
single factor most frequently cited by debtors as leading to bankruptcy); Nine States Study,
supra note 233, at 295 ("unanticipated medical expenses play a major role in the family
finances of more than half the personal bankrupts").
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itor-generated prevention, and limit the debtor's opportunities to
substitute self-insurance in place of either. The explanation,
rather, necessarily implies two additional assumptions: first, that
debtors, having waived discharge, would not resort to market insurance or prevention in its place; and second, that there would be
something wrong with that situation. Put another way, the rules of
nonwaivability must rest on a view that debtors, left to their own
devices, would underinsure and that they would thereby excessively rely on self-insurance in dealing with the risks covered by
the discharge.
The idea of "excessive" reliance implies, of course, that there is
some external standard of value against which to measure an individual's insurance preferences. One standard is easy enough to
identify. For the economically rational borrower, the choice of
strategies in dealing with default risks is a function of relative
costs and benefits. Because each strategy is a substitute for the
others, it is rational to prefer self-insurance only to the extent that
a dollar's worth of self-insurance buys greater protection than a
dollar's worth of insurance prevention. Moreover, as long as the
costs and benefits of each strategy are borne by the parties to the
transaction (that is, in the absence of externalities), choices made
in accordance with that model of "expected utility" should at least
presumptively optimize the social gain from the transaction.2 51
Thus, to speak of "excessive" self-insurance relative to credit
risks is to posit a divergence between borrowers' actual decisions
and the assumptions of expected utility. In particular, the imposition of a standard distinct from individual choices reflects one of
two possible judgments about the quality of those choices. On the
one hand, it can mean that, in the absence of compulsion, the insurance decisions of debtors would be irrational, in the sense that
the debtors' choices would fail to accurately reflect their actual
preferences (that is, the relative values they in fact attach to the
various alternatives).25 2 Or, on the other hand, it can mean that the
251. See generally K. ARROW, supra note 135, at 177-85, 199-202; Ehrlich & Becker,
supra note 215. As a descriptive tool, of course, the expected utility model is valuable in
describing or predicting aggregate market behavior rather than individual behavior. In the
context of consumer credit risk choices there may be reason to doubt the model's descriptive
power even as to aggregate behavior. See infra notes 254-63 and accompanying text.
Whether or not that is the case, the model remains valuable as a working normative standard of "rationality" in individual and aggregate decisions regarding risk, due to both its
coherence and comprehensiveness in accounting for the elements of risk.
252. Irrationality in that sense may be the product of inaccurate (because insufficient or
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decisions, although individually rational, would nonetheless be
nonoptimal from a social perspective because of the capacity of
borrowers to externalize to others the costs of some alternatives
and not others. The former approach assumes that borrowers
would excessively self-insure because they would mistakenly underestimate the relative benefits of insurance or the relative costs
of self-insurance. The latter approach assumes that borrowers
would estimate correctly but that they would nonetheless excessively self-insure because they could externalize the costs of selfinsurance to a greater degree than they could the costs of market
insurance or prevention.
From almost the first entry of consumers into the bankruptcy
system, the perceived deficiencies in consumer credit decisions
have usually been regarded as problems of irrationality rather than
as a function of externalities.2 53 Very often that perception has
rested on little more than strong intuitions that a substantial portion of borrowers tend to discount excessively the risk of financial
difficulties, systematically underestimating both the probability of
adverse changes in their circumstances and the gravity of the costs,
especially the nonmonetary costs, in the event of default. In recent
years, those intuitive judgments have received significant support
misperceived) information as to the probability or expected value of a future loss, or it may
be a function of errors in evaluating even accurate information. Central to the idea is a
divergence between the individual's actual choice and the choice he would make if fully and
accurately informed. Cf. Tversky & Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning:
The Conjunction Fallacyin ProbabilityJudgment, 90 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 293, 304 (1983).
The concept thus addresses the quality of the process by which one chooses a course of
action to advance one's preferences, rather than the quality of the preferences themselves.
To the extent that one speaks of another's preferences as themselves "irrational," the complaint is directed not to rationality vel non but to the noncorrespondence of those preferences with some substantive standard of value. Judgments of that kind are not unknown in
debates over the use of consumer credit, especially those regarding credit use among lowincome consumers. See Newton, Economic Rationality of the Poor, 36 HUM. ORGANIZATION
50, 50 (1977) (suggesting that claims of economic irrationality among poor consumers rest in
substantial part on class biases as to the values pursued). Nonetheless, because any particular conception of "rationality" in the content of values is essentially idiosyncratic (and
hence arbitrary as applied to others), and because the legal enforcement of credit "rationality" in that sense is fundamentally at odds with the American legal system's general approach to contractual exchange, see supra note 247 and accompanying text, it provides a
meager foundation for constructing a systematic explanation of discharge rights. For that
reason, it is treated as irrelevant here.
253. See supra notes 75-77, 111-13, 144, 166-68, and accompanying text. A concern with
externalized productivity costs has been an important aspect of bankruptcy debates since
the last century, see supra notes 23, 55, and accompanying text, but that concern has been
framed in terms of the effect of credit decisions on society, rather than in terms of the
incentives created by the possibility of externalization.
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from empirical studies of insurance decisions and from more general examinations of the psychology of decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty. 54 Central to the psychological theories is
the observation that, consciously or otherwise, people tend to act
on estimates of the probability of uncertain future events. These
estimates are formed using a variety of intuitive mental shortcuts
or judgmental "heuristics" to evaluate limited information and to
reduce complex probability estimations to simpler and more manageable judgments.25 5 While these heuristics are valuable in simplifying decision processes, each has a number of built-in biases that
lead to systematic errors in judgment regarding the likelihood of
uncertain outcomes. 5 s One result of such biases appears to be a
254. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982); R. NiSBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE
(1980); P. SCHOEMAKER, EXPERIMENTS
ON DECISIONS UNDER RISK. THE EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS (1980). As what appear to be
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT

among the first systematic efforts at rigorously testing the degree to which individual behavior corresponds to the standards of the expected utility model, the psychological studies
have increasingly become a part of evaluating legal rules addressed to risk taking by consumers. The relevance of the studies both to consumer credit decisions and to warranty
terms is explored in Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983),
and (in more abbreviated form) in Farber, supra note 180, at 331-33, 336-38. Their relevance to the credit risks dealt with by the bankruptcy discharge, in particular, is discussed
in Jackson, supra note 5, at 1410-18. For an argument as to their relevance to commercial
behavior, see Gerla, The Psychology of PredatoryPricing: Why PredatoryPricingPays, 39
Sw. L.J. 755 (1985).
255. Thus it has been observed that people tend to decide whether a particular outcome
is likely to occur by ordering the available evidence according to mental models (such as
stereotypes, prototypes, or schemata), and by assessing the degree to which the outcome
would be "representative" of the model. "Representativeness" may be in turn a function of
similarities between model and outcome or it may reflect causal or correlational beliefs.
"Thus, an outcome is representative of a model if the salient features match or if the model
[is believed to have] a propensity to produce the outcome." Tversky and Kahneman, supra
note 252, at 296. Likewise, probability judgments are strongly influenced by the ease with
which particular instances or occurrences of an outcome can be brought to mind (the "availability" heuristic). See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127-28 (1974). And, in some circumstances, people tend to
make probability estimates by starting from an initial value (the "anchoring" heuristic) and
by adjusting from that value to reach a final judgment. Id. at 1128-30.
256. Thus, the process of adjusting from an initial anchoring estimate, supra note 255,
typically tends to involve too little in the way of adjustment. As a result, the final estimate
tends to be biased toward the starting point, a bias that effectively accords excessive weight
to the information first available and insufficient weight to information acquired later. Similarly, the "availability" heuristic, supra note 255, tends to result in excessive weighting of
outcomes that are more readily called to mind or mentally retrievable than others. While
retrievability may depend in part on frequency or probability, it may be affected as well by
other factors, such as recency or emotional impact, that are unrelated to probability (as in
the "common experience that the subjective probability of traffic accidents rises temporarily
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pervasive tendency to underestimate the likelihood of very lowprobability events.2 57 Another result is a similar tendency toward
unrealistic optimism, manifested in judgments that overestimate
the probability of pleasant outcomes and underestimate the
probability of unpleasant ones.25 s
In the specific context of the risks associated with consumer
credit use, there is a low probability of default for even the least
credit-worthy borrower able to obtain a loan; high-risk debtors
tend to be a "high risk" only relative to other debtors. 259 As a result, both the low probabilities and the unpleasant outcomes involved may well lead debtors to systematically underestimate at
when one sees a car overturned by the side of the road," Tversky & Kahneman, supra note
255 at 1127). And, because the "representativeness" heuristic, supra note 255, places great
weight on "typical" characteristics, its use tends to result in judgments that ignore the insufficiency of the available data as a basis for judgment. Remarkably small samples, for
example, are given great weight, and limitations on the reliability or predictability of the
available data tend to be ignored. See id. at 1126 (noting, for example, that a generally
favorable description of a business will lead to predictions of high profitability without regard to the reliability of the description or the relevance of its particulars to future performance). See generally id. at 1124-30.
257. See H. KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 12-17,
182-84 (1978); Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 275, 282-83 (1979). It has been suggested that this tendency
may be a function of the biases accompanying the use of the availability heuristic, supra
note 256, in that "there may be some critical probability threshold below which people ignore the threat that a large loss may occur. This threshold may exist because people have
limited attention capacity and must be selective about the problems to which they allocate
their scarce 'attention resources.'" P. SCHOEMAKER, supra note 254, at 68.
258. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 255, at 1129; Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY, July-Dec. 1980, at

806. In part the tendency to excessive optimism is attributable to the anchoring heuristic,
supra note 255, one consequence of which is a bias both toward overestimating the
probability of conjunctive events (that is, those that depend for their occurrence on the
occurrence of several other events) and toward underestimating the probability of disjunctive events (that is, those occurrences which depend on the occurrence of any one of several
other events). Because the successful completion of a plan ordinarily depends on the success
of its several parts, the tendency to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events leads
to overestimation of the likelihood of success. Likewise, because a plan can go awry if any of
a number of adverse events occurs, the tendency to underestimate the probability of disjunctive events leads to excessive discounting of the risk of failure. See Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 255, at 1129. The tendency toward optimism may also be a consequence of the use of other heuristics to the extent that the occurrence of unfavorable events
is associated with negative stereotypes (representativeness) with which the actor does not
identify or to the extent that the actor's prior experience does not include the event in
question (availability). See Weinstein, supra at 807-08.
259. Cf. Benston, Risk on Consumer Finance Company Personal Loans, 32 J. FIN. 593,
606 (1977) (consumer finance companies, which have considerably higher loss rates and operating expenses than other consumer lenders, experience average net losses due to default
of about $1.30 per $100 of loan outstanding).
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the time of borrowing the likelihood of events, such as severe illness or loss of employment, that might render repayment difficult.2 0 To the extent that debtors do underestimate such risks,
even actuarially fair market insurance and, to a lesser degree, preventive activities will tend to appear unduly costly relative to their
perceived benefits. Self-insurance, on the other hand, will appear
unrealistically attractive, since the perceived cost of that strategy
will be the erroneously overdiscounted present value of the risk.
While these implications of the widespread existence of cognitive
biases have not yet been empirically tested in the context of credit
decisions, the tendency to underinsure against low-probability perils has been observed both experimentally and in field studies of
other insurance decisions.2 61 To that extent, both theory and data
lend support to the long-standing intuitive rationale for
nonwaivability that, given the opportunity, debtors would systematically and irrationally tend to substitute self-insurance for the
protections afforded by the discharge or available in a more costeffective form by way of market insurance or prevention.
The role of cognitive biases in risk decisions also tends to make
less plausible the alternative view that bankruptcy rules of
nonwaivability are designed to reduce the incentive for the debtor
to externalize the costs of self-insurance. There are, to be sure,
sound reasons for believing that, in the event of default, a putatively self-insured debtor would not necessarily bear the entire cost
260. That would be particularly the case to the extent that the heuristics involve the
placing of excessive emphasis on the debtor's situation at the time he obtains the loan. For
example, in the absence of prior experience with difficulties leading to default (experience
that would militate against his obtaining the loan), the availability heuristic would lead to
excessive weighting of the debtor's past ability to pay. See Hassler, Myers & Selden, Payment History as a Predictor of Credit Risk, 47 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 383 (1963). In addition, because possible impairment of his future ability to pay involves disjunctive events
(that is, his ability can be affected by the occurrence of any of several events, such as illness,
accidents, or economic layoff from employment, each of which has an individually low
probability), the tendency to underestimate disjunctive probabilities, see supra note 258,
would likewise lead to excessive discounting of the risks of repayment difficulties.
261. See, e.g., H. KUNREUTHER, supra note 257; Kunreuther & Slovic, Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, 69 AM. EcoN. Rxv. PAPERS AND PROCEEsDINGS 64 (1979);
Schoemaker & Kunreuther, An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK &
INS. 603 (1979); Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan & Combs, Preference for Insuring
Against Probable Small Losses: InsuranceImplications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237 (1977). But
see Hogarth & Kunreuther, Ambiguity and Insurance Decisions, 75 AM. EcoN. REv. 386
(1985) (suggesting that failure to insure against low-probability high-loss events is a function of insurers' unwillingness to insure rather than of consumers' unwillingness to pay
premiums).
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of his decision to self-insure," 2 and for a rational debtor those possible externalities would create incentives for excessive reliance on
self-insurance at the time of borrowing. Certainly, when financial
difficulties have in fact occurred, one could reasonably expect that
the debtor's choice among the then-available options would be
guided by the perceived relative costs and benefits of each. His
conduct at that point might well be influenced by his ability to
externalize some costs and not others. But the existence of such an
incentive effect prior to default depends on an assumption that
the ability to externalize the costs of self-insurance would be correctly understood and rationally calculated by debtors at that
time. It is, however, by no means clear either theoretically or empirically that the capacity to externalize losses normally plays a
significant role in ex ante decisions to favor self-insurance over
market insurance. The existence of cognitive biases suggests,
rather, that those decisions are based on erroneously low estimates
of the probability of default. To that extent, the incentive created
by the possibility of externalizing the costs of failure should be correspondingly reduced: for the debtor who substantially underestimates the risk of financial difficulties ex ante, the perceived value
of a future low-cost bailout will also be substantially, albeit mistakenly, discounted. 8 3
The view that the possible externalization of debtors' self-insurance costs has limited significance as to prebankruptcy incentives
does not imply that externalities are wholly irrelevant to discharge
policy. On the contrary, the existence of some external costs appears to be an integral part of a coherent justification for the
nonwaivability of discharge rights. The mistakes generated by cognitive biases have an influence over the entire range of decisions
involving risk and insurance. Yet, legal intervention to correct
those errors of judgment is markedly infrequent. Even within the
specific context of the risks accompanying credit use, the disabling
effects of nonwaivability rules do not reach the full range of deci262. See infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.

263. See Kunreuther & Slovic, supra note 261, at 66 (concluding that tendency to underinsure against natural disasters is unaffected by expectations of postdisaster government

assistance).
The tendency to underestimate the risk will also affect the debtor's choice of a means of
self-insurance: that is, his choice between accounting for the risk by increasing present savings, on the one hand, and accomplishing that end by relying on future income, on the other
hand. To the extent that the present value of the risk is excessively discounted, the debtor
will mistakenly "under-save" and, by default, rely excessively on future income or property
to deal with the loss.
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sions potentially affected by cognitive distortions. Debtors are effectively precluded from self-insuring only to the extent of the exempt property and future income protected in bankruptcy. Beyond
that limited degree of compulsion, their insurance decisions are
untrammeled by nonwaivability rules, notwithstanding that cognitive errors can easily distort those decisions as well.2" 4 Standing
alone, the likelihood of irrational insurance choices by consumer
debtors cannot explain the limited scope of legal interference with
those choices.26 5 By contrast, a concern for minimizing the possible
externalization of some self-insurance costs provides a sensible justification for legal interference where it has occurred.
The most frequently identified external costs of consumer financial difficulties result from the impact of collections activity on the
debtor's incentive or ability to maintain an optimal level of gainful
employment. The causal relation between financial difficulties and
underemployment or unemployment has been identified in various
ways: as the result of the debtor's choice to forego full employment
that would benefit the collecting creditor rather than himself;26" as
stemming from the involuntary loss of employment following mul264. Thus, for example, a debtor remains free to impair exemptions by the use of
purchase money security interests, even though there is no reason to distinguish between
purchase money and nonpurchase money interests in terms of the degree to which he is
likely to underestimate the risk of future financial difficulties. Similarly, he is free to place
his nonexempt property at risk, notwithstanding that there is again no reason to expect that
distortions in his estimation of the risk would vary according to the property involved.
265. The limited scope of the intervention effected by nonwaivability rules also tends to
limit the descriptive power of theories that attribute the rules to a kind of collective "selfpaternalism," that is, a choice to limit our freedom of choice in circumstances where there is
a general recognition that our failure to correctly estimate the consequences will lead to
decisions that on reasoned reflection we believe are likely to be mistakes (a position summed
up in the view that "I'm for it because I might need it some day"). See, e.g., G. TULLocK,
supra note 135, at 53-55; Jackson, supra note 5, at 1414-15. If the systematic underestimation of the risks associated with credit use warranted a general rule precluding reliance on
self-insurance on that ground, one would expect the preclusion to be more or less coextensive with the occasions of underestimation. As described above, however, the preclusion is in
fact far narrower than the range of opportunities for such mistakes. Sef-paternalist explanations are usually offered as normative justifications as, for example, in Professor Jackson's
use of a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" as the premise of his suggestions in this regard. See
Jackson, supra note 5, at 1410, 1414-15. It may be worth noting, however, that the limited
attractions of the discharge, due to its limited scope, do not appear to make it a particularly
"good buy" for the great majority of the population. From that perspective, self-paternalist
motives seem implausible as a descriptive matter, whatever the normative position. Cf. Rodgers, Explaining Income Redistribution, in REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 165,
189-90 (H. Hochman & G. Peterson eds. 1974) (discussing implausibility of similar selfparternalist "insurance" explanations for public assistance programs).
266. See, e.g., Discussion, supra note 96, at 151-53; Jackson, supra note 5, at 1421-23;
Rendleman, supra note 8, at 726.
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tiple garnishments; 26 7 or, less directly, as the product of an impaired ability to work attributable to the health and psychological
costs that accompany financial distress. 26 s Whatever their source,
the employment consequences of default are costs that a self-insured debtor has in theory opted to bear, mistaken though he may
have been as to their nature or probability. In fact, however, it has
long been suggested that debtors would not fully bear all of the
costs involved if allowed to self-insure. In the classic view, the employment consequences of default have been depicted as externalizing costs to society in the form of the loss of the debtor's productivity.2 0 More recently, those employment consequences have been
viewed as imposing external costs by increasing the need for debtors to resort to the benefits of various social insurance or public
assistance "safety net" programs.
As to productivity losses, it is doubtful that the costs are in fact
externalized under ordinary circumstances, since most decreases in
productivity are usually internalized to the debtor in the form of
lower income.27 ' Moreover, to the limited extent that productivity
267. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 92.
268. See, e.g., Weistart, supra note 107, at 111; authorities cited supra note 95.
269. See supra notes 23, 82, 180, and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 96, 180, and accompanying text. A third form of externalization that
has been suggested at times is the externalization to the debtor's family of the employment
costs of payment or collection. See, e.g., F. NoEL, supra note 16, at 186-87; Discussion,
supra note 96, at 142-43; Jackson, supra note 5, at 1419. While the existence of such externalities is plausible, they provide at most a highly limited explanation for the preclusion of
self-insurance effected by the existing nonwaivability of discharge rights. In particular, if the
object of discharge were to protect family members from bearing the employment costs of
collection, one would expect family obligations to be generally nondischargeable. Instead,
the Code limits the dischargeability of such obligations only to the extent that they involve
the support of family members. A rule that leaves family members with the consequences of
the debtor's financial difficulties beyond that level is (as described infra notes 300-01 and
accompanying text) compatible with a concern for social insurance costs, but it does not
suggest a particularly strong concern for limiting externalization of costs to the family members themselves in the absence of social insurance externalities. See id.
271. That would not be the case to the extent that the debtor's wage rate prior to a
decrease in productivity understated the value of his labor to society, since the social loss in
productivity would then be greater than the decline in the debtor's income. While divergences between wage rates and social value no doubt exist, there appears to be no reason to
suspect that they involve a systematic understatement of productivity in wage rates. See
generally Jackson, supra note 5, at 1420 n.88. Moreover, in the context of contract credit,
the risk of a collections-generated decline in the debtor's productivity should ordinarily be
accounted for in the cost of the loan, see supra note 235 and accompanying text, so that the
cost of the decline will ordinarily be internalized to the debtor in any event. See Discussion,
supra note 96, at 152-53. There are, no doubt, circumstances in which internalization in this
form may be less than complete. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text. But that is
least likely as to the most common kinds of dischargeable obligations. See supra notes 233-
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losses can be externalized, nonwaivability rules are a clumsy instrument for dealing with the problem. 72 Empirical studies indicate that the chief beneficiaries of the discharge system, and thus
presumably the primary targets of nonwaivability rules, are contract debtors with low to moderate incomes, 2 73 for whom the opportunities to externalize lost productivity costs are the most
74
limited.
By contrast, the limitations imposed on self-insurance by the
nonwaivability of the discharge are readily compatible with a concern for the possible externalization of default costs to the social
insurance system.2 7 5 By and large, the default risk for any given
36 and accompanying text. Nor is there any reason to believe that the availability of discharge ameliorates the externalization: if the cost to the debtor fails to account for the risk
of a decline in productivity, it will equally fail to account for the risk of complete discharge.
272. In circumstances in which the debtor's wages understate the social value of his employment, it has been suggested that the debtor's substitution of lower paying employment
in response to collections activity would be less costly to the debtor than to society, due to
the role of nonpecuniary benefits as a part of the measure of value. See Jackson, supra note
5, at 1422-23. In particular, the suggestion is, if the value to the debtor of the nonpecuniary
benefits of a lower-paying job exceeds the social value of those benefits (as measured by
their value to workers at the margin), a shift to the lower-paying job may cost the debtor
less in lost total compensation than it will cost society in lost productivity. Id. at 1423. As
that description suggests, however, social cost is no more likely to exceed individual cost
than individual cost is likely to exceed social cost in circumstances in which the debtor's
shift to lower-paying employment is an involuntary consequence of garnishment or of the
health or psychological consequences of collection activity. In those cases, that is, because
the substitution is not the product of incentives, one can as readily expect that the value to
the debtor of the nonpecuniary benefits of the substitute employment would be the same as
or less than the value of those benefits to society. Thus, a systematic excess of social cost
over individual cost should occur, if at all, only in the context of employment costs incurred
by a voluntary shift in employment, and then only in the even more limited context of the
debtor for whom it is possible to obtain a lower-paying job that affords nonpecuniary benefits of a greater value to him than their value to workers at the margin. In short, to the
extent that the concern is with externalities of this sort, the problem appears to be one of
fairly narrow dimensions. And, as suggested infra note 274, it appears to be least significant
among debtors who are the likeliest candidates for discharge.
273. See GAO STUDY, supra note 2, at 23, 29; New Jersey Study, supra note 233, at 551
table 11; Nine States Study, supra note 233, at 290 table B.
274. To the extent that any externalization of lost productivity costs is a function of the
creditor's inability to shift the cost to the debtor at the time the liability is created, see
supra note 271, contract debts are the least likely occasions for the problem to arise. See
supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text. To the extent that the externalization is a result
of differences in values ascribed to the nonpecuniary benefits of lower-paying substitute
employment, see supra note 272, low-income debtors have the least opportunity to make the
substitution; because they begin with already low incomes, they are less apt than others to
be in a position to seek employment at even lower pay, whether or not the new employment
offers nonpecuniary compensation that is highly valuable to the debtor.
275. As used here, references to the social insurance system are meant as a shorthand
label for the entire range of government-sponsored benefit programs that are intended to
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borrower tends to have an inverse correlation with his levels of in7
Even in the absence of discharge rights, for
come and wealthy.

the low-risk, high-income borrower, the existence of a significant
income and wealth cushion would substantially decrease the possibility either that financial reversals would result in a loss of employment due to collections activity or that it would be possible for
him to resort to social insurance benefits in the event that they
did.177 For the high-risk, low-income borrower, on the other hand,
significantly less protection would be afforded by his available income and wealth.y In the event of an adverse change in the borassure the general availability of a minimum income or standard of living. The term includes the various public assistance or income maintenance programs (such as general relief,
aid to families with dependent children, supplemental security income, and the like), as well
as programs affording subsidized assistance for particular basic living needs, such as food
stamps, medicaid, or emergency food and housing assistance. To the extent that the likely
beneficiaries of a government-sponsored income or other benefit program pay (directly or
indirectly) a nonsubsidized, risk-related premium for their benefits (as may be the case, for
example, relative to some forms of workers' compensation), a debtor's resort to the benefits
as a consequence of collections costs should ordinarily involve only limited externalization,
since the risk of such claims is at least generally internalized to the beneficiaries by means
of premium payments. Thus, the primary concern here is with social "insurance" for which
the "premium" is largely metaphorical (as in references to tax payments as a premium for
public assistance) or in which the "premium" is unrelated to risk. As to those forms of social
insurance, the transfer of collections costs to benefit costs will far more frequently be at the
public's expense, rather than at the debtor's. Finally, it should be noted that, as the above
parenthetical partial listings suggest, social insurance benefits of this kind are far more extensive than those simply afforded by income maintenance programs. For a more complete
listing, one need only thumb through any recent edition of the Catalogof Federal Domestic
Assistance. See U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE (20th ed.

1986).
276. The correlation (which is, of course, a product of the relationship between ability to
repay and the availability of resources for repayment) is most evident from the importance
accorded income and wealth in credit-granting decisions. See Dunkelberg, A Lower Rate
Maximum for Retail Credit: The Impact on Consumers, in 6 THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CONSUMER FINANCE, TECHNICAL STUDIES 18-19 (1974) (discussing dominant role of income
and income-correlated characteristics in credit standards); see also id. at 12 (greater likelihood of default among low-income borrowers).
277. That is not to say that it would be wholly unlikely or impossible for the affluent
debtor to convert collections costs to social insurance costs in the event of financial difficulties. While income maintenance and other "safety net" programs frequently impose financial need criteria for eligibility, that is not inevitably the case as to the range of social insurance benefits. The services provided by subsidized community mental health or family
service agencies, for example, are at times available to the public generally, and it would
thus be possible for the psychological costs of collections to be transferred in part to such
agencies by high-income borrowers. Moreover, even a debtor with substantial income is capable of losing that cushion in fairly short order, and of becoming thereby eligible even for
those benefits as to which there are financial need criteria. The difference is one of likelihood, rather than of absolute possibilities.
278. See CREDrr RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIVERSIrY, MONOGRAPH No. 22, CRC 1979 CONSUMER FINANCIAL SURVEY 320 (1981)
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rower's circumstances, the immediate costs would thus be far more
likely to include loss of employment, and it would also be more
likely to result in his resort to social insurance benefits. Absent a
nonwaivable discharge, in short, it might be meaningful to speak of
the low-risk debtor's decision to self-insure as true self-insurance,
since the debtor and his property will ordinarily bear the costs of
default. For the debtor with a significant income and wealth cushion, self-insurance may be unwise, but it is self-insurance. The
high-risk debtor, however, has a relatively small capacity to bear
the loss, and any decisions to "self-insure" in his case would in fact
frequently involve not simply self-insurance, but also the externalization of collections-generated costs to the social insurance system.
Thus, in the same way that concerns with consumer judgment
deficiencies suggest a basis for intervening in consumer insurance
choices, a concern for the externalization of a limited class of collections costs tends to explain the limited scope of that intervention. In particular, the primary effect of nonwaivability rules is to
limit the opportunity for troubled debtors to externalize the costs
of default following a decision to self-insure. By compelling ex ante
the substitution of implicit market insurance and preventive activities in place of self-insurance, it internalizes to the parties the
risks associated with credit transactions.

7

9

The discharge thereby

(data on relative holdings of liquid assets among income groups); Dunkelberg, supra note
276, at 10 (also relative holdings of liquid assets data); authorities cited supra note 112.
279. The compulsion of preventive activities as a substitute for self-insurance is accomplished indirectly, by placing the risk on creditors and thereby affording them an incentive
either to limit the risk themselves (by limiting credit extensions) or to require risk-limiting
behavior on the debtor's part as a condition of the loan. In that regard, it has been suggested that the available data on heuristic biases in risk judgments argue against shifting
credit risks from debtors to creditors, since people should be less prone to error "when assessing their own behavior than when evaluating others' actions." Schwartz & Wilde, supra
note 254, at 1444. From that perspective, it is claimed, the frequency of mistaken underestimations of risk may be increased by the nonwaivability of debtor protections. In reply, it
has been argued that, even if creditors would be more prone to cognitive errors as an initial
matter, there is greater reason to expect "market constraints" to correct errors made by
creditors than by debtors (that is, the probability that competition will tend to "weed out"
firms that systematically err in judging risk). Jackson, supra note 5, at 1417-18 & n.77. More
fundamentally, the premise that debtors are less likely to err seems to be erroneous in itself.
Individual credit grantors are far more likely than individual debtors to have experienced
credit defaults in their history: for lenders, default is a part of doing business, while for
borrowers it is a substantial impediment to acquiring a loan. Thus, to the extent that the
tendency to risk underestimation is a function of the availability heuristic, see supra note
260, one would expect the wider experience of creditors to limit the intensity of the bias. Cf.
Weinstein, supra note 258, at 813 (noting that increased awareness of the failures of others
tends to reduce biases toward optimism). Moreover, as to cognitive biases generally, it appears that there is a greater tendency to employ statistically sound heuristics (that is, those
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provides the debtor with an alternative, arguably more attractive,
means for maintaining a minimum level of assets and income in
the event of payment difficulties, without the necessity of transferring collections costs to the social insurance system. At the same
time, the coverage of the insurance compelled by the discharge is
limited to those protections that are of value in decreasing the
debtor's need or incentive to rely on social insurance programs.
For example, because collections efforts directed at earnings are
the most likely cause of externalizable unemployment costs, the
discharge affords virtually complete protection to the debtor's
postbankrupty income and to the property acquired with that income. A similar concern appears to define the contours of the
Code's other postbankruptcy protections. The prohibition of private employment discrimination28 0 directly limits postbankruptcy
unemployment costs. Less directly, the prohibition of governmen2 2
tal discrimination,8 l the injunction against informal collections,
and the restraints on the debtor's capacity to reaffirm2 8 3 limit externalization by limiting activities that have historically been perceived as likely to resurrect the debtor's financial difficulties
shortly after bankruptcy. 28 By contrast, other adverse postbankruptcy conduct, such as impaired credit and other forms of private "discrimination," which appear to entail no particular employment or social insurance consequences, remain unregulated. 285
in which biases toward error are muted or absent) as one's experience with the particular
kind of event increases. See Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda, The Use of Statistical
Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, 90 PSYCHOLOGicAL REV. 339, 347, 354-55

(1983) (describing the process and attributing it to the role of experience in enhancing the
salience not only of the distribution of events, but also of the role of chance factors in affecting outcomes). To the extent that that is the case, one should expect creditors to be less
likely than debtors to err in risk assessments because their experience makes it more likely
that they will rely on statistically sound heuristics in-reaching their judgments. And, indeed,
the common use of statistically validated credit-screening devices, see supra note 236, suggests that to be the case.
280. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (Supp. III 1985).
281. Id. § 525(a).
282. Id. § 524(a)(2).
283. Id. § 524(c), (d) (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985).
284. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 989, supra note 153, at 80; REPORT, supra note 5, at 177, H.R.
REP. No. 565, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 162-65 (1977).
285. In 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed the
enactment of a rule forbidding "discriminatory treatment [against a person] because he, or
any person with whom he is or has been associated, is or has been a debtor or has failed to
pay a debt discharged in a case under the Act." REPORT, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 143-44.
While that phrasing appeared to encompass private as well as governmental discrimination,
the Commission's explanatory note described its proposal as a protection from "discriminatory treatment under federal or state law," id. at 144 (emphasis added), and the Commis-
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Similarly, the Code affords only the minimal protection of exsion's Executive Director later described the reach to private conduct as an inadvertant
error in drafting. There were those, however, who regarded at least some postbankruptcy
expressions of private hostility toward debtors as incompatible with the "fresh start" policy.
See, e.g., S. ENZER, R. DEBRIGARD & F. LAZAR, supra note 98, at 186; Comment, Postdischarge Coercion of Bankrupts by Private Creditors: Girardier v. Webster College, 91 HAv.
L. REv. 1336, 1340-45 (1978). As originally enacted, the Code forbade only governmental
discrimination, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2593 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)), an approach described as a codification of Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (discussed supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text). See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 153, at 81. In somewhat bolder fashion, however, the legislative history contained a statement that the statutory rule was "not
exhaustive" and that it permitted "further development [by the judiciary] to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-governmental organizations that perform licensing functions
. . .or by other organizations that can seriously affect the debtors' livelihood or fresh start,
such as exclusion from a union." Id. Notwithstanding that invitation and apart from occasional dicta, see, e.g., Terry v. Gordon's Jewelry Co., 7 Bankr. 880, 881 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1980), the reported decisions under the Code were essentially unanimous in holding that,
unless it amounted to an effort to collect a discharged debt, which would violate the discharge injunction, private "discriminatory" conduct was not prohibited by the Code. See,
e.g., Barbee v. First Va. Bank-Colonial, 14 Bankr. 733, 735-36 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); In re
Coachlight Dinner Theatres of Nanuet, Inc., 8 Bankr. 657, 658-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
But cf. Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., 7 Bankr. 328, 33435, 338-39 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1980) (preliminary injunction ordering suppliers to deal with
business in Chapter 11, where substantial question was held to exist as to whether refusal to
deal was unlawful discrimination contrary to "the letter or policy" of the Bankruptcy Code).
As a doctrinal matter, a hesitant approach was hard to avoid, since § 525 was by its terms
limited to government action, and Perez (which Congress envisioned as the seed for "further
development") was decided under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, a constitutional restraint on state law, rather than on private conduct. In 1984, the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act extended the express prohibitions of § 525 to include the conduct of "private employer[s]" and precluded "terminat[ing] the employment of, or discriminatfing] with
respect to employment against" debtors or persons associated with them "solely because"
they had filed bankruptcy or had failed to pay a discharged debt. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (Supp.
III 1984).
Given the express extension to a particular form of private conduct (and the interpretive
canon, expressio unius est exclusio alterius), one can reasonably doubt the continuing existence of whatever force the 1978 call for "further development" might once have had. Moreover, even if one were prepared to put aside doctrinal difficulties and principles of statutory
construction, the considerations discussed in the text above suggest that a substantial degree of caution is still warranted in judicial prohibition of other forms of private discrimination under the "fresh start" rubric. In particular, because the postbankruptcy "fresh start"
protections appear to be focused on limiting postbankruptcy social insurance costs, the inquiry as to particular kinds of private "discrimination" should be directed to the degree to
which the conduct at issue can be expected to impair the debtor's postbankruptcy capacity
to provide for himself. With the exception of employment discrimination, however, it is difficult to imagine forms of private conduct that can be expected (or that have been shown) to
have any significant effect in that direction. In the absence of such a nexus between the
conduct and the debtor's livelihood, the "fresh start" appears to offer no reason for intervention. See also infra notes 348-57 and accompanying text (discussing the role of postbankruptcy moral costs in reducing moral hazard). At the same time, the considerations suggested above suggest a fairly flexible construction of the terms "private employer" and
"employment" in the existing express prohibition, in order to assure that their scope in-
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emptions to the debtor's property existing at bankruptcy. 286 Some
degree of protection in that area may well be required in order to
render the discharge more attractive than resorting to the social
insurance system 2 7 and to limit the debtor's need for immediate
postbankruptcy credit. But a requirement that the debtor surrender property beyond that basic level is, in addition to its utility in
reducing moral hazard, a cost that is unlikely to have an adverse
impact on the debtor's capacity for self-support. Likewise, the
debtor's power to avoid nonpurchase money liens in exempt property28 8 can be attributed both to assuring the attraction of discharge relative to social insurance and to limiting the postbankruptcy leverage of lienholders. The latter concern, indeed,
suggests a rationale for the lack of a similar power as to purchase
money liens: 28 9 because the property secured by a nonpurchase
money lien is far more likely to be of minimal value relative to the
amount of the debt, the holder of such a lien is more likely than
his purchase money counterpart to employ repossession rights, not
to realize the market value of the collateral, but rather to induce
payments from the debtor's postbankruptcy income. 9 0
2. Consumer Competence, Social Insurance Costs, and the Contours of the Code's "Fresh Start"
An understanding of the underlying assumptions about the quality of consumer risk decisions and the externalized costs of those
decisions has value beyond explaining the nonwaivability of discludes actors (such as labor unions) whose relationship to the debtor is central to his continued earning power, whether or not the relationship falls within a strict definition of
"employment."

286. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
287. See In re Beck, 4 Bankr. 661, 663 (Bankr. C.D. MI1.1980); Trebilcock & Shulman,
supra note 96, at 458-59.

288. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982).
289. It may be that the distinction in avoidability between purchase money and nonpurchase money liens reflects a perceived difference in the degree to which deficiencies in consumer risk judgments will affect the decision to place exempt property at risk. Because
purchase money interests are created in the course of the acquisition of the property, see
U.C.C. § 9-207 (1978), it may be that the possibility of the property's loss in the event of
default would have greater salience to the debtor than the possible loss when the property is

already owned and has no particular connection to the loan.
290. See Head v. Home Credit Co., 4 Bankr. 521, 524 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1980). That difference in practical utility between the two kinds of security interests appears to have played a
substantial role in the Federal Trade Commission's recent promulgation of a rule prohibiting the taking of nonpurchase money interests in certain forms of basic property. 16 CYFR. §
444.2(a)(1) (1986).
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charge rights. In addition, the assumptions tend to place in perspective other aspects of the "fresh start" policy embodied in the
existing structure of the discharge under the Bankruptcy Code. As
discussed above, for example, the grounds for denial of discharge
and the nondischargeability of some debts can sensibly be viewed
as responsive to moral hazard problems. 91 As responses to moral
hazard, however, those limitations are remarkably mild. Outright
denial of discharge is essentially confined to cases of interference
in or noncooperation with the monitoring activities of the bankruptcy proceeding, 2 2 and the moral hazard forms of nondischargeability are limited -to fines, penalties, and fraudulently or
maliciously incurred liabilities. 2 3 Thus, with the exception of
crimes, fraud, and malicious injuries, the debtor's prebankruptcy
conduct leading to financial difficulties appears to be largely irrelevant to the availability or scope of relief under the Code.294 That
general lack of concern for affording the debtor an incentive to be
cautious in the creation of credit obligations and the corresponding
focus on his circumstances and incentives at the time of bankruptcy would ordinarily be difficult to explain. It is more readily
understandable, however, when viewed as a manifestation of the
assumption that, due to the distortion of consumer risk and insurance decisions by cognitive biases, the ex ante incentive created by
limitations on the discharge is severely limited. As a result, the primary concern is to limit the debtor's incentive to resort to social
insurance benefits at the time financial difficulties arise.2 95
291. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. As to these liabilities, the role of
deficiencies in judgment regarding risk is presumably substantially limited, since the full
liability is a direct and immediate consequence of the conduct, and estimations of later
ability to pay (whether or not mistaken) do not usually figure largely in the decision to act.
For that reason, there may be substantially greater reason to expect that the liabilities serve
a valuable deterrent function ex ante.
294. Moreover, nondischargeability is defined by reference to the debtor's prebankruptcy
conduct only in Chapter 7 cases, since the § 523(a) moral hazard kinds of claims are fully
dischargeable in Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982); see, e.g., Johnson v. Edinboro
State College, 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984).
295. Those concerns may also place in perspective the difference between Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 as to the dischargeability of malicious injury claims and the like, see supra note
294, a difference that has been described as "puzzling," Jackson, supra note 5, at 1440
n.147, and as "ludicrous," In re McMinn, 4 Bankr. 150, 154 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) ("If...
it is the intent of Chapter 13 to absolve debtors of the liability for such acts, then that
intent is ludicrous and the malaise apparently affecting our society is indeed understandable."). See also Future Earnings Hearings, supra note 2, at 37-38, 45-58 (testimony and
statement of Claude L. Rice, arguing that plan confirmation in Chapter 13 should require
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In the same vein, the existence of cognitive biases suggests an
explanation for the lack of Code provisions limiting the quality or
extent of the discharge rights available to "improvident" debtors,
as opposed to those who are merely "victims" of external events. 29 6
As the insurance characterization suggests, the failure to insure
against external catastrophes can be regarded as no less a form of
"improvidence" than is "overindulgence" in "easy" credit, since
both kinds of conduct involve excessive reliance on self-insurance
in place of market insurance or preventive activities.9 7 And in
that the debtor propose to pay § 523(a) claimants at least the amount that as a practical
matter they would have been able to collect after discharge if the debtor had filed under
Chapter 7 instead).
The difference in treatment may be less puzzling if one thinks of nondischargeability as a
coverage limitation addressed to moral hazard concerns and if one recalls that deductibles
and coinsurance can be used to serve a similar function. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. In Chapter 13 cases, the deductible (or cost to the debtor of relief) is almost inevitably higher than it is in Chapter 7 cases. At a minimum, the debtor's payments to creditors
in Chapter 13 must be at least equal to what he would pay in Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (1982). In addition, under the 1984 amendments, the debtor must (if an impaired
creditor objects) devote to plan payments an amount equal to his entire projected disposable income over three years, that is, the amount by which his income exceeds that "reasonably necessary" for his family's support. Id. § 1325(b) (Supp. III 1985). And, beyond that
additional financial cost, Chapter 13 can usually be expected to entail greater nonmonetary
burdens, since performance of the plan ordinarily requires that the debtor subject himself
and his finances to external examination and control for at least three years, in contrast to
the relatively brief duration of the ordinary Chapter 7 case. The extent of those burdens
may be evidenced in part by the high failure rate of Chapter 13 plans, even prior to the 1984
amendments. See supra note 2. In any event, because the point of both deductibles and
coverage limitations is a reduction in moral hazard, the higher deductible under Chapter 13
may serve to maintain a kind of rough equivalence with the more stringent coverage limitations of Chapter 7. At the same time, a concern with social insurance costs suggests the
propriety of affording some form of relief even from liabilities that involve significant levels
of moral hazard in their creation. While- liabilities for theft, assault, and drunk driving can
serve an important deterrent function, even thieves, brawlers, and drunks are nonetheless
capable of transferring collections costs to the social insurance system. See supra note 293.
A desire to limit postliability incentives of that kind (and a recognition that preliability
incentives to avoid undesirable conduct can be maintained without a lifetime of liability, cf.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2913.02(B), 2929.11(D) (Anderson Supp. 1985) (two-year maximum
sentence for grand theft)), affords a sensible foundation for the rough trade-off between
deductibles and coverage limitations manifested in the differences between Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13.
296. See supra notes 70-73, 121-23 and accompanying text.
297. One quick intuitive reaction to the statement in text is, of course, that the "victim's"
decision to self-insure may be the product of economic necessity and not of judgment deficiencies, since it frequently involves not choice but simply an inability to afford the premiums for market insurance. Cf. Shapiro, Disability: The ForgottenInsurance, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1984, at Fl, col. 1 (noting that disability income insurance "does not come
cheap"). But that reaction misses the role of prevention as an alternative to self-insurance
in limiting risk. To the extent that a debtor's liabilities include precalamity contract obligations, his inability to afford market insurance is immaterial to the question of whether he
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both cases the role of judgment deficiencies as the source of that
excessive reliance suggests the limited point of discharge constraints intended to create ex ante insurance incentives.
A concern for limiting the externalization of default costs to government assistance programs similarly aids in explaining the nonmoral hazard limitations of the existing "fresh start." In particular,
nondischargeable tax liabilities and family obligations do not appear to raise particular moral hazard problems, and yet both are
thoroughly excepted from discharge under both Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13.2es What sets these debts off from other allowable
claims is the likelihood that release of the debtor will do little to
limit the transfer of collections costs to the public. In the case of
taxes, the likelihood is a certainty. As to family obligations, the
usual nonbankruptcy standards for establishing the level of the
debtor's obligation (the debtor's ability and the dependent's or
spouse's needs) 299 make it relatively predictable that the deprivation of the debtor's support will frequently result in increased public assistance costs. Indeed, to the extent that nonbankruptcy standards fail to adhere to that focus, the statute requires that labels
be disregarded and that dischargeability be defined by reference to
whether the claim is "actually in the nature of" support.3 0 0 The
has made a rational trade-off between prevention (that is, foregoing credit) and self-insurance in dealing with the risk of a calamity impairing his payment ability. The reaction also
misses the difference in available methods of dealing with even unavoidable decisions to
self-insure, that is, reliance on future income versus committing present income to the risk
by preferring savings over consumption. See supra note 261. From that perspective, the only
"victim" without a choice is the one who cannot afford market insurance and whose financial difficulties would be the same regardless of his precalamity credit, consumption, and
savings choices.
298. Notably, these are the only nondischargeable obligations with no apparent relation
to moral hazard. That they are also the only obligations excepted from discharge both under
Chapter 7 and under Chapter 13 may tend to support the view that the differential dischargeability of other § 523(a) claims is a function of moral hazard considerations. See
supra note 295.
299. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B) (Anderson 1980).
300. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Thus, the status of a particular
obligation as "support" is a federal question decided in large measure by whether it was
intended to be used for the spouse's or the dependent's living expenses and whether it was
in fact necessary for that purpose. See, e.g., Long v. Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
Because the spouse or dependent may well have met his or her needs by borrowing or by
resorting to public assistance, see infra note 301 and accompanying text, it is appropriate to
disregard the parties' relative circumstances at the time of bankruptcy in deciding the dischargeability of arrearages. See, e.g., Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1984). It is
likewise appropriate to disregard present circumstances in deciding the dischargeability of
current "support" obligations (as long as the parties have the ability to seek modification of
the original decree under state law standards that correspond to the bankruptcy meaning of
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same orientation is evident in the provision that support obligations become dischargeable when they are assigned, unless the assignment is to a government agency that has provided public assistance to the debtor's spouse or child.30 1 In each case, as with taxes,
the effect of permitting discharge would not be to reduce the externalized social cost; it would, rather, simply shift the cost from one
government pocket to another. s 2
"support"), not because the circumstances are irrelevant but simply as a matter of comity.
Cf. Boyd v. Robinson, 31 Bankr. 591, 596 (D. Minn. 1983) (preference for abstention in
favor of state courts in domestic relations matters). At the same time, it seems inappropriate to decide the status of arrearages by reference to the parties' circumstances at the time
the support decree was entered, rather than at the time the particular payment came due,
see, e.g., Boyle, 724 F.2d 681, since it is at the latter time that the parties' relative needs and
abilities will influence the likelihood of resort to social insurance benefits by spouse or dependent. On the other hand, because the parties ordinarily will have the ability to seek a
nonbankruptcy modification of the original decree on the basis of future changes in circumstances, those circumstances should be less relevant to the issue of the allowability (and
hence dischargeability) of "support" payments due in the future.
301. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The difference between the assignment of support to a private party and simply borrowing to cover living expenses is that, in
the latter event, the spouse's or dependent's ability to meet his or her needs remains impaired by the outstanding credit obligation. See supra note 300; cf. Rombold v. Department
of Human Resources, 34 Bankr. 396 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (distinguishing between outright
assignments and assignments for collection).
302. Other liabilities to the government (which are generally dischargeable) do not ordinarily involve the same externalization problems as would be involved in the discharge of
tax liabilities and assigned support obligations. To the extent that the debtor's obligation is
contractual, the government's claim is not significantly different from that of private actors
in the relevant market, at least in terms of the capacity to internalize the costs to transactions involving the debtor or other contractual partners who are similarly situated. As to
noncontractual claims, there is less ability to pass the cost to the debtor, but there is still a
capacity to localize the risk to particular functions and to take risk-reducing steps to limit
the loss. This may be less costly than the debtor's resort to social insurance would be under
a regime of nondischargeability. Relative to taxes, by contrast, there is no particular function to which the risks or losses can be internalized, and relative to assigned support payments, the only available strategy of risk reduction would be a reduction in public assistance
to the debtor's spouse or dependents.
Student loans (the one form of nondischargeable government claim other than taxes and
assigned support obligations) do not involve these difficulties. Rather, their nondischargeability appears to be a function of the second form of moral hazard, the incentive to
resort to discharge in the absence of need. See infra notes 303-09 and accompanying text.
Given that student loans are a means of increasing the debtor's wealth by adding to his
human capital, one has greater reason than in the case of consumption credit to assume that
the borrower's circumstances have improved since the time the debt was incurred. That
approach is, indeed, compatible with the structure of the student loan exception, which effectively establishes only a presumption of nondischargeability capable of being rebutted by
a showing of "undue hardship" or by the passage of time. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1982 &
Supp. II 1985). A similar rebuttable presumption of nondischargeability in circumstances
that strongly suggest the existence of moral hazard is employed relative to obligations for
eve-of-bankruptcy "luxury goods" purchases. Id. § 523(a)(2)(C).
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The assumptions underlying nonwaivability rules also tend to
30 3
explain the absence of precise standards of eligibility for relief.
If the intent is to preclude reliance on self-insurance only to the
extent that "self-insurance" is in fact likely to be "social insurance," relief should be available only when the debtor's circumstances render payment of his debts sufficiently burdensome or
collections activity sufficiently aggressive that his reliance on social
insurance benefits will become either necessary or desirable. Ideally, that objective could be accomplished by expressly defining eligibility for relief in terms corresponding to the likelihood of such
externalization, as by requiring some particular degree of indebtedness in excess of income or assets. As a practical matter, however,
it is simply not possible to ascertain with any precision the point
at which collections costs are likely to be externalized as to any
given debtor. In part, that difficulty is a function of the variety of
causes of externalizable social insurance costs.3 04 In part, too, it can
be traced to the variety of social insurance programs to which collections costs might be transferred.3 0 5 What appears to be most important in this respect, however, is the role played by the nonmonetary burdens of payment and collections activity. Any
definitions of "need" or "inability-to-pay" framed wholly in financial terms would fail to capture the situation of debtors for whom
the psychological, health, or even moral costs of payment, whether
coerced or voluntary, are sufficiently grave as to result in a decline
in employment and in a consequent resort to social insurance benefits.3 06 Because those nonmonetary costs tend to be highly idiosyncratic, varying widely from debtor to debtor both in gravity and
in the extent to which they can be expected to occur, and because
303. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 275.
306. For discussions of the nonmonetary costs of financial difficulties, see authorities cited
supra note 95; see also Kinsey & Lane, The Effect of Debt on Perceived Household Welfare, 12 J. CONSUMER AFF. 48 (1978); Liem & Rayman, Health and Social Costs of Unemployment, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1116 (1982); Siporin, supra note 93, at 51-52; Trebilcock &
Shulman, supra note 96, at 417-18. Payment may involve substantial nonmonetary costs to
the debtor even in the absence of financial difficulties, as would be the case where a change
in values had rendered morally troublesome the objectives pursued in the original choice to
borrow. See Kronman, supra note 176, at 785-86. As to a debtor who is not in financial
difficulties, there is less reason to be concerned with the possibility of his externalizing payment costs to the social insurance system because the availability of social insurance benefits tends generally to depend on financial need criteria. That is not inevitably the case,
however, as is suggested supra note 275. In addition, even in the absence of current financial
difficulties, the nonmonetary burdens of payment, if sufficiently severe, may themselves lead
to financial problems by impairing the ability or motive to work.
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they are not susceptible of measurement in any useful terms, they
cannot be incorporated into an administratively workable standard
of need.
Given these considerations, the absence of express need criteria
governing access to the Code's discharge is hardly surprising: financial criteria would be too narrow, and nonfinancial tests would
be incoherent. The Code's solution is, rather, the indirect method
of reliance on the costs of discharge and on the limited scope of its
benefits as a control on access. 307 Thus, the discharge is designed
to be attractive only to those debtors for whom the financial or
other burdens of payment or collections activity are particularly
severe, and for whom the possibilities of externalization of those
burdens are correspondingly large. Because the debtor is himself
the best judge of the gravity and extent of the default costs he
suffers, his choice to substitute the costs of discharge can be taken
as establishing need, as long as those discharge costs bear some
relation to the objective of limiting social insurance costs. As suggested above, the limited protection of present assets in bankruptcy appears to be directed to that relationship. 30 8 In the main,
however, reliance on the incentive effects of costs and benefits is
not, and as to nonmonetary costs cannot be, much more precise
than express standards would be. The indirect approach has the
advantage, however, of appearing to work in practice, as is suggested by the socioeconomic characteristics of consumer debtors
under the Code, the great majority of whom are, as described in
one recent study, "the near poor-families barely getting by and
always at the brink of actual proverty." 30 9
Finally, the deficiencies in consumer insurance decisions and the
problem of externalized costs provide a rationale for the otherwise
troublesome general dischargeability of most tort liabilities. As already discussed, the discharge of liabilities to involuntary nonbusiness creditors constitutes "insurance" for the debtor only in the
sense that dischargeability shifts the risks created by his conduct
from the debtor to potential tort plaintiffs. 310 Unlike insurance, the
307. See Eisenberg, supra note 8,at 980.
308. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
309. New Jersey Study, supra note 233, at 545. See id. at 558 (debtors' mean incomes
"only marginally" higher than Bureau of Labor Standard's "lower living budget"); Nine
States Study, supra note 233, at 306 (62% of debtors in sample reported income lower than
"lower living budget").
310. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
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risk transfer does not routinely involve the spreading or distribution of risks. More importantly, the liability does not depend on a
voluntary transaction between the parties, and the debtor pays no
"premium" for the protection afforded him. As noted by various
commentators, that externalization of the debtor's insurance costs
to tort plaintiffs is problematic because, in theory, it disrupts the
incentive structure established by nonbankruptcy tort rules,
thereby increasing the net social cost of noncontractual injuries
and accidents. 11 Those difficulties with the dischargeability of tort
liabilities are far less compelling, however, if one assumes that a
consumer debtor's failure to rely on insurance against accident liabilities is likely to be less the product of incentives to underinsure
created by the discharge than a function of deficiencies in his ability to accurately estimate the risk of such liabilities. 1 2
That the capacity to externalize costs ordinarily has a limited
incentive effect on a consumer debtor's ex ante insurance decisions
(as appears to be assumed by the rationale for nonwaivability of
the discharge) makes more understandable the focus of the discharge on costs and incentives that exist after the tort liability has
been created. At that point, the social cost of the injury itself is the
same whether or not the liability is dischargeable. At the same
time, however, the availability of discharge can reduce the debtor's
then-existing incentive to externalize to the public the employment
costs caused by the tort plaintiff's collections activity. In that respect, with only limited attention given to preliability insurance
incentives, contract obligations and tort liabilities are essentially
indistinguishable; to the extent that minimizing the externalization
of collections costs warrants the dischargeability of one, it likewise
warrants the dischargeability of the other. In both cases the effect
of permitting discharge is the same: correction of the consumer
debtor's tendency toward excessive reliance on self-insurance ex
ante, but only to the degree necessary to limit his ex post incentives to externalize the costs of self-insurance to the social insurance system.
311. See, e.g., Keeton & Kwerel, Externalities in Automobile Insurance and the Underinsured Driver Problem, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 149 (1984); Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the
Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1984).
312. Cf. Arnould & Grabowski, Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of Market Failure,
12 BELL J. ECON. 27 (1981) (study of systematic underestimation of risk in demand for and
use of automobile safety devices); Robertson, Car Crashes: Perceived Vulnerability and
Willingness to Pay for Crash Protection, 3 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 136 (1977) (similar study
of risk underestimation).
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Other Considerationsand Constraints

The description set out above outlines the major elements of the
"fresh start" policy in its existing form under the Code: the character of the discharge as a form of implicit insurance for debtors,
established by a nonbargainable allocation of a part of the risk of
an adverse change in the debtor's circumstances; the problems of
moral hazard that inhere in any insurance relationship; and the
assumptions about consumer insurance choices, incentive effects,
and externalities that appear to be reflected both in the
nonwaivability of discharge rights and in the particular contours of
those rights under the Code. At the same time, however, the
description does not exhaust the complete range of concerns historically set forth as important influences affecting the shape of
the consumer "fresh start." As described in Part II, both the existence of the discharge and particular limits on its scope have been
justified at various times by reference to other considerations as
well: the rehabilitation of debtors, the advancement of distributive
preferences, the enforcement of moral standards, and the furtherance of the bankruptcy system's debt collection functions.
Whether and in what way these other considerations are relevant
to the present state of the "fresh start" policy depends, however,
on the extent to which they are compatible with the existing expression of that policy in the Bankruptcy Code. From that perspective, the description set out above provides not only an explanation of the Code's discharge but also a framework against which
to measure the present relevance of these other considerations.
1. Debtor Rehabilitation
As described in Part II, a vision of the "fresh start" policy as
incorporating concerns for debtor rehabilitation (in its strong or
therapeutic sense) depends on the twin assumptions, first, that
limited economic competence is at the root of the financial difficulties experienced by an identifiable portion of consumer bankrupts,
and second, that the institutions administering the discharge are
capable of correcting that root cause. 13 To a degree, the first of
those assumptions does mesh with a portion of the rationale for
nonwaivability of discharge rights, that consumer insurance decisions are commonly and systematically distorted by errors in judg313. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
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ment generated by cognitive biases. Indeed, both a failure to insure
against external economic events and "overindulgence" in credit
use can be regarded as products of the same underlying deficiencies in judgment regarding risk.3 14 To that extent, the existence of
cognitive biases might superficially suggest a broader role for therapeutic intervention than that contained in the commonly proposed model of relief for "victims" and rehabilitation for the
"irresponsible."
The second assumption of rehabilitation theory, however, cannot
so readily be accommodated to the existing structure of the discharge. As it stands, the bankruptcy system is utterly devoid of the
kinds of institutional arrangements one would expect to find if
therapy were seriously a concern in the process: there are no consumer education classes, no social workers, no debt counselling sessions, nor even established procedures for referral to community
service agencies that might provide such assistance.3 15 Their absence is not surprising, since one repeatedly noted aspect of the
heuristics at the source of consumer judgment deficiencies is that
they are not particularly amenable to correction, whether by training, education, or even experience.3 16 That limited mutability of
cognitive biases underscores as well the difficulties with less formal, ad hoc efforts at incorporating judicially devised "therapy"
into the administration of the Code's "fresh start." Even if the tendency for errors in risk decisions were readily capable of modification, one might well doubt the competence of judges, or other amateur therapists, to act as agents of change. 1 Given the tendency's
314. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
315. The Code does require that a consumer debtor be advised at filing by the clerk, 11
U.S.C. § 342(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and by his attorney, see Form 1, 1 7 & exhibit B, 11
U.S.C. app. Bankr. Rules (Supp. III 1985), of the bankruptcy options available to him,
and it likewise requires that he be advised at discharge relative to the effect of any reaffirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d)(1)(A) (1982). Advice of that kind is not, of course, the kind of
counselling contemplated by rehabilitation proponents.
316. See Einhorn & Hogarth, Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of Judgment and
Choice, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 53, 77-80 (1981); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 255,
at 1130. As discussed supra note 279, there is a degree to which experience appears to dilute
the force of biases in predicting outcomes by increasing the salience both of chance factors
and of the distribution of events. What that suggests, however, is that worthwhile therapeutic experience in the context of default risks is the experience of failure, rather than of
"successful" financial management (whether or not accomplished under "rehabilitative"
supervision).
317. Notably, the chief proponents of judicial "therapy" have tended to be bankruptcy
judges, see, e.g., sources cited supra note 121, while skepticism regarding the efficacy of
rehabilitation has tended to characterize the views of others in the legal community. See,

e.g., D.

BAIRD

& T.

JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY

742-43
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resistance to curative measures, efforts of that kind can most often
be characterized as pointless. Indeed, to the extent that the imposition of putatively "rehabilitative" constraints adds to the costs of
discharge, it may in some circumstances defeat the objective of relief by increasing the attractions of social insurance relative to
bankruptcy.
2. Distributive Preferences
It is similarly difficult to reconcile the existing structure of the
"fresh start" with the assumptions necessarily implied in distributive explanations for the relief afforded by the discharge. To a degree, of course, the historical vision of debtor relief as effecting a
wealth transfer from creditor to debtor31 (and, perhaps, the appeal
of that vision in some quarters) can be readily enough understood.
It may be that it is possible and appropriate in some circumstances
to advance distributive preferences by the manipulation of legal
rules governing debtor-creditor relations.3 1 9 But, as suggested by

the discussion above, 20 the discharge afforded by the Code can
rarely be expected to accomplish distributive transfers from creditors to debtors. Indeed, the only circumstance in which such a
transfer is likely to occur is the case of nonbusiness involuntary
creditor, that is, the individual tort plaintiff.3 21 In the more common context of contract credit, the creditor is the least likely
source of any wealth transfers to the debtor, and the distributive
effects of the discharge, if any, take the form of debtor-to-debtor
or

cash-customer-to-debtor

transfers.3

22

The

debtor-to-debtor

transfers, moreover, are only partially distributive in effect. Because the transaction giving rise to each such transfer involves the
prior exchange of the discharge's insurance coverage for a premium
which constitutes the source of the transfer, the transfer effected
by the discharge can fairly be called distributive only to the extent
of any subsidization of the cost of credit, that is, to the extent that
(1985); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 2, at 64 (noting that Chapter 13 debtors under

the Act ordinarily had worse postbankruptcy debt payment records than did "straight"
bankrupts); Limiting Access, supra note 171, at 1146.
318. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
319. See Kennedy, Distributiveand PaternalistMotives in Contractand Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 Mi. L. REv.
563 (1982); Kronman, ContractLaw and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
320. See supra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.

321. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
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any given debtor's cost of credit fails to accurately reflect his particular level of risk. While such subsidies certainly do occur, they
are likely to be least extensive in the most common transactions
giving rise to dischargeable obligations, namely loans by those in
the business of consumer finance.32 3 Further, even when subsidies
of that kind exist, the individuation of credit screening and the
segmentation of consumer credit markets tend to limit their effect
to debtors with similar indicia of risk, which indicia commonly reflect the individual debtor's income and wealth characteristics. 2 4
Thus, any subsidization of the cost of credit for high-risk, low-income borrowers will most frequently be at the expense of other
high-risk, low-income borrowers, while the cost of any subsidies to
low-risk, high-income borrowers will usually be borne by others
with similar risk and income characteristics. In short, the distributive effects of the discharge are severely limited in the frequency of
their occurrence, and to the extent that they do occur they appear
to follow a pattern that can be rationalized only by reference to
some highly unconventional, and as yet unidentified, theory of distributive justice.2 5
That distributive concerns are empirically an implausible basis
for the availability of the discharge does not necessarily imply that
they are wholly irrelevant to the structure of the Code's "fresh
start." Indeed, it has at times been suggested that such concerns
are significant less as an explanation for the discharge than as a
source of at least some constraints on its operation.32 6 From that
perspective, the distributive effects relevant to discharge policy are
those involving regressive or otherwise distributively undesirable
transfers, which can be minimized by particular limitations on the
availability or scope of relief in bankruptcy. As is true of distributive explanations of the discharge itself, however, distributive explanations for its limits find little expression in the Code as it
exists.
For the most part, neither the grounds for denial of discharge
nor the catalog of nondischargeable debts includes claims the dis323. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
325. Of course, to the extent that various social insurance programs reflect efforts at
wealth redistribution, one can speak of the discharge as carrying out distributive ends by
limiting the burdens on those programs. But that does not appear to be the meaning intended by those who offer distributive explanations for the availability of relief. See, e.g., C.
FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE 108-09 (1981).
326. See supra notes 65, 120 and accompanying text.
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charge of which would ordinarily entail distributively awkward
consequences. To be sure, there are exceptions, most notably the
nondischargeability of malicious tort liabilities in Chapter 7
cases327 and of family obligations both in Chapter 7 and in Chapter
13.328 While the classes of creditors thus protected may arguably
correspond to favored distributive classes, however, the correlation
nonetheless does not comfortably support an inference that the
special protections spring from distributive concerns. In each instance, the limitation of discharge can be readily explained on
nondistributive grounds. At the same time, there is no apparent
distributive basis for distinguishing between the protected creditors and other equally appealing candidates for distributively motivated limits on the discharge whose claims are nonetheless fully
dischargeable. To the extent, for example, that the discharge of
tort liabilities is distributively problematic, it is neither more nor
less so in cases of negligence than in cases of malicious injury, but
negligence claims are dischargeable while malicious injury liabilities are not. As noted above, the disparity in treatment can be sensibly understood on nondistributive grounds as reflecting a difference in relative degrees of moral hazard. 29 If, however, the
protection accorded malicious injury claimants is attributed to distributive preferences, the failure to similarly protect negligence
plaintiffs becomes simply arbitrary. The ad hoc quality of distributive explanations and the availability of more coherent alternative
rationales characterize other arguably distributive limits on the
discharge as well.3 30 In each case, whether or not distributive pref327. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), (b) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
328. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. II 1985); 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982).
329. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
330. Thus, the dischargeability of support claims assigned to private parties, see supra
text accompanying note 301, should impair to some degree the marketability of those claims
and hence their value to the spouse or dependent. From the standpoint of distributive pref-

erences, it is difficult to see the point of distinguishing between assigned and retained claims
or, if that distinction is to be made, between claims assigned to private parties and those
assigned in return for public assistance benefits.
The discussion in the text is not intended to suggest that no aspects of the Code are fairly
explainable as ad hoc exceptions to general policies. Certainly, there are contexts in which
such makeshift explanations are inescapable. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3) (1982 & Supp.
1m 1985) (special rules governing rejection of shopping center leases). The point is the nar-

rower one that available explanations consistent with an inclusive and coherent policy
framework are ordinarily to be preferred if possible to those of the ad hoc variety. In part
that is simply a matter of aesthetic preference, but it has a more pragmatic foundation as
well. Because any ad hoc explanation, by its nature, is limited to its particular context, none
offers assistance in dealing with questions of interpretation and application in other contexts. Thus, even if one were to conclude, for example, that the nondischargeability of mali-
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erences ought to shape or limit the "fresh start," there is little reason to believe that they do.
3.

Moral Norms

While neither rehabilitation nor distributive concerns are well
represented in the existing structure of the discharge, moral explanations are a more complex matter.3 31 In the narrow context of the
scope of the discharge, such explanations can readily be offered to
describe particular exceptions to dischargeability. In particular, it
is not difficult to suggest a moral basis for the nondischargeability
of fraud and malicious injury claims, s given the existence of
widely held standards regarding the ethical status of the conduct
involved. Likewise, to the extent that the prohibitions of the criminal law can be said to reflect moral norms, 3 similar judgments as
to the debtor's fault in incurring the obligation can be suggested as
underlying the nondischargeability of fines and penalites 3 4 These
fault-based liabilities are not, however, entirely excepted from discharge; to the contrary, unlike family obligations and tax liabilities,
they remain fully dischargeable in Chapter 13 cases. 33 5 From the
perspective of moral explanations, this difference in treatment is
anomalous, since the blameworthiness of the conduct creating the
liability is presumably the same in either event.
Even if one regards the exceptions as founded in moral judgcious injury claims reflects a somewhat arbitrary distributive preference for battery plaintiffs, the point would be interesting but not terribly instructive as to the contours of the
general policies that constitute the "fresh start." Since identifiable general policies of the
"fresh start" are crucial in Code interpretation, explanations that contribute to a working
general picture are not only more comfortable but more useful as well.
331. In part, the complexity is a function of the elusiveness of "morality" as a distinct
category of explanation. Distributive preferences, for example, presumably spring quite
often from judgments as to the moral quality of existing wealth distributions. Likewise, even
pure economic efficiency analyses have been dressed at times in moral garb. As used here,
the reference is to explanations founded in what are (or are claimed to be) widely accepted
notions of right and wrong, of personal responsibility, or of interpersonal "justice" that are
only remotely related, if at all, to considerations of efficiency or equality. In short, the category is in many respects a residuary catchall, and its imprecision reflects that function. Cf.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1080
(1972) ("Justice notions attach to other societal preferences which can only with difficulty
be explained in terms of either efficiency or wealth distributional preferences . . . . These
other justice notions . . . we are unable to describe in general terms . . .
332. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), (7) (1982).
333. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1-25 (1965).
334. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), (7) (1982).
335. See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
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ments, however, their treatment under the Code can be more precisely characterized not as a case of moral fault precluding the
debtor's release from liability, but rather as a matter of such fault
limiting the insurability of the debtor's conduct. As noted above,
the general uninsurability of intentional losses and criminal penalties is ordinarily based on a desire to assure the existence of incentives to avoid such losses. 3 6 In that context, the difference in scope
of the discharge between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 can be understood as reflecting an assumption that the greater cost to the
debtor of a Chapter 13 proceeding provides an adequate substitute
for the limited incentive effects of the exclusions in Chapter 7.337
What these considerations suggest is that, even if one regards the
exceptions as founded in moral judgments as to the debtor's fault,
those judgments are nonetheless subordinate under the Code to
concerns with the limited power of ex ante incentives and with the
ex post externalization of collections costs. Moral judgments may
provide a basis for creating or increasing incentives to avoid particular conduct, but it is the existence and quality of the incentives,
rather than the moral judgment, that determines the availability of
relief.
Beyond the limited concern with fault-based liabilities, a vision
of moral norms as relevant to the "fresh start" also arises in a
more general way, in the view that limits on the availability or extent of the discharge are warranted out of regard for the moral
value of one's obligation to pay one's "just debts.3' 3 8 Central to
such moral explanations is a characterization of the discharge as an
exception to the general enforceability of that moral duty, an exception that can be justified only by some morally acceptable excuse for nonperformance or by a countervailing moral duty of forbearance on the creditor's part. The existence of moral principles
of that kind is, of course, difficult to dispute. Whatever may be the
case as to the accidental injuries, 339 as to contract debts there is
certainly no shortage of well developed accounts of the moral character of the underlying promissory obligations 40 Indeed, it is safe
336.
337.
338.
339.

See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 295.
See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 311.
Compare, e.g., Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537
(1972) with R. POSNEa, supra note 135, at 119-59. See generally G. CALABRESI, COSTS OF

24-33 (1970).
340. See, e.g., H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDMON 243-47 (1958); 1.KANT, GROUNDWORK OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 70-71, 89-90, 97 (H. Paton Trans. Harper Torchbooks ed.
ACCIDENTS
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to say that, while there may be substantial disagreement as to its
legal significance, 3 41 the moral obligation to keep one's promises is
a virtually universal ethical precept. Likewise, while forbearance or
other forms of altruism are rarely transformed into legal obligations, 42 their moral value is a principle almost as widely accepted
as the moral duty of payment.3 43 At the same time, however, it is
difficult to describe the Code's "fresh start" or its limits in those
terms. If the general moral duty of payment is to be enforced in
the absence of grounds for excuse or forbearance, those
grounds-the debtor's need or the difficulties of performance-should be central to the availability of release from the
duty.3 44 Yet, as described above, the Code is strikingly devoid of
standards defining the perils insured against.3, 5 There are no express standards of eligibility, no requirements of need or inability,
and no specifications of the particular circumstances triggering the
right to relief. To the contrary, the availability of discharge under
the Code is essentially a matter of the debtor's choice. For the
debtor prepared to bear its costs, the decision to file bankruptcy is
virtually conclusive of questions regarding the necessity or propriety of the decision. That absence of a standard of need has been, of
course, the object of intense criticism in recent years, much of it
framed in terms of moral obligation.3 46 As the existence of such
criticism suggests, however, limits on the availability of the discharge in its present state have little apparent relation to the limits of morally legitimate excuses for nonpayment. Nor is the absence of such a relationship entirely surprising, even from the
perspective of moral obligation. At least relative to contract liabilities, the release obtained by the debtor is the product of a prior
1964); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-50 (1971); Raz, Promises and Obligations in LAw,
MORALITY AND SOCIETY 210 (P. Hacker & J. Raz, ed. 1977).
341. Compare, e.g., P. ATiYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 649-59
(1979) with C. FRIED, supra note 325, at 7-27.

342. See generally THE

GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW

(Ratcliffe ed. 1966); Landes &

Poster, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of

Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); see also H. Arendt, supra note 340, at 243
("forgiving.

.

. -perhaps

because of its religious context, perhaps because of the connec-

tion with love attending its discovery-has always been deemed unrealistic and inadmissible
in the public realm").

343. See, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND
338-39. See generally J. FISHKIN, THE

WRONG 114-31 (1978);
LIMrrs OF OBLIGATION

J. RAWLS, supra note 340, at
passim (1982).

344. Cf. J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 128, 129 (1961) (equating ethics with the

study of excuses).
345. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 174.

1986]

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

exchange in which, absent fraud, the risks of nonpayment were accounted for. In that context, the moral foundation of the creditor's
claim to payment is somewhat dubious. Rather than being morally
347
entitled to payment, he has already been paid.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the language of moral rights
and obligations has long had an undeniable rhetorical significance
in disputes over the appropriate shape of discharge rights. The
staying power of that rhetoric suggests a somewhat different role
for moral norms in the structure of the "fresh start." As described
above, the absence of specific standards defining eligibility for
bankruptcy can be understood as the product of the intractable
difficulties inherent in identifying the degree of protection required
3 48
to effectively minimize the externalization of collections costs.
One consequence of an undiscriminating policy is, however, the opportunity that it creates for debtors to resort to the discharge
when financial or other burdens of payment are slight and the risks
of externalization are low. Given the impractability of direct control by way of specific standards, that form of moral hazard cannot
be eliminated, but it can be reduced. The primary means of doing
so is the imposition of costs on the insured debtor in order to limit
the ease with which relief can be sought. 349 While the costs may
impose financial burdens, as in the requirement that the debtor
surrender assets or income as a condition of relief, there are other,
nonmonetary, controls. One variety of such nonmonetary costs is
the "stigma" (that is, the postbankruptcy loss of creditworthiness
or social standing) traditionally thought to be associated with
bankruptcy.3 5 0 A second form of control is the debtor's own sense
of moral obligation regarding the payment of dischargeable
debts. 51 To a degree, of course, and particularly relative to
347. The debtor himself may not be the source of the payment, but from the perspective
of the creditor's moral claims, that is immaterial. From the perspective of those who are the
source of the payment (primarily other borrowers), the role of exchange in the creation of
the liability likewise suggests a somewhat more limited range for moral argument, since the
contribution of those other borrowers to the debtor's loss has in some degree been compensated for by the similar insurance coverage afforded them. That would not be the case, of
course, to the extent that the compulsory nature of the insurance limits the existence of
perfect equivalence between the premium paid by any other borrower and the value to him
of the risk reduction accomplished by the availability of discharge. See supra note 217.
348. See supra notes 303-09 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966); Cover, supra note
69, at 90-91; LoPucki, supra note 176, 373-78.
351. See Arrow, supra note 223, at 538; Shuchman, supra note 97, at 456.
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postbankruptcy credit, the stigma of bankruptcy is simply the
product of economic judgments.3 52 But to the extent that it goes
beyond that and reflects community moral standards, it shares
common features with the debtor's own internalized moral judgments. In both cases, the role of moral standards is not to provide
a rationale for limits on the availability of relief. It is, rather, the
standards themselves that are the limits. Whether individually
held or socially imposed, the very existence of such standards adds
to the costs of claiming relief and thus raises the threshold degree
to which the debtor must find payment burdensome before he will
choose discharge as an alternative.
The role of moral norms as instrumental in the reduction of
moral hazard is not, however, an unmixed blessing. Both the existence and the extent of postbankuptcy social stigma have long
been matters of doubt. 53 Moreover, even when they do exist,
neither stigma nor individual moral standards are terribly susceptible of measurement in any meaningful way.354 At the same time,
as already noted, there are substantial difficulties involved in identifying the precise degree of relief from payment burdens that is
required to minimize the externalization of the employment costs
of collections activity.3 55 A primary consequence of these uncertainties is the limited predictability of the incentive effects of
moral standards. At an extreme, it can probably be said with confidence that a universal posture of unqualified moral hostility to use
of the discharge would defeat its social function, both by excessively limiting its use and by imposing externalizable postbankruptcy costs even on those who did use it. Short of that, however,
the extent to which moral norms limit the attractiveness of bankruptcy is essentially a matter of conjecture, and one can likewise
352. That is, the judgments relative to credit reflect the perceived predictive power of the
debtor's earlier failure to pay. See, e.g., Allen, The Prevention of Default, 36 J. FIN. 271
(1981); Hassler, Myers & Seldin, Payment History as a Predictor of Credit Risk, 47 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 383 (1963).
353. See, e.g., Reform Act Hearings, supra note 170, at 19, 21 (stigma regarded as de
minimis); LoPucki, supra note 176, at 373-78 (treating stigma as essentially limited to impaired credit). Even as to postbankruptcy creditworthiness, it is not entirely clear that a
bankruptcy filing impairs one's ability to obtain new loans. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH,
supra note 2, at 62-65.
354. For an interesting, but hardly adequate, effort at measurement, see Reform Act
Hearings, supra note 170, at 19, 20 (survey of bankrupt debtors' opinions on "major social
impacts" of bankruptcy).
355. See supra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
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only guess at whether the costs they impose are useful or
counterproductive.
These uncertainties suggest the basis for the Code's somewhat
ambivalent response to the role of moral norms. In general, where
the externalization of employment costs is reasonably direct and
predictable, the Code limits both the imposition of external moral
standards (as in the prohibition of discrimination by employers
and government agencies) 356 and the debtor's capacity to honor his
own moral judgments (as in the limited power to reaffirm dischargeable debts).5 7 In other circumstances, however, the Code refrains from interfering in or adding to the imposition of costs by
the enforcement of moral norms, whether the imposition is accomplished by others or by the debtor himself. The policy judgment
underlying that approach is in many respects similar to the judgment at the base of the failure to establish specific criteria of need
for the discharge. Given the difficulties in ascertaining and predicting the relevant incentives, and in the absence of identifiable externalities or incompetence, the unregulated choice of the participants is as likely as any other device to produce the socially
appropriate result.
4. The Collections Function and Payments to Creditors
A final concern sometimes advanced as influencing the contours
of the consumer "fresh start" is the historical role of the bankruptcy system as a collections device used to secure payments to
356. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982 & Supp. I 1985).
357. Id. § 524(c), (d). The shifting legislative treatment of reaffirmations is a particularly
useful illustration of the problem of accounting for moral costs. As originally enacted, the
Code provided that most reaffirmations were unenforceable unless approved by the court
prior to discharge as "not imposing an undue hardship" and "in the best interest of the
debtor." See supra note 168. Almost without exception, the bankruptcy courts construed
"best interest" as meaning "financial or economic best interest" and thus refused to approve
reaffirmations motivated by the debtors' sense of moral obligation, whether to creditors or
to family members who had given guarantees. See, e.g., In re Leonard, 12 Bankr. 91 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1981); In re Berkich, 7 Bankr. 483 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Avis, 3 Bankr. 205
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). In 1984, the requirement of court approval was deleted for debtors
represented by counsel, and in its place was substituted a requirement that counsel certify
the agreement as "fully informed and voluntary" and "not an undue hardship." 11 U.S.C. §
524(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985). Apart from questions as to the wisdom of shifting the
decisional responsibility to lawyers, see Morris, supra note 196, at 106-07, the shift away
from judges and the deletion of the "best interest" standard can reasonably be taken as an
indication that the judicial treatment of reaffirmations was viewed as unduly constraining,
and that greater room was needed for debtors to make their own judgments as to the value
of nonmonetary gains and losses.

144
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creditors.3 58 In the context of consumer bankruptcies, that distinct
function is occasionally described as embodying an independent
policy concern for creditor payment that must be "balanced"
against the "fresh start" policy to determine the extent of particular discharge rights."' As a framework for interpretation, of course,
that approach has the advantage of the flexible vagueness which
tends to characterize the use of "balancing" standards in legal discourse generally. Nonetheless, the approach is flawed as a description of bankruptcy policy. To the extent that it rests on an inference from the institutional arrangements for administering the
discharge, it appears to misconceive the relationship between the
collections and discharge functions of the bankruptcy system. To
the extent that it rests on a more general social policy favoring the
collection of debts, it adds nothing coherent to the existing Code
accommodation of that policy with the concerns underlying discharge rights.
As described in Part II, the combination of the bankruptcy systems collections and discharge functions in a single institutional
framework is largely an accident of constitutional history, rather
than the product of deliberate choice.36 0 But the two functions are
not wholly unrelated. In the administration of the discharge, a requirement that the debtor surrender some assets to creditors is an
important means of controlling moral hazard. To the extent that
the imposition of that cost does produce payments for creditors,
there are obvious advantages in distributing the dividends by
means of an existing, nonduplicative collections system.36 1 From
the perspective of discharge policy, however, the relevant point is
the imposition of costs on the debtor, not the production of a payment to creditors.3 62 Likewise, the focus of the distribution is not
the relationship between debtor and creditors, but rather the relationship among creditors themselves. 6 3 Indeed, that policy of equity in distribution is the central point of the collections function
of bankruptcy, distinguishing it from the wide variety of individual
358. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1974).
360. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
361. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 1396.
362. Thus, as a device for the control of moral hazard, a requirement that a Chapter 13
debtor be divested of three-years worth of disposable income has essentially the same utility
whether the income is turned over to plan payments or to Planned Parenthood.
363. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor's Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982); Radin, supra note 15, at 3; cf. In re Phillips, 298 F. 135 (S.D.
Ohio 1924) (discharge denied where debtor scheduled only one nondischargeable debt).
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creditor's remedies available under state law. In the existing insititutional arrangement, that function complements devices for the
reduction of moral hazard. It does not, however, suggest that inceasing the size of the bankruptcy estate is, independent of moral
hazard considerations, a relevant factor in determining the availability or scope of discharge rights.
To suggest that the collections function of bankruptcy affords no
reason for limiting the "fresh start" is not, of course, to deny the
existence of a general social policy favoring the payment and collection of debts. Nor is it to deny that the availability of a means
for release from payment is in some respects at odds with that policy. But recognition that there is such a policy does not add to the
analysis of the scope of existing discharge rights. There are likewise social policies favoring safe driving, control of pets, and the
cleanup of toxic waste sites, each of which is arguably impaired to
some degree by the availability of discharge. 4 In each case, it
might well be possible to advance those policies by restricting the
dischargeability of debts. In general, however, as described above,
the very existence of the discharge reflects a judgment that the social cost of the impairment of those other policies is small in relation to the social value of avoiding opportunities for the externalization of collections costs.365 In the larger context of legal rules and
sanctions generally, that is, one can speak coherently of striking a
balance between competing policies. In the narrow context of the
discharge, however, the balance has already been struck.
So too, a generalized policy favoring collection of debts, standing
3 66
alone, would justify virtually any limitation of discharge rights.
To provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate limitations, the collections policy must be
more precisely defined: for example, that collection is favored in
the absence of employment externalities, or only to the extent that
a debtor is able to pay. Cast in those terms, however, the description merely restates the policy concerns that warrant the existence
of the discharge. The pertinent considerations are the reasons for
364. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (toxic waste liabilities dischargeable); Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (automobile accident liabilities); In re Quezada, 718 F.2d
121 (5th Cir. 1983) (dog bite liabilities).
365. See supra notes 263, 295 and accompanying text.
366. See Rejoinder, supra note 171, at 1097. "At bottom, then, the argument ... is the
same tired truism: the more limited the discharge, the fewer debtors who will go into bankruptcy. This approach to predictability would reach its apogee where the consequences of
nonpayment of debt were so draconian that all debt would be repaid ..... Id.
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permitting nonpayment, and not the social value of payment. In
short, undifferentiated reliance on the policy favoring payment is
incoherent as a source of limits on the "fresh start," and a more
precise definition of that policy simply duplicates the limits derivable from the nature of the "fresh start" policy itself. In neither
case does reference to the social value of payment make a helpful
contribution to the analysis.
D. The Bankruptcy Code's "Fresh Start" and the Judiciary: By
Way of Summary, and an Example
1.

The Theory of Discharge Under the Code

At bottom, the "fresh start" policy, at any given time, consists of
the empirical assumptions and normative judgments that underlie
the existing set of discharge rights. As outlined in the foregoing
description, the Bankruptcy Code's vision of the "fresh start" is
built on a relatively narrow subset of the possible range of such
assumptions and judgments, and the considerations relevant to the
scope and limits of that policy are correspondingly limited. In particular, the central premise of the Code's discharge rights is a circumscribed concern with the externalization to the social insurance
system of the costs of collections activity. That concern is attributable in turn to the perceived tendency of consumer debtors to rely
excessively on self-insurance in credit decisions due to systematic
errors in judgment regarding risk-creating activity. Of the variety
of possible responses to those problems, the Code's approach is an
indirect one, effectively compelling debtors to substitute for selfinsurance a minimum level of implicit insurance. This implicit insurance takes the form of the nonbargainable allocation to creditors of a part of the risk of a change in the debtor's circumstances.
The characteristic features of insurance, together with the underlying concerns for externalities and judgment deficiencies, establish the framework within which particular aspects of the
Code's "fresh start" are defined. Thus, the degree to which discharge rights interfere with consumer insurance choices is defined
primarily by the extent to which self-insurance decisions are expected to result in the externalization of collections costs. Likewise, both the availability and the extent of the compelled insurance are defined by the need to limit the adverse incentives or
moral hazard created by the existence of insurance. Those incentives ordinarily take two forms: first, a decreased reliance on risk-
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reducing behavior in advance of a loss; and second, an increased
tendency at the time a claim is made to exaggerate either the existence of the peril insured against or the extent of the loss.
Under the Code, the first form of moral hazard is treated as relatively insignificant. This reflects the empirical assumption that,
relative to credit, the risk-taking behavior and insurance decisions
of consumer debtors are not ordinarily affected by the existence of
discharge rights. The focus of predefault incentives, at least as to
contract debts, is the creditor. Acting as insurer, he is assumed to
afford a measure of unbiased risk estimation and hence more accurate risk reduction in the form of limited credit extensions. At the
same time, discharge limitations addressed to the debtor's prebankruptcy behavior are confined to circumstances, such as fraud or
malicious injury, in which there is stronger reason to believe that
incentive effects exist, or in which the debtor's conduct would impair the creditor's efforts at risk evaluation and prevention. Moreover, even as to such liabilities, the effort to control prebankruptcy
behavior is limited to imposing the ordinarily greater cost of a
Chapter 13 proceeding as the price of relief.
Postdefault incentives, by contrast, are a central part of the
Code's discharge structure. In that respect, the purpose for compelling insurance and the subsidiary goal of limiting the second
form of moral hazard are intertwined, since claims can be characterized as exaggerated or unnecessary only with reference to the
objective of limiting the externalization of collections costs. Ideally,
these postdefault concerns could be addressed by a precise definition of the insured peril in terms of the possibilities for externalization (which is to say, by eligibility standards), and by postbankruptcy monitoring to reduce the opportunities for exaggerated
claims. That course is not available, however, due to the impossibility of identifying with any precision the circumstances in which
collections costs are likely to be externalized. Instead, the Code relies on the nature and extent of the available relief as a proxy for
express standards. Thus, the most important impact of the freedom from personal liability effected by the discharge is the prevention of collection efforts against future income or the fruits of future income, which efforts would otherwise be a chief source of
externalizable employment costs. Likewise, the relief extends to
other postbankruptcy conduct-employment discrimination, informal collections, reaffirmations, and governmental discrimination-that, as a matter of logic or experience, could be expected to

UNIVERSITY

OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:49

result in postbankruptcy employment costs if left uncontrolled. By
contrast, the debtor's existing assets are protected only to the minimum extent of the basic property covered by exemption rights.
Affording some degree of protection in that regard is essential to
making the discharge more attractive than unemployment. At the
same time, the requirement that the debtor surrender his existing
property beyond that level, coupled with other, nonmonetary costs
of bankruptcy, tends to render discharge attractive only to those
for whom the financial or other burdens of payment are particularly severe. Finally, the Code excludes entirely from the scope of
relief a limited class of debts, family obligations and tax liabilities,
the discharge of which would externalize costs to the government
and neutralize the value of the discharge in reducing costs to the
social insurance system. Taken together, those costs and benefits
of resort to bankruptcy both define the effective coverage of the
compelled insurance and operate as a check on moral hazard in the
form of unnecessary or exaggerated claims (that is, bankruptcy petitions by debtors for whom the possibilities of externalized collections costs are minimal).
2.

An Illustration: "Substantial Abuse" Dismissal in Chapter 7

As the foregoing summary suggests, both the existence of the
discharge and its particular contours under the Code can be understood as reflecting a coherent set of legislative assumptions and
judgments regarding consumers and their participation in credit
markets. An understanding of the substance of the Code "fresh
start" policy is of obvious value in understanding the purposes of
and relationships among the various rules regarding the availability, scope, and effect of discharge rights under the Code. In addition, and more importantly from a practical standpoint, a sound
grasp of the detailed content of the "fresh start" policy is an essential tool in judicial administration of the discharge. Relative to the
Code or any other statute, of course, the judicial function ordinarily involves a task both more narrow and more complex than the
direct identification and enforcement of legislative policy. What
Congress enacted was the Bankruptcy Code, not a "Fresh Start
Policy Act" or a set of empirical assumptions and normative judgments, and the usual means by which courts carry out bankruptcy
policy is the application of the statute according to its terms, em.-
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ploying the conventional tools of statutory analysis.36
Within that conventional framework, the underlying theory of
discharge may be of distinctly subordinate consequence in the interpretation of a large number of Code provisions. There remain,
however, a variety of contexts in which the general policy of the
Code provides the only sensible standard for choosing among otherwise plausible but competing constructions of vague or ambiguous statutory language.3 68 Moreover, there are portions of the Code
in which vagueness or ambiguity shades into deliberate legislative
invitations to the use of undiluted policy judgments in judicial
framing of the contours of the discharge. The most recent addition
provisions 6 9 -section
of statutory
to this latter class
70
707(b)3 -affords a valuable illustration not only of the central
significance of discharge theory in Code interpretation but also of
the means for integrating considerations of policy into the administration of particular Code provisions.
Section 707(b) states that "on its own motion, and not at the
request or suggestion of any party in interest," the bankruptcy
court may dismiss a Chapter 7 case filed by an individual debtor
"whose debts are primarily consumer debts," if it finds that relief
would be "a substantial abuse of the provisions" of Chapter 7.371
The section also establishes notice and hearing requirements and a
"presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the
367. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106
S. Ct. 681, 689 (1986) ("Invocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at the expense of the
terms of the statute itself... prevents the effectuation of congressional intent."); TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned . . . the
judicial process comes to an end."). But see Balthazor v. Winnebago County, 36 Bankr. 656,
658 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984) (although not within the literal scope of the then-existing list of
nondischargeable claims, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. II 1984), liability for support under decree of paternity held nondischargeable as a matter of policy).
368. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982) (nondischargeability of claims for "willful and
malicious" injury); 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6) (Supp. I1 1985) (requirement for approval of reaffirmation by debtor not represented by counsel that agreement be "in the best interest" of
the debtor). The vagueness or ambiguity may not be apparent at first glance. See, e.g., MidAtlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986) (trustee's duties regarding toxic waste sites); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)
(special standards for rejection of collective bargaining agreements) (modified in part by 11
U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. III 1985)).
369. Another open invitation of the same class may be embodied in the "penumbra" of
the protection against discrimination, 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as discussed
supra note 285.
370. Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, supra note 7, enacting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)
(Supp. III 1985).
371. Id.
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As even a quick reading of the section suggests, there

are any number of interpretive issues that must be addressed in
the course of judicial efforts to apply its provisions to particular
cases. 37 3 Chief among these is, of course, the question of when or in
what circumstances discharge would constitute a "substantial
abuse" of Chapter 7.
A degree of guidance as to the scope of that vague and undefined
language can be garnered from the statute itself and from its legislative history. Thus, various comments in the House and Senate at
the time of enactment make it fairly obvious that the central legislative concern was to limit Chapter 7 filings by debtors whose projected available income would be sufficient to pay some significant
portion of their debts if they filed under Chapter 13 instead. 37 4 A
concern with income as a measure of "abuse" is likewise evident in
the addition of an income and expense statement to the schedules
required to be filed in Chapter 7 cases, 37 5 since that document

would appear to have no other use if it were not intended as the
basis for a section 707(b) inquiry. The section itself is the lineal
descendant of earlier proposals advocated by the consumer credit
industry that would have expressly conditioned the availability of
relief on the debtor's "need" or on the insufficiency of his future
income. 7 6 Indeed, it seems to be generally conceded that a chief
impetus for the consumer bankruptcy amendments in the 1984 Act
was the claim of the consumer credit industry that discharge was
too accessible for debtors who had substantial income available to
them.3 77 As enacted, however, the section significantly differs from
its predecessors by omitting the absence of financial need as an
express criterion for dismissal and in limiting the dismissal power
3 78
to Chapter 7 cases.

372. Id.
373. For example, when are a debtor's debts "primarily consumer debts?" See In re
White, 49 Bankr. 869, 872-73 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (debtor with single liability, a tort
judgment, not within § 707(b) since liability was not incurred for personal, family, or household purpose); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984) (whether debtor with
mix of business and personal debts falls within the section is not per se to be determined by
number or amount of each class).
374. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); id.
H7497 (remarks of Rep. Brooks); id. H7499 (remarks of Rep. Anderson).
375. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Supp. III 1985).
376. See, e.g., supra note 198. On the derivation from earlier proposals, see 130 CONG.
REC. H7491 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead).
377. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 196, at 94-95; New Jersey Study, supra note 233, at
590-91; Rejoinder, supra note 171, at 1103; see also notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
378. Cf. Rejoinder, supra note 171, at 1103 ("the provisions adopted are pale and ambig-
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That background provides, if only tentatively, somewhat more
content to the "substantial abuse" question than the bare statutory language imports. Congress, one can reasonably conclude, has
determined that, when a Chapter 7 petitioner's income reaches a
certain level, it may be appropriate to depart from the general
principle that the debtor's own decision to seek relief is the best
evidence of the necessity of discharge. When that is the case, the
debtor is to be denied the ability to choose Chapter 7, and is to be
left to obtain a discharge either under Chapter 13 or not at all.
Obviously, however, a focus on income as a primary test of "substantial abuse" serves only to begin the inquiry. In particular cases,
a number of questions still remain. What level of income, for example, calls for a finding that the debtor's choice of a Chapter 7
discharge would be a "substantial abuse? ' 37 9 Is some level of income alone a sufficient basis for such a finding, or must income be
examined with other factors? 380 Is excess income even a necessary
element of "substantial abuse," or would a section 707(b) dismissal
be appropriate on other grounds, apart from income considerations? 38 1 An answer to these and similar questions can hardly be
derived from the statute alone or from its legislative history.
Rather, whether and in what way the debtor's income or other circumstances should operate to veto his choice of discharge generally, or of a Chapter 7 discharge in particular, can be determined
only by reference to the reasons for the existence of that choice in
the first place.
As suggested by the analysis summarized above, the deference
ordinarily accorded the debtor's decision to seek relief is a function
uous reflections of the original ...

proposal").

379. In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (abuse found in part on ground
that surplus income sufficient to pay 68% of unsecured claims over five years); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (threshhold income level for instituting inquiry is ordinarily surplus income sufficient to pay 100% of total indebtedness within three
years); see In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21 (abuse found in part on ground that debtor's surplus
income was sufficient to pay 67% of unsecured loans over three years).
380. See In re Hudson, 56 Bankr. 415, 419 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (court should take
into account available income together with circumstances leading to difficulties, debtor's
behavior in the proceeding, and the like).
381. Compare In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (ability to pay is
"primary, if not exclusive" consideration) with In re Christian, 51 Bankr. 118, 121 n.3
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1985) (dictum that some forms of injustice or misconduct "could shock the
conscience of the court" and permit dismissal even if they do not "ris[e] to the level of a
ruling on dischargeability"); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 937 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("future ability to pay is the proper focus" of § 707(b) and other forms of putative "abuse"
are immaterial).
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of the purpose of the discharge in limiting his need or incentive to
rely on the social insurance system. The debtor's reliance may be
an involuntary result of coercive collections activity or a product of
the attractions of social insurance relative to the burdens of payment.3 82 In either event, a debtor's "need" for discharge is measured by the likelihood that continued enforcement of his debts
will lead to the externalization of payment or collections costs in
the form of social insurance costs. Reliance on the debtor's choice
as conclusive of need reflects the uncertainties involved in accurately identifying the circumstances in which externalization is
likely to occur, as well as an assumption that the financial and
other costs of bankruptcy are usually an adequate proxy for ex3 83
press standards.
From that perspective, the appropriate focus under section
707(b) is the accuracy vel non of those two assumptions in any
given case. Thus, if the costs of collection or payment borne by the
debtor are so slight as to create no risk that he would find it necessary or desirable to resort to social insurance benefits if bankruptcy were unavailable, there is no social point to relief. In such
an instance, discharge would be an "abuse" not simply of Chapter
7, but of the Code generally. Likewise, even when the debtor's circumstances appear to involve some degree of collections costs, the
cost of a Chapter 7 discharge may be insufficient to assure that the
debtor's burdens are in fact severe enough to entail a risk of externalization. In such a case, one can speak of relief under Chapter 7
as a "substantial abuse," in the narrower sense that the greater
cost of a Chapter 13 proceeding provides a more accurate test of
"need."
The relevance of the debtor's income to these considerations is,
of course, that the existence and extent of available income will
frequently have a direct effect on the extent of collections costs
and on the risk of externalization. A debtor whose expected income
substantially exceeds his liabilities is unlikely to forego that income in favor of social insurance, even if left without the protections of discharge. Likewise, when a prospective Chapter 7 debtor's
expected surplus income is large relative to the value of his nonexempt assets, the disparity gives reason to believe that his willingness to bear the asset surrender cost of a Chapter 7 discharge is
382. See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 307-09, 350-57 and accompanying text.
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not necessarily strong evidence of the severity of the collections
burdens that he would bear in the absence of discharge. A minimal
level of surplus income, on the other hand, suggests the contrary,
both as to the likelihood of externalizable collections costs and as
to the reliability of the debtor's choice. In that circumstance the
absence of an income cushion offers strong evidence that the
debtor's burdens are likely to become social insurance costs, either
due to the impact of unpayable liabilities on his incentive to conor as a collateral consequence of aggressive collectinue working 84
3
tions activity.
In each case, examination of the debtor's income is useful in determining whether the assumptions underlying the availability of
the discharge are sound. Of necessity, however, income considerations can play only a part in such decisions. In particular, consideration of income alone does not take into account the nonfinancial
costs of collections or of discharge. Thus, the situation of a debtor
with a substantial surplus of income over liabilities may nonetheless create, due to the nonfinancial costs of payment or collections,
a significant likelihood of externalizable employment costs. One
can, of course, imagine the somewhat extreme case of a debtor for
whom payment has become morally offensive, 8 5 but that is hardly
necessary. Even ordinary debtors with substantial income may be
largely incapable of personal financial management. Notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) their surplus income, they will be subject to precisely the sort of repeated collections activity that tends
to have an adverse effect on employment.3 8 Likewise, the costs of
a Chapter 7 discharge often include not only asset surrender but
also a variety of social, psychological, and moral burdens.3 87 For
any given debtor, the combination of asset surrender and those
moral costs may be substantial. Thus, even when asset surrender
alone would be a weak check on the debtor's "need" for relief, the
total cost of the Chapter 7 discharge might still be sufficient to
warrant a conclusion that the debtor's payment or collections burdens are in fact particularly severe and that the risk of externalizable health, psychological, or employment costs is correspondingly
great.
384. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
385. Cf. Kronman, supra note 176, at 783-84, 785-86.
386. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (married debtors with stable employment, a
combined income of $60,000 per year, and total debts of approximately $15,000 had nonetheless been unable to maintain payments scheduled through a credit counseling agency and
several creditors had recently resorted to wage garnishment for payment).
387. See supra notes 350-57 and accompanying text.
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As these considerations suggest, the determination whether to
grant a debtor's request for discharge under Chapter 7 must be
made not only on the basis of the debtor's income level but also in
view of the relative costs to the debtor of Chapter 7, Chapter 13,
and outright dismissal. It is, after all, those factors that are relevant to whether the debtor's situation corresponds to the assumptions underlying the availability of discharge rights. At the same
time, the analysis described in the preceding sections leads to a
conclusion that considerations other than relative costs and the
debtor's income should play little if any part in resolving "substantial abuse" questions.
The statutory standard is, to be sure, markedly vague. This is a
characteristic that has led some courts to suggest that "substantial
abuse" dismissal would be proper for any of a variety of reasons: as
a response to the debtor's misbehavior in the proceeding (by the
filing of inaccurate income schedules, for example); 88 or on the basis of the causes of the debtor's financial difficulties ("unforeseen
calamity" versus "a high lifestyle"),3 8 9 the offensiveness of his motives or prebankruptcy conduct,3 9 0 his putative need for the "curative" discipline of a Chapter 13 proceeding,3 91 or the equities of
particular debts. 9 2 Even as a matter of routine statutory construction, however, reliance on at least some of those considerations is
unsupportable. The debtor's misbehavior in the proceeding itself,
for example, is a matter addressed in detail by the grounds for denial of discharge under section 727393 as well as by the provision
for dismissal on account of "unreasonable delay" under section
707(a), 9 each of which establishes specific requirements for denying relief. An application of section 707(b) to punish misconduct
that almost but not quite reaches the standards set out in those
sections would, of course, render the standards pointless.3 9 5 Similarly, to the extent that particular claims are to be accorded special
treatment in Chapter 7, they are provided for in the exceptions to
388. See, e.g., In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385; In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21.
389. See, e.g., In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385.
390. See, e.g., In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21.
391. See In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385.
392. See, e.g., In re Christian, 51 Bankr. at 121 n.3 (dictum); In re Reynolds, 49 Bankr. 51
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1985) (dictum).
393. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
394. Id. § 707(a).
395. See In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 937 n.3 (Abram, J., dictum).
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discharge under section 523.396 Since the very point of the Chapter
7 discharge is relief from debts not listed in section 523, one can
hardly characterize such relief as a "substantial abuse" of Chapter
7.397 Indeed, a use of section 707(b) to protect the holders of particular dischargeable claims, however appealing they may be, appears to be incompatible with section 707(b) itself, which provides
that dismissal may not be ordered "at the request or suggestion of
any party in interest."39 8 That denial of standing strongly suggests
that creditors lack any cognizable interest in the outcome of the
"substantial abuse" inquiry.
The inconsistency of the remaining considerations with the policy underpinnings of the discharge itself is fairly plain, although
the statute is less clear. That is particularly true of dismissals premised on the debtors' prebankruptcy "exorbitant lifestyle"3 9 or
their failure to display "a sincere resolve to tighten their belts.4 0 0
As described above, the very existence of a nonwaivable discharge
is predicated in part on the perception that ex post consequences
afford little utility as a prebankruptcy incentive for debtor caution
in incurring credit obligations. 40 1 At least relative to contract debt,
the focus of the Code is on providing an incentive to creditors to
undertake preventive activities. 0 2 In that context, a denial of relief
intended to punish the debtor's lack of care has counterproauctive
incentive effects, since it does nothing to ameliorate the rik of externalized collections costs and it dilutes creditors' incentives to
limit risk-creating credit extensions.
Nor is consideration of prebankruptcy conduct warranted by the
differential moral appeal of the "unfortunate victim" as opposed to
the "extravagant" wastrel, or by the supposed rehabilitative value
of the greater financial discipline involved in a Chapter 13 proceeding. 40 3 As described above, the situation of the "victim" who
fails to insure against external events is not fundamentally different from that of the borrower with a taste for highly leveraged consumption. Both situations involve excessive reliance on self-insurance, and both are the product of the same deficiencies in
396. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982).
397. See In re White, 49 Bankr. 869.
398. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. III 1985).
399 In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21.
400. In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385.
401. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 279.
403. See, e.g., In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385; In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21.

UNIVERSITY

OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:49

judgment regarding risk.40 4 Moreover, in neither case can one reasonably expect the structured aspects of a Chapter 13 proceeding
or other "rehabilitative" efforts to have much impact on the far
side of discharge.40 5 In the absence of a rehabilitative effect, of
course, dismissal as a response to the debtor's prebankruptcy lifestyle still retains its counterproductive consequences relative both
to externalization and to the creditors' prebankruptcy incentives.
The foregoing considerations suggest, then, the appropriate line
of inquiry under section 707(b). The central question is the
debtor's "need" for relief, in the sense that discharge is appropriate to limit the externalization of collections costs to the social insurance system. As an initial matter, "substantial abuse" dismissal
is thus appropriate in cases in which the court is convinced that
the debtor's liabilities will create neither a disincentive to employment nor any risk of employment loss or of significant psychological or health costs due to collections activity. This determination
will most frequently rest in large part on the level of the debtor's
surplus income, since a debtor capable of fully paying his debts in
the short term is ordinarily not likely to be a voluntary or involuntary candidate for social insurance as a result of those minimal
burdens. In that context, the appropriate measure of a high surplus income is a capacity for full payment in the relatively short
term (a year or less, for example), since an ability to rapidly eliminate debts is what gives assurance that the debtor's situation involves no risk of externalization. 406 But even a high surplus income
is not itself a sufficient basis for a finding of "substantial abuse."
Because the risk of externalization is also affected by the nonmonetary burdens of payment, a determination that discharge is
not needed must also rest on the absence or insignificance of those
nonmonetary burdens in the particular case. Thus, even for a highsurplus debtor, the absence of indicia of nonmonetary costs, such
404. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
406. Likewise, in this context, the amount of income that constitutes "surplus" (i.e., the
amount regarded as available for payments to creditors) should be measured by the debtor's
actual spending habits and not on the basis of what would be "reasonably necessary" for his
support, since the central question is what can be expected to happen if the debtor is left to
his own devices outside bankruptcy. If full payment in the short term would require an
alteration in lifestyle, then the debtor would in fact bear some degree of payment or collections burden, and dismissal on the ground that no such burden exists would be unwarranted. At the same time, of course, a dismissal to obtain the greater assurance of Chapter
13 costs might nonetheless be appropriate in such a case, as described infra notes 408-13
and accompanying text.
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as a history of financial mismanagement or recent collections activity directed to earnings, should be a condition precedent to
dismissal. 0 7

Short of a determination that there is no risk of externalization,

"substantial abuse" dismissal may also be appropriate where the

cost to the debtor of a Chapter 7 proceeding is so low relative to
his surplus income that his decision to seek relief cannot be taken
as a reliable indicator that his debt burdens are severe enough to

involve a risk of externalization. In that context, the point of dismissal is only to deny Chapter 7 relief and not to preclude dis-

charge altogether. Thus, the pertinent considerations are subtly
but significantly different. First, because the intended effect is to
substitute the greater cost of a Chapter 13 proceeding as a test of

"need," dismissal in the absence of the circumstances described in
the preceding paragraph would be appropriate only when relief is
in fact available to the debtor by way of Chapter 13.40 At a minimum, that means that the debtor must be eligible to proceed
under Chapter 13, but one must also be able to conclude that a
Chapter 13 plan would be confirmed and successfully carried
out.40 9 Second, because the focus is on the reliability of Chapter 7
407. Because a dismissal in this context is based on the premise that the debtor will not
or cannot avail himself of relief by way of Chapter 13, the possible role of bankruptcy protections in limiting nonmonetary costs (as, for example, the effect of the automatic stay in
preventing garnishment) cannot be taken into account, as it might be if the decision were
premised on the availability of Chapter 13 relief.
408. See In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Edwards, 50
Bankr. 933; In re White, 49 Bankr. 869. At least one court has held that dismissal ought not
to turn on the availability of Chapter 13 relief, since a debtor can respond to the dismissal
by filing under Chapter 11. See also In re White, 49 Bankr. at 874-75, cf. In re Moog, 774
F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1985) (individual consumer debtor may fie under Chapter 11). As described by the court in In re Mastroeni, however, the technical availability of Chapter 11 is
meaningless in this context. Because a consumer debtor's chief asset, his income, would not
be property of the Chapter 11 estate, "an individual consumer's Chapter 11 plan would not
differ much from a Chapter 7 liquidation," and creditors could be expected to seek conversion to Chapter 7 in fairly short order. In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. at 459. Compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a) (1982 & Supp. HI 1985) with 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1982).
409. See In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933. In that respect, one must take into account the
high failure rate among even fully voluntary Chapter 13 plans at a time prior to the enactment of the present rigorous payment requirements. See supra note 2. That experience
strongly suggests caution in reaching the conclusion that a debtor who prefers to be in
Chapter 7 will have the incentive and ability to carry out a three-year regimen of living
within the "reasonably necessary" budget imposed by Chapter 13. Nor is it a particularly
sound answer to that difficulty to suggest that the act of rendering Chapter 7 unavailable
will add to the debtor's incentive to succeed in Chapter 13. As noted by Judge Abram, it can
as easily "encourage debtors in need of bankruptcy relief to delay filing and possibly incur
further debts they will ultimately prove unable to pay" under either Chapter. In re Ed-
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costs as a proxy for "need," there must be reason to believe that
the debtor's decision to seek discharge does not actually reflect severe debt burdens. This would be true in cases where the debtor's
surplus income, while perhaps not sufficient for full payment of his
debts in the short term, nonetheless comes close to meeting that
measure. 4 0 Third, there must be some significant added value of
Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 in providing assurance of "need." Of
course, the cost to the debtor of a Chapter 13 discharge will ordinarily be greater than his costs under Chapter 7,411 and in that
sense Chapter 13 will almost inevitably provide some greater assurance that the debtor's payment or collections burdens are substantial. But that greater assurance may be of comparatively little
added value if the debtor's Chapter 7 costs, financial or otherwise,
are themselves substantial already.
Thus, a finding of "abuse" requires not only a high income-todebt ratio but also the absence or insignificance of Chapter 7 costs
to the debtor in the case at hand. Conversely, in any case where
the likelihood of externalizable collections costs is apparent, as
where the debtor has been the subject of repeated collections efforts, or in which the Chapter 7 discharge entails significant costs
to the debtor,1 2 whatever the level of his income, there is no reawards, 50 Bankr. at 941 n.10. For that reason, one must be confident that the debtor will in
fact use Chapter 13 if denied relief under Chapter 7.
410. See, e.g., in re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (ability to pay 100% of debts within three
years, employing Chapter 13 "disposable income" test). As Edwards suggests, a hypothetical
Chapter 13 plan affords a useful starting point, both in assessing the relevance of Chapter
13 feasibility, see supra notes 408-09 and accompanying text, and in estimating the existence of an income cushion that raises doubts as to the likelihood of the debtor's resort to
social insurance benefits. When the Chapter 13 "disposable income" standard is used for the
latter purpose, however, the appropriate focus is on surplus income as a measure of need,
rather than on that income as a source of repayments to creditors. For that reason, it should
be immaterial whether a hypothetical Chapter 13 plan would or would not produce "meaningful" or "substantial" payments to creditor. See, e.g., In re Bell, 56 Bankr. at 641. Even if
"meaningful payments" can be made, the debtor's Chapter 7 costs may still be substantial
and thus sufficient to evidence "need." Conversely, and far less likely, even if "meaningful
payments" are not an expected outcome of a hypothetical Chapter 13 case, the debtor's
surplus may still be large relative to his Chapter 7 costs, and those costs may be sufficiently
small as to raise doubts about "need." The point is that the debtor's surplus income is
relevant, not because of its attractions to creditors, but because its size (relative to both his
Chapter 7 costs and the amount of his debts) is a valuable indicator of whether his indebtedness creates a risk of employment loss or other externalizable collections costs.
411. See supra note 295.
412. Thus, for example, a debtor with substantial nonexempt assets, or one whose exempt
property is largely subject to nonavoidable security interests, may already be paying a high
price for the Chapter 7 discharge, a price that may in itself evidence the existence of significant payment or collections burdens beyond the monetary value of the property.
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son to doubt the accuracy of the debtor's choice as reflecting the
existence of substantial payment or collections burdens. There is
thus no reason to require the further assurance of Chapter 13 costs
as a test of "need."
As may be apparent, both lines of "substantial abuse" inquiry
involve common elements. Prime among those is the need to identify with precision both the particular assumptions underlying the
ordinary rule of deference to the debtor's choice and the considerations that are material to deciding the accuracy of those assumptions in the case at hand. In addition, the inquiry requires a sensitivity to the role of nonmonetary costs and benefits in deciding
whether a particular debtor's choice is in fact compatible with
those assumptions.4 13 In that regard, there is room for a substantial
measure of judicial skepticism, or perhaps humility, regarding the
judicial capacity to make accurate individual assessments of the
present or predicted effects of indebtedness on any given debtor's
"need" for the relief afforded by the discharge. As suggested above,
the general accessibility of the discharge is in large measure a
product of the uncertainties inherent in the making of such assessments, and reflects a legislative decision to err on the side of relief.414 The power conferred by section 707(b) does not obviate, but
rather enhances, the role of caution in making firm judgments as
to the likely health, psychological, or employment costs of indebtedness in individual cases. As is suggested in part by the statutory
presumption "in favor of granting the relief requested by the
debtor, ' 415 the debtor's own choice, whether of discharge generally
or of Chapter 7 in particular, remains a valuable indicium of
"need." A decision to override that choice should be made only
when one, having taken into account the inherent limits of human
judgment, can nonetheless remain confident as to the accuracy of
that judgment in the case at hand.
IV. CONCLUSION
The approach suggested above is by no means limited in its relevance solely to section 707(b) or to other provisions of the Bank413. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933.
414. See supra note 306-09 and accompanying text. For a recent and quite remarkable
example of blithe unconcern for the limits of one's predictive powers, see In re Bell, 56
Bankr. at 642-43 (Chapter 11 plan deemed feasible for community college teacher on terminal contract, since in court's view "he likely will not be unemployed for very long").
415. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (West Supp. 11 1985).
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ruptcy Code in which Congress has deliberately legislated with a
view to the judicial identification and enforcement of underlying
policies. In any context in which policy is a controlling factor in
the choice among plausible interpretations, faithful administration
of the Code requires a clear and precise idea of what is provisions
are designed to accomplish. Such catch phrases as "fresh start"
and "honest but unfortunate" (or, for that matter, "externalization" and "social insurance costs") can be useful as shorthand labels summarizing the complex of values and assumptions that
shape the discharge. They become dangerous, however, when they
constitute not summaries of, but substitutes for analysis. As described in Part II, it is possible to imagine a host of values that
might be taken into account in framing discharge policy. The
description in Part III suggests the particular vision of the relevant
considerations that appears to be embodied in the Code as it exists. The interpretive theory described is not, of course, a universal
solvent for all problems of Code interpretation. But to the extent
that it emphasizes the importance of asking questions about the
assumptions underlying the Code, and to the extent that it offers
plausible answers to some of those questions, the description will
have served a useful purpose.

